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INTRODUCTION
T HE Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act (Act)' is now al-
most fifty years old. Conceived in the midst of the Great Depres-
sion, it has been the subject of controversy ever since.2 Critics, in a
"contest of witticisms," 3 have had much fun with the Act, calling it
the "Typhoid Mary of Antitrust," 4 a "grotesque manifestation of the
scissors and paste-pot method" of draftsmanship,5 and something
ranking "high on the list of things with which economic nonsense is
associated." ' 6 The Act's supporters have prevailed, however, and the
Act has remained invulnerable to amendment. 7
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976). The first section of the Act is an amend-
ment to section 2 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730-31 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976)).
2. W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 202-03 (1963)
("Robinson-Patman Act ... enforcement has not been without opposition.");
Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for Reappraisal, 42
Wash. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1966); Rowe, The Robinson-Patman Act-Thirty Years Thereaf-
ter, 30 A.B.A. Antitrust See. 9, 9 (1966) ("That the Robinson-Patman Act ... is the
most controversial of our antitrust laws may be the understatement of the century.")
[hereinafter cited as Rowe I].
3. Levi, The Robinson-Patman Act: Is It in the Public Interest?, 1 A.B.A.
Antitrust Sec. 60, 60 (1953).
4. Bork, The Place of Antitrust Among National Goals, Address Before the
National Conference Board, at 9 (Mar. 3, 1966).
5. Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?, in Robinson-
Patman Act Symposium (CCH) 141, 153 (1948), quoted in Levi, supra note 3, at 60.
6. Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 Antitrust L.J. 18, 22 (1976).
7. As Congressman Patman noted shortly before his death:
This law has stood the test of time. It has repeatedly been attacked and after
each encounter with its detractors, this statute has emerged stronger than
1114 [Vol. 51
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In 1975 this invulnerability was threatened when President Ford
and the Department of Justice (Department) launched a public attack
upon the Act." Unlike the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Com-
mission), which had historically supported the Act, 9 the Department
had neither supported nor criticized the Act; it had simply ignored
it. ' 0 When pressed to explain its lack of enforcement, the Department
cited its division of labor agreement with the FTC rather than express-
ing any policy dissatisfaction with the Act." The change in its public
position in 1975 was therefore surprising, especially when the Depart-
ment suggested not only amendment, 12 but also outright repeal of the
Act 3 -a course that few of the Act's critics had endorsed.' 4
ever, and it still stands as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar-a bulwark of
protection for the 9 / million small entrepreneurs of this great Nation of
ours.
Recent Efforts to Amend or Repeal the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings Before the
Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Antitrust, The Robinson-Patman Act, and Related Matters of
the House Comm. on Small Business [pt. 1], 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as Recent Efforts Hearings].
One strong critic of the Act has admitted that "[a]lmost all of the fatigued,
frustrated, and fulminating critics eventually admit that this statute seems invulnera-
ble to amendment." Austern, Isn't Thirty Years Enough?, 30 A.B.A. Antitrust Sec.
18, 25 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Austern I].
8. Within a period of seven months the President, the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division and two of his assistants all made statements attacking the Act. The Presi-
dent stated:
The Robinson-Patman Act is a leading example of [a law] which restrain[s]
competition and den[ies] buyers substantial savings .... It discourages both
large and small firms from cutting prices, and it also makes it harder for
them to expand into new markets and to pass on to customers the cost-
savings on large orders.
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
1975 Pub. Papers 598, 603 (Apr. 28, 1975); see Rose, The Robinson-Patman Act: A
Misguided Response to the A & P, Address before the Legal Comm. of the Grocery
Manufacturers of Am. (Oct. 29, 1975).
9. See infra notes 312-18 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 327-44 and accompanying text.
11. See Price Discrimination in Dairy Products: Hearings Before a Special Sub-
comm. of the House Select Comm. on Small Business [pt. III], 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
678 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Dairy Price Discrimination Hearings]; Recent Efforts
Hearings [pt. 1], supra note 7, at 598-99.
12. The Department suggested two alternative legislative amendments: enact-
ment of a "Predatory Practices Act" (Appendix A) to protect seller-level or primary-
line competition only; or enactment of a "Robinson-Patman Act Reform Statute"
(Appendix B) to protect both primary-line and buyer-level or secondary-line compe-
tition.
13. The Department suggested repealing the Act and relying instead on § 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), to reach predatory pricing. One
Antitrust Division official stated "[i]n my personal view, outright repeal is probably
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The Justice Department initiative was met by an immediate coun-
terattack. The House Small Business Committee formed an Ad Hoc
Subcommittee to hold hearings on the efforts to amend or repeal the
Act. 15 The Department, recognizing that this was hardly a friendly
forum, 16 sought hearings before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee. When this effort was unsuccessful, hearings were held
under the auspices of the Domestic Council Review Group on Regula-
tory Matters.' 7 These hearings led to the Department of Justice Report
on the Robinson-Patman Act (Justice Report),' which recommended
extensive amendment of the Act. Strong opposition in the House 19 and
the most intellectually sound and economically defensible approach." Rose, supra
note 8, at 15.
14. While some critics have advocated repeal, R. Posner, The Robinson-Patman
Act: Federal Regulation of Price Differences 52 (1976); Liebeler, supra note 6, at 22;
Rose, supra note 8, at 15, most have accepted the need for a price discrimination law,
albeit a better one than the Robinson-Patman Act. See, e.g., Austin, The Robinson-
Patman-Is it in the Public Interest?, 1 A.B.A. Antitrust See. 92, 105 (1952) ("the
Robinson-Patman Act as it is now interpreted is [not] in the public interest [but] I
would not for the moment advocate . . .repeal"); Elman, supra note 2, at 5 ("the
Policy of the Robinson-Patman Act is rooted in a justifiable ethic"); Handler,
Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 415, 457 (1973) ("I have never
been one who advocated the repeal of Robinson-Patman .... A price discrimina-
tion law, grounded in common sense and having proper economic objectives, could
serve a very useful function.").
15. Recent Efforts Hearings, supra note 7.
16. If there was any doubt about the Small Business Committee's views, it was
dispelled by the Committee Chairman's statement in the announcement of the for-
mation of the Subcommittee that "[t]his landmark Act should be retained, continued
and enforced." Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. I], supra note 7, at 1.
The Department's fears that it would not receive a fair hearing proved to be
justified. As noted in the Report of the Recent Efforts Hearings:
Based upon preconceived notions about the Robinson-Patman Act, [the]
opportunity [for an objective and impartial evaluation] was not afforded
the Ad Hoc Subcommittee .... The hearings ... were so one sided as to
make it impossible to believe anyone can honestly think otherwise. Thirty
non-government witnesses appeared before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee and
not one of them advocated weakening or repealing the Robinson-Patman
Act. . . . How an objective study can be made of anything, let alone a
controversial piece of legislation, by only hearing from one side is beyond
our understanding.
H.R. Rep. No. 1738, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1976) (additional views of Hon. M.
Caldwell Butler, Hon. Thomas N. Hiness, and William F. Coodling). Also, for some
unexplained reason the opponents of the Act received their invitations to testify only
days before the scheduled time or even after the scheduled time, while those favoring
the Act received them weeks before. Id. at 135-36.
17. See United States Dep't of Justice, Report on the Robinson-Patman Act
preamble (1977) [hereinafter cited as Justice Report].
18. Id.
19. The House Ad Hoc Committee produced a report supporting the Act. See
H.R. Rep. No. 1738, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976).
[Vol. 51
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a change in Administrations, however, halted whatever momentum
had developed to amend or repeal the Act.
Today, the Department again ignores the Act, and again justifies its
inaction on the basis of the division of labor rationale. 20 Although it
remains a vocal critic of the Act, 2' and despite widespread recognition
that the Act is flawed, the Department appears to have no plans to
seek either amendment or repeal. As Justice Powell recently stated:
"The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both for its
effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. Although Congress
is well aware of these criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for
almost half a century. 22
Three principal reasons explain why the Act has remained un-
scathed for so long. First, supporters are steadfast in their belief that
the Act is a "fair dealing" statute that protects the small business-
man. 2 3 And unlike the effects of the now defunct Fair Trade Laws,2 4
the Act's harmful effects on consumers are difficult to show, 25 at least
to a degree sufficient to outweigh this support for small business.
Second, few people understand the complex world of Robinson-
Patman law, and fewer still care to. Consequently, the number of
20. Impact of Federal Antitrust Enforcement Policies on Small Business: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Activities Affecting
Small Business of the House Small Business Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1982)
(statement of Hon. William F. Baxter) [hereinafter cited as Impact Hearings].
21. Id. at 5-6.
22. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Lab., 103 S. Ct. 1011, 1023
(1983).
23. See Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. I], supra note 7, at 37-38 (testimony of J.
Lewis, Executive Vice President, Nat'l Small Business Ass'n); id. at 579 (statement of
Rep. Bevill).
24. The Sherman Act was amended in 1937 by the Fair Trade Act, ch. 690, tit.
VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801, which exempted "agreements prescribing minimum prices
for the resale of a [branded] commodity which . . .is in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others," when
such agreements are lawful in the state of resale. Id. Between 1933 and 1940, forty-
four states enacted statutes authorizing resale price maintenance. See Justice Report,
supra note 17, at 111. The McGuire Bill, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), repealed by,
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801, strengthened
this exemption.
The Ford Administration as part of its regulatory reform program proposed, with
support from consumer groups, repeal of the federal exemptions for fair trade laws.
Congress quickly passed the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
145, 89 Stat. 801 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1976)). Thus, since March 1976
state fair trade laws have been illegal under the Sherman Act prohibitions against
resale price maintenance. Nevertheless, during the Supreme Court's 1982 Term the
Justice Department, as amicus curiae, argued that resale price maintenance should
not be a per se violation of the Sherman Act, but should be governed by the Rule of
Reason. See infra note 344.
25. See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
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people available to pressure for change and to educate those who
would have to change it is limited. For example, the Justice Depart-
ment could not get the Nader organization or any other consumer
group to support its 1975 efforts toward amendment, even though the
Act undoubtedly leads to higher prices for consumers.2 6 Robinson-
Patman law is difficult to understand for a number of reasons. First,
the law has no internal consistency or guiding rationale that would
suggest either appropriate analyses or results. Second, it bears little
resemblance to other antitrust laws. Third, it is rarely taught in law
school, and one has to devote many hours to mastering its intricacies.
Even those with years of experience have admitted to still being
"puzzled" by it.27 Finally, unlike other areas of the law, it produces no
devotees or disciples. No one, it appears, dwells longer than necessary
in the land of Robinson-Patman.
The final reason that the Act has escaped repeal or amendment is
that underneath the rhetoric, the prevailing attitude toward competi-
tion has been ambivalence. Praised in the abstract, competition is
often sacrificed to protect competitors, especially when the competi-
tors are small .2 Therefore, even when the arguments for change in
Robinson-Patman law are effectively made, critics must still overcome
the irrepressible but unspoken concern for competitors.
None of this is meant to say that the Justice Department's 1975
efforts were for naught, or that change in the Act is impossible. The
Department undoubtedly raised the consciousness of the bench and
bar: The Supreme Court has taken a renewed interest in Robinson-
Patman,2 9 two studies have recently been made, 30 and there have been
26. See infra notes 375-419 and accompanying text.
27. A federal court of appeals judge stated, "I am still puzzled by [the Act] after
many years." Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 233 F.2d
649 (7th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958), quoted in F. Rowe, Price Discrimina-
tion Under the Robinson-Patman Act xi n. 10 (1962); see Recent Efforts Hearings [pt.
III], supra note 7, at 101; Rowe, The Robinson-Patman Act: Elements of a Price
Discrimination, 51 Ill. B.J. 538, 541 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Rowe II].
28. See infra notes 45 & 69. See Baxter, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm. on S. 418 and S.127, the "Unfair Foreign Competition Act of 1983," at 3
(Mar. 21, 1983). In a rare occurrence, the Supreme Court appeared to recognize
explicitly the protectionist character of the Robinson-Patman Act. See Jefferson
County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 103 S. Ct. 1011, 1023 & n.39 (1983).
Justice Powell noted that the purpose of the Act was to benefit small businesses, id. at
4201 n.39, and provide them with "protection from.., competition," id. at 4201.
29. One year after the Justice Report was issued, the Supreme Court noted the
Department's strong stand against the Act. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Mary-
land, 437 U.S. 117, 133 n.26. (1978). Since then the Court has decided five Robin-
son-Patman cases including two in the 1982 Term. Falls City Indus. v. Vanco
Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983); Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v.
Abbott Labs., 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
451 U.S. 557 (1981); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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favorable developments in the case law. 3 1 There is also a new interest
in the methods of proving predatory pricing, an important concept in
Robinson-Patman law. 32
The time therefore appears ripe to fan the low flames of the Robin-
son-Patman debate. Was the Justice Department correct? Should the
Act reach its Golden Anniversary? If so, in what form? If changes are
needed, what modifications would be best, and what is the most likely
method of accomplishing them?
This Article attempts to provide both a comprehensive basis for
understanding, and a critical analysis of, the Act. Part I of this Article
reviews the origins of the Act, the development of the law to date, the
methods of enforcement, and the practical effects of the Act. Part II
explores the various possibilities for change, and suggests appropriate
amendments.
I. FORTY-SEVEN YEARS OF ROBINSON-PATMAN
The Robinson-Patman Act was proposed by a wholesaler organiza-
tion seeking protection from competition. 33 Rhetoric rather than fac-
tual or economic analysis prevailed in Congress, and the Act was
poorly drafted. For years, enforcement by the FTC was at best ill-
advised, the Justice Department consistently ignored the Act and
private plaintiffs used it to stave off the ravages of competition.
Moreover, courts for the most part "muddled rather than clarified" 34
the Act's operation. One British observer concluded that for one unfa-
miliar with the law, "there is a real danger that an account of the
case-law under the Robinson-Patman Act ... will be met with frank
unbelief."' 35 On the other hand, there has recently been considerable
improvement in courts' interpretations 36 and the FTC has shown a
greater willingness to be guided by economic principles in its enforce-
ment efforts. 37
30. I ABA Antitrust Sec., The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy and Law (ABA
Monograph No. 4) (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Monograph]; H. Shniderman,
Price Discrimination in Perspective (1977).
31. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
33. The organization was the United States Wholesale Grocers Association. Its
counsel, H.B. Teegarden, is credited with drafting most of the Act. Justice Report,
supra note 17, at 114.
34. J. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect Subcomm.
on Administrative Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 51 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as Landis Report].
35. A. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A. 253 (1960).
36. See infra notes 151-64, 205-11 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 319-26 and accompanying text.
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Why has the Act's enforcement and interpretation been so uneven?
The answer, to the extent one exists, starts with the circumstances that
produced the Act.
A. Origins of the Act
Supporters of the Robinson-Patman Act are fond of saying, "[i]f we
didn't already have a Robinson-Patman Act, we'd have to invent
one," 38 the clear implication being that the Act was a response to a
universal need. In fact, however, it is a period piece, the product of
unique and troubled times. 9
In 1936 the United States was in the depths of the Great Depres-
sion. Citizens and their elected representatives alike were looking for
answers, and not finding many. Traditional solutions did not work,
basic values were questioned, and the nation had lost its faith in
competition. 40 The antitrust laws, "the charter of economic liberty," 41
were suspended to the extent that they conflicted with the radical
approach of the National Recovery Act (NRA).42 With unemployment
high and independent merchants going out of business at a reported
rate of ten percent per year, 43 economic survival was the main consid-
eration. The Blue-Eagle economics of the day branded competition
and efficiency as luxuries, 44 and throughout the country there was a
strong populist bent. 45
38. Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. II], supra note 7, at 138. (statement of Owen M.
Johnson, Jr., Esq., Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition (quoting Paul Rand
Dixon, Acting Chairman of the FTC)).
39. One indication of this is that the states have resisted the temptation to copy
the Robinson-Patman Act, despite enacting price discrimination laws of their own.
But see Va. Code §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.9 (1974). Apparently France is the only foreign
country that has a similar statute, and it is said not to enforce it. See Rose, supra note
8, at 2.
40. See A. Burns, The Decline of Competition 564 (1936).
41. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
42. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (declared
unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42
(1935)).
43. F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 5; see C. Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law
8-11 (1959). There was some evidence, however, that the number of small businesses
had in fact increased between 1929 and 1933. See To Amend the Clayton Act:
Hearings on H.R. 8442, H.R. 4995, H.R. 5062 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1935).
44. See Justice Report, supra note 17, at 101-02. See generally A. Burns, supra
note 40.
45. Justice Brandeis summarized the populist view in a 1933 Supreme Court
decision upholding a Florida tax on chain stores:
There is a widespread belief that the existing unemployment is the result,
in large part, of the gross inequality in the distribution of wealth and
income which giant corporations have fostered; that by the control which
1120 [Vol. 51
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It is not surprising therefore that change in the traditional system of
distributing goods and commodities was viewed in more than eco-
nomic terms. For example, although some consumers viewed the
increase in the number of chain stores at the expense of small corner
stores as a competitive benefit, 46 others viewed it as a threat to reli-
gious values, 47 the ability of working people to buy food 48 and the
quality of small-town life in general.
4
In trying times issues are not always framed in subtle ways. Fine
distinctions give way to black and white, good and evil. Scapegoats
the few have exerted through giant corporations, individual initiative and
effort are being paralyzed, creative power impaired and human happiness
lessened; that the true prosperity of our past came not from big business, but
through the courage, the energy and the resourcefulness of small men; that
only by releasing from corporate control the faculties of the unknown many,
only by reopening to them the opportunities for leadership can confidence
in our future be restored and the existing misery be overcome; and that only
through participation by the many in the responsibilities and determina-
tions of business, can Americans secure the moral and intellectual develop-
ment which is essential to the maintenance of liberty.
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 580 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This
view was carried over into later years most explicitly by Justice Douglas. See United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 540-45 (1973) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring in part).
46. See S. Doc. No. 93, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68-73 (1934).
47. As Representative Shannon stated in debates prior to passage of the Act:
I am not a Sabbatarian, but I do believe in a proper observation of that
day from the standpoint of religion, rest, and pleasure.
In almost every city in this country today you will find a group of chain
stores, under the guise of drug stores, selling every article under the sun and
keeping open 18 hours on Sunday as well as the day before, the Sabbath of
Moses.
80 Cong. Rec. 8128 (1936) (statement of Rep. Shannon).
48. Representative Moritz stated:
I do not know what our family would have done when I was a child if we
had not used the book of the independent store. We used the book of the
friendly neighborhood grocery store. We waited until dad got paid and then
paid the bill. You cannot do that at the chain store. If that is radical, make
the most of it. I believe that chain stores should not only be curbed, but they
should be eliminated, because the great harm they do far outweighs the
little good they do.
Id. at 8136 (statement of Rep. Moritz).
49. Representative Nichols stated:
You know there is a certain sentiment and romance about the corner or
crossroads grocery store. There formerly, and there now, exists the skit and
whittle club. You know, where the boys gather around the stove in the
winter, sit around its red-hot fire, chew tobacco, spit on the bowl, and
listen to it sizzle, and settle the problems of the Nation, and the problems of
the community.
Id. at 8135 (statement of Rep. Nichols); see id. at 8133 (statement of Rep. Dirksen)




are found and conspiracies uncovered. During the Depression, the
prime scapegoats were the chain stores, and in particular, the Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, known to all as the A & P. 0
Independent merchants and wholesalers organized a massive cam-
paign against the "chain store menace." 51 Huey Long proclaimed that
he "would rather have thieves and gangsters than chain stores in
Louisiana." 5 2 The chains were accused of conspiring with the lords of
Wall Street and Big Business, 53 and the underlying bias was strongly
anti-New York. 54 The intensity and extent of the campaign led one
observer to compare it to "the beginnings of the Nazi movement in
Germany, where the same zeal was displayed to protect the small
businessman from his large competitors." 55 Although the comparison
is extreme, 56 the situation was certainly unique in American history.
In this climate, Congress became radicalized in its approach to
solving the nation's problems. As one authority on the Act stated:
Legislative proposals that would previously have seemed drastic
were regarded as conservative. Procedures in considering legislative
recommendations that would previously have seemed superficial
and summary were regarded as adequate. There survived from the
NRA period and from the continuing economic depression a sense
of urgency and a willingness to experiment. 57
One product of this radicalization was the Robinson-Patman Act.
The congressional hearings were surprisingly limited for a major stat-
ute, and consisted for the most part of testimony by members of
Congress or representatives of the food industry.58 No witnesses were
50. Congressman Patman testified 20 years later: "One certain big concern had
really caused the passage of this Act, the A & P Company." To Amend Sections 2 and
3 of the Clayton Act: Hearings on H.R. 11, H.R. 2611, H.R. 2690, H.R. 2850, H.R.
9487, H.R. 89, H.R. 1840, H.R. 2577, and H.R. 8395 Before the Antitrust Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1956).
51. See Justice Report, supra note 17, at 102-08.
52. Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, the Struggle Between Inde-
pendents and Chains, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1051 (1951).
53. See 80 Cong. Rec. 8102 (1936) (statement of Rep. Sabath); 79 Cong. Rec.
11,575 (1935) (statement of Rep. Patman).
54. See 80 Cong. Rec. 8111-12 (1936) (statement of Rep. Patman).
55. Levi, supra note 3, at 60.
56. See Elman, supra note 2, at 5 ("indefensible charge").
57. C. Edwards, supra note 43, at 11-12.
58. Id. at 23-24; Baker, Statement prepared for Hearings on the Robinson-
Patman Act before the Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform (Dec.
9, 1975) (quoted in Justice Report, supra note 17, at 137-38):
Congress held very few hearings, considering the sweeping nature of the
legislation. The House Committee held a short set of hearings on the origi-
nal Patman Bill in the early summer of 1935; a few more days in February,
1936. Meanwhile the Senate Committee held no hearings on the Robinson
Bill and only two days of hearings on the Borah-Van Nuys Bill in March,
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heard from the Department of Justice, the FTC, 59 the American Bar
Association (ABA), members of the bar, economists or consumers.60
Economic analysis was replaced with rhetoric. The chains were "brib-
ing or baiting their customers with real low prices while their compet-
itors [were] being destroyed." 6' It was a question of "right or wrong,"
and the chains were "wrong."' 62 Congress made no factual investiga-
tion of its own, and ignored evidence that conflicted with accepted
rhetoric.6 3
Congress made no pretense at first that the Act was an antitrust
statute. Without a blush, the original bill was called the "Wholesale
Grocers Protection Act."' 64 Congressman Celler, one of the few vocal
opponents in Congress, complained that "this is a bill that seeks to
help a very small segment of our business population." 65
An attempt to include in the Act the traditional Clayton Act "injury
to competition" standard was opposed because it was "too restrictive,
in requiring a showing of general injury to competitive conditions." 66
A "less rigorous" standard was adopted instead. 67 For Congress the
1936. That was pretty much the extent of te record developed by the
Congress.
Id.
59. The FTC's absence was especially surprising because the FTC report on
chain stores supplied the only factual basis for the hearings. See FTC, Final Report
on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)
[hereinafter cited as FTC Report].
60. Of course, at that time there were no consumer groups. As Congressman
Celler noted then: "Unfortunately, housewives and the consumer generally are not
organized. Their voice is not articulate." H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(pt. 2), at 6 (1936) (dissenting statement).
61. 80 Cong. Rec. 7887 (1936) (statement of Rep. Patman).
62. Id. at 8111 (statement of Rep. Patman). Representative Patman noted:
[T]here has grown up in this country a policy in business that a few rich,
powerful organizations by reason of their size and their ability to coerce and
intimidate manufacturers have forced those manufacturers to give them
their goods at a lower price than they give to the independent merchants
under the same and similar circumstance and for the same quantities of
goods. Is that right or wrong? It is wrong.
Id.
63. See Justice Report, supra note 17, at 126-39. Congress even ignored evidence
in the FTC Report that had provided the basis for the Congressional hearings. See
FTC Report, supra note 59.
64. H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935):
65. 80 Cong. Rec. 8108 (1936). Twenty-three years later Professor Adelman
concluded, "The Robinson-Patman Act was hardly any more than a re-enactment of
the relevant NRA codes." M. Adelman, A & P: A Study in Price-Cost Behavior and
Public Policy 177 (1959).
66. S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
67. 80 Cong. Rec. 9417 (1936) (statement of Rep. Utterback). This was accom-
plished by adding to the traditional Clayton Act standard one that emphasized injury
to the disfavored competitor. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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"immediately important concern [was] injury to the competitor vic-
timized by the discrimination, ' 68 and not injury to competition.
While this concern is understandable given the context of the times, it
supports the view that the Robinson-Patman Act is an antitrust statute
in name only.69
In fact, the Act was part of a multi-faceted congressional response
to changes in the American marketplace that threatened the tradi-
tional market structure and the political and social values thought to
go along with it.70 Other efforts resulted in the NRA, 71 the Fair Trade
Laws,72 and the chain-store taxation and abolition bills.73 No one
would claim that these efforts had anything to do with antitrust. The
only product of these efforts that remains in effect today is the Robin-
son-Patman Act.
B. Development of the Law to Date
This section is not intended as an exhaustive survey of Robinson-
Patman law. Rather, it introduces the reader to the basic principles
and some of the complexities and problems with the law that have
developed over the years. Until recently, the problems inherent in the
Act were compounded by FTC and court interpretation of the Act's
provisions.
1. Nomenclature
The Robinson-Patman Act is comprised of four sections. The first
section is an amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act.74 Thus, while
the Act has a first section, it has no "Section 1." Rather, the six
subdivisions of this section are denominated 2(a) through 2(f) to com-
68. S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
69. See Levi, supra note 3, at 61. Traditional antitrust law has had a populist,
protectionist bent to it also. See supra note 45. This was particularly evident during
the Warren Court years when the Court's vertical distribution restrictions favored
autonomy of the small retailer over economic efficiency or the interests of the
consumer, see, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), and its merger
opinions seemed to reflect a "small is good" philosophy, see, e.g., United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Justice Stewart, in dissent in Von's Grocery.
complained that "the Court's opinion is hardly more than a requiem for the so-called
'Mom and Pop' grocery stores-the bakery and butcher shops, the vegetable and fish
markets-that are now economically and technologically obsolete in many parts of
the country." Id. at 288. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
70. See Justice Report, supra note 17 at 113; I ABA Monograph, supra note 30, at
14.
71. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
73. See Justice Report, supra note 17, at 112; F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 8.




plement the nomenclature of the Clayton Act section that they
amend. The Act also contains sections numbered 2, 3 and 4.75 This
numbering has even confused experts, who have variously referred to
section 1 (which does not exist) and to section 2 (which merely pro-
vides for prospective relief) of the Robinson-Patman Act when refer-
ring to the substantive amendments to section 2 of the Clayton Act. In
discussing the substantive civil provisions of Robinson-Patman, it is
accurate to refer either to sections 2(a) through 2(f) of the Robinson-
Patman Act, or to section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.
2. Section 2(a)
Section 2(a) 76 is the heart of the Act. It prohibits price discrimina-
tion in the sale of commodities of like grade and quality when the
effect may be to injure competition at either the seller or customer
levels.7 7 Such discrimination is permitted, however, when it is justi-




Before the legality of a pricing practice may be judged under the
Act, certain jurisdictional or threshold requirements must be met.
These requirements generally narrow the reach of the Act as com-
pared with other antitrust statutes. The Act applies only if two or
more consummated sales7 9 of commodities ° of like grade and qual-
75. Section 2, which, with certain exceptions, provides for prospective relief, has
no effect today. See 15 U.S.C. § 21a (1976). Section 3, an independent, non-
amendatory enactment, makes it a criminal offense for a seller to charge different
prices or unreasonably'low prices for his products in different geographic areas "for
the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." Id. § 13a. It also
declares it to be a criminal offense "to be a party to, or assist in," certain enumerated
discriminatory treatment of competing buyers. Id. This section, which may be
invoked only by the Department of Justice, has rarely been used. See infra note 329
and accompanying text. Section 4 gives limited immunity to cooperatives. 15 U.S.C.
§ 13b (1976).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The section provides in part: "It shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly
or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947) ("[N]o
single sale can violate the Robinson-Patman Act. At least two transactions must take
place in order to constitute a discrimination."); see Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 547 (9th Cir. 1983); Atalanta Trading Corp. v.
FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1958); 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Executory sales
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ity 1 are made at discriminatory prices 2 by the same seller8 3 to two or
contracts may constitute "sales" or "purchases." See J.W. Burress, Inc. v. JLG
Indus., 491 F. Supp. 15, 18 (W.D. Va. 1980); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Tandet, 235
F. Supp. 111, 114 (D. Conn. 1964). Consignments and lease agreements are not
"sales." See Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49, 52-53
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956).
One court has held that the requirement of an actual sale was excused in a case in
which the plaintiff's failure to purchase "was directly attributable to defendant's own
discriminatory practice." American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919,
924 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951). Section 9 of the Justice Depart-
ment's Robinson-Patman Reform Act adopts this approach and states that "[ain offer
to deal only on discriminatory terms shall ... be treated as a completed transaction
for the purpose of according relief under this Act." Appendix B, § 9. Nevertheless,
whether it is good policy or not, the Fifth Circuit holding is an aberration and has
not been followed. See, e.g., M.C. Mfg. Co. v. Texas Foundries, Inc., 517 F.2d
1059, 1065 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hoff
& Thames, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1060, 1068 (S.D. Miss. 1981); Republic Packaging
Corp. v. Haveg Indus., 406 F. Supp. 379, 381 (N.D. Ill. 1976) ("Bruce's Juices is
inconsistent with the plain statutory language requiring consummated transac-
tions.").
80. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). This term includes tangible goods but not services.
See, e.g., Baum v. Investors Diversified Serv., 409 F.2d 872, 875 & n.4 (7th Cir.
1969); Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping
Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 400, 403 (W.D. Pa. 1963). A 1968 study, the White House
Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) (No. 411, pt. II) (May 21, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Neal Report], in its
proposed revision of the Robinson-Patman Act, see id. at 18, suggested extending
coverage to services for what Dean Neal later called reasons of "logical tidiness,"
Neal, Let's Reform It, 45 Antitrust L.J. 52, 58 (1976). The recent Justice Department
proposed statutes would not extend the coverage to services. See Appendices A & B.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); see FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 639-40
(1966) (milk sold under brand name and private labels which is physically and
chemically identical is of "like grade and quality"); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359
F.2d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968); Checker
Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp 876, 888-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 405
F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); Central Ice Cream Co. v.
Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 184 F. Supp. 312, 319 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d
265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). There have been conflicting views as to the exact
scope and meaning of "price discrimination." The meaning appeared to be resolved
by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), in
which Chief Justice Warren stated "a price discrimination within the meaning of
[section 2(a)] is merely a price difference." Id. at 549. However, within two years, a
leading authority on the Act stated: "Notwithstanding the broad Anheuser-Busch
doctrine as to differentials in prices paid, no price discrimination arises if the same
concessions are practically accessible to all customers, even though some do not avail
themselves of the option." F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 97 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). In FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966), the Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit on the issue of "like grade and quality," id. at 638-39, but also
remanded the case for consideration of issues not addressed by that court, one of
which was the FTC's determination that mere price differences were "discriminatory




more different purchasers 84 contemporaneously or within the same
As the opinion of the Court suggests. . the existence of price discrimina-
tion is an issue that remains open in the Court of Appeals. If Borden is able
to demonstrate that the price differential between its premium and private
label brands is not a price discrimination, the inquiry by the Commission is
at an end . . . Nothing in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., a case concerned
only with territorial price discrimination, requires an equation in all cir-
cumstances between a price differential and price discrimination. So long as
Borden makes private label brands available to all customers of its premium
milk, it is unlikely that price discrimination within the meaning of § 2(a)
can be made out.
Id. at 659 n. 17 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
In FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977), defendant-appellant Ford seized on Justice
Stewart's distinction, and argued that the rule in Anheuser-Busch was not applicable
in FLM. The case involved a secondary-line sitfuation in which all of Ford's dealers
were offered the same prices for crash parts, even though these prices differed
depending upon whether the dealer was going to use the part in its retail or wholesale
operation. The Second Circuit agreed that the rule did not apply, stating that "the
Act, as its language indicates, requires equality of treatment among purchasers, but
it does not require a seller to adopt a single uniform price under all circumstances."
Id. at 1026. Recently, the Third Circuit concurred in this view. Edward J. Sweeney
& Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 120 (3d Cir. 1980) (uniform pricing formula
applicable to all customers not price discrimination even if it results in different
prices), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). There appears to be continued adherence
to the Anheuser-Busch definition in primary-line cases, however. See, e.g., William
Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1040 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum
Prods., 588 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
Section 2(a) by its very terms applies to "indirect" as well as "direct" price
discrimination. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Such discrimination may take the form of
1) special credit terms, Carlo C. Gelardi Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 502 F. Supp.
637, 647 (D.N.J. 1980), 2) quantity discounts, see Minneapolis-Honeyvell Regulator
Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 1951) (addressing quantity discounts issue
but holding them non-injurious in this case), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952), 3)
discounts for cash payments, Borden Co., 54 F.T.C. 563, 566 (1957), 4) rebates,
Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83, 84 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd per curiam, 371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966), 5) bonus goods with regular
purchases, see National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76, 82-83 (N.D. Ill.
1945), 6) freight allowances, see Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 942, 948
(D. Conn. 1966), and 7) warehouse and distribution arrangements, Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 55 F.T.C. 1759, 1761 (1959). A court recently held that consumer
"cents-off" coupons did not represent differences in price among retailers but rather a
transaction between the producer and the public. Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 482 F. Supp. 1104, 1109-10 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); see Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co., 414 F.2d
588, 590 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1969);
National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Massachusetts Brewers Ass'n v. P. Ballantine & Sons,
129 F. Supp. 736, 739 (D. Mass. 1955); Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89, 91
(1954).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). An "indirect purchaser" doctrine has devel-
oped:
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approximate time period.8 5 At least one of the sales must cross a state
line,"" and both sales must be for use, consumption or resale within
[It] treats as the supplier's own customers, in contemplation of law, the
accounts of his distributors, whose autonomy he has supplanted by his own
activities. In such circumstances, a cognizable discrimination in price or
promotional arrangements can arise by reason of disparities between the
supplier's own customers and those customers of his distributors which are
viewed as the supplier's "indirect purchasers."
F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 57 (footnote omitted). The doctrine was first enunciated
one year after the passage of the Act by the FTC in Kraft-Phoenix Cheese Corp., 25
F.T.C. 537 (1937). The Commission stated: "A retailer is none the less a purchaser
because he buys indirectly if, as here, the manufacturer deals with him directly in
promoting the sale of his products and exercises control over the terms upon which he
buys." Id. at 546. The doctrine has been generally approved by the courts. See, e.g.,
Hiram Walker Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4, 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 901 (1969); cf. American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.)
(§ 2(d) action), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962). The doctrine has been limited by
some courts to situations in which "the manufacturer 'deals directly with the retailer
and controls the terms upon which he buys,' " FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019, 1028 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting American News Co. v. FTC,
300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962)), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1097 (1977); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1956); Windy
City Circulating Co. v. Charles Levy Circulating Co., 550 F. Supp. 960, 966 (N.D.
Ill. 1982); Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F. Supp. 58, 75 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
The doctrine has become less important since the Supreme Court broadly defined
standing to sue by private plaintiffs. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642,
649-50 (1969); cf. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1968) (§ 2(d) action).
For a recent case narrowing standing in Robinson-Patman actions, see Schwimmer v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1980) (indirect purchaser-plaintiff must
be in the "target area" of the seller's price discrimination). But see infra notes 165-84
and accompanying text.
The courts are split whether a parent company's transfer of goods to its wholly
owned subsidiary can be a "sale" under the Act, or stated another way, whether the
subsidiary can be a "purchaser." Under one view, such intra-corporate transactions
can never be considered "sales" within the meaning of the Act. Security Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 942 (1979); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hoff & Thames, 511 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (S.D.
Miss. 1981). Under the other view such transactions may be sales depending upon the
amount of the parent's control or dominion, and the arm's length nature of the
transaction or the competitive situation. See Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973,
977 n.2 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Schaben v. Samuel Moore & Co., 462 F. Supp.
1321, 1330 (S.D. Iowa 1978), aff'd per curiam, 606 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1979).
85. See, e.g, England v. Chrysler Corp., 493 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307
F.2d 916, 921 (5th Cir. 1962); Grandstaff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,421, at 76,540-41 (E.D. Va. 1978); cf. Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC,
258 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1958) (§ 2(d) action) ("the time interval is a determining
factor").
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S.
186, 200-01 (1974). The Robinson-Patman Act, like other antitrust statutes, was
enacted by Congress under its constitutional authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with
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the United States or any territory thereof.87 Refusals to deal are specif-
ically excluded from the scope of the Act. 8
foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The
Robinson-Patman Act's coverage, however, is narrower than the other provisions of
the Clayton Act and much narrower than the Sherman Act. The cumulative com-
merce requirements specified in § 2(a) limit application to a person 1) "engaged in
commerce," 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976), who 2) "in the course of such commerce"
discriminates in price between different purchasers, id., and 3) "where either or any
of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce." Id.; see, e.g.,
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1043 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); Hampton v. Graff Vending Co.,
516 F.2d 100, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1975). Under this standard, price discrimination that
is wholly within one state, the markets of which involve only local intrastate com-
merce, is not within the reach of the Act. 80 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1936) (statement of
Rep. Utterback) ("Where a manufacturer sells only to customers within the State, his
business is beyond the reach of Federal authority and is not included within the
provisions of [the Act]"). Therefore, under these commerce limitations an interstate
seller may discriminate between two or more local buyers in one state and not be
liable under the Act. See Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309
F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963). This result might be
different, however, if the goods had previously crossed state lines. Then they might
be in the "flow of commerce" and subject the seller to the provisions of the Act. See
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 237-38 (1951) (temporary storage of gasoline
does not interrupt flow of commerce); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d
971, 979 (2d Cir. 1977) (milk processing does not stop flow of commerce), rev'd on
other grounds, 440 U.S. 69 (1979). But see Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175,
180 (10th Cir.) (processing of crude oil to gasoline stops the flow of commerce), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Mowery v. Standard Oil Co., 463 F. Supp. 762, 775
(N.D. Ohio 1976) (same), affd mem., 590 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1978).
Generally, goods leave the flow of commerce when they are stored in a ware-
house or storage facility for general inventory purposes without consideration of
particular customers' needs or orders. See Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 516 F.2d
100, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1975). A recent Ninth Circuit case held commerce not to be
interrupted when goods are stored in warehouses owned by the interstate producer.
See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 879 (9th Cir. 1982). Certain
interstate sales, such as isolated "drop-shipments," may be "de minimis" and there-
fore not interstate commerce for the jurisdictional purposes of the Robinson-Patman
Act. Id. at 880-81; Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 788 (10th Cir.
1967).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). Thus, the specific provisions of § 2(a) exempt
export sales. Courts have held, however, that § 2(c), id. § 13(c), does apply to these
sales. Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 829,
834 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303, 305 (W.D. Pa.
1950). See also B. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Anti-
trust: A Comparative Guide 55 (1979) ("sections 2(c), (d) and (e), unlike section 2(a),
probably cover goods sold for export").
88. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The relevant provision states: "[N]othing herein
contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in
commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in
restraint of trade." Id.; see Shaw's Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331, 333-34
(3d Cir. 1939); Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F. Supp. 58, 75 (M.D. Pa.
1975).
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In 1938 the Nonprofit Institutions Act89 exempted from the applica-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act sales to nonprofit schools, colleges,
universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals and charitable insti-
tutions for their own use. 90 Given this exemption, a significant ques-
tion remaining unresolved in the jurisdictional area is whether the
Robinson-Patman Act covers sales to government-operated organiza-
tions of this kind.9 Although this issue remains unresolved, the Su-
preme Court in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association v. Ab-
bott Laboratories92 addressed in the 1982 Term the extent to which
sales to the government are implicitly exempted from the Robinson-
Patman Act.
The petitioner in Jefferson County was a trade association repre-
senting private retail pharmacies in Jefferson County, Alabama. The
association sued drug manufacturers and the government entities that
ran three hospital pharmacies. 93 Each pharmacy sold drugs on a retail
basis. Petitioner alleged that the government pharmacies, through a
system of competitive bidding, were receiving lower prices from the
drug manufacturers than the local private pharmacies.9 4
89. Ch. 283, 52 Stat. 446 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976)).
90. Id.
91. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 103 S. Ct. 1011,
1020 n.23 (1983) ("Whether the existence of an exemption in § 13c supports an
exemption for certain state purchases depends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to
apply to state agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in
its own right. . . .We need not address this issue here.") (citations omitted).
92. 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983).
93. Id. at 1013. The hospital pharmacies were sued under § 2(f), which pro-
scribes buyer inducements of price discriminations in violation of § 2(a). See infra
notes 286-304 and accompanying text. The two government respondents were the
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, which was responsible for the
University of Alabama Hospital Pharmacy and the Russell Ambulatory Center Phar-
macy, and Cooper Green Hospital, a county hospital and a public corporation under
the laws of Alabama, which was responsible for the Cooper Green Hospital Phar-
macy. See Brief for Respondents at 3, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v.
Abbott Labs., 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983).
94. Petitioner alleged that the three government pharmacies violated § 2(f) and
the drug manufacturers violated § 2(a). 103 S. Ct. at 1013. The district court
dismissed the action on the grounds that the sale to state governments were "beyond
the intended reach of the... Act, at least with respect to purchases for hospitals and
other traditional governmental purposes." 656 F.2d 92, 102 (5th Cir. 1981) (district
court opinion in appendix). The Fifth Circuit by a divided panel affirmed on the
basis of the district court opinion. Id. at 93.
In the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued broadly that there was no government
exemption at all, Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at 7, Jefferson County Pharmaceu-
tical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983), and that even assuming there was
some form of exemption, it did not cover sales to the government for resale. Id. at 11.
Respondents argued that there was an implicit exemption in the Act demonstrated by
the legislative history, Brief for Respondents at 8, and subsequent actions by Con-
gress, id. at 18, 34. They also argued that 46 years of state purchasing practices were
based upon the firm conclusion that the Act did not cover such sales. Id. at 30.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Powell stated that the terms "per-
sons" and "purchasers" in the Act were broad enough to cover govern-
mental bodies. 95 In support of this conclusion he cited the Court's
opinions in Sherman and Clayton Act cases construing "persons" to
cover governmental bodies. 96 Accordingly, he concluded that the
"plain language of the [Robinson-Patman] Act strongly suggests that
there is no exemption for state purchases to compete with private
enterprise."'9 7 Notwithstanding the petitioner's argument that there
was no need to look at the legislative history,9 Justice Powell ac-
knowledged that congressional intent to exempt certain government
purchases could be found if "apparent from the purpose and history of
the Act." 99 Nevertheless, he found no such intent. Noting that "'our
cases have repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption
against implicit exemptions' from the antitrust laws," 100 he concluded
that the legislative history,' 0 ' subsequent actions by Congress, 10 2
courts10 3 and commentators 10 4 offered little support to justify the
exemption. 105
Although Justice Powell defined the issue narrowly to concern only
those purchases by state governments for resale in the retail market, 10 6
his reasoning reaches more broadly and would seem to lead to the
95. 103 S. Ct. at 1015.
96. Id.; see, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 395 (1978). As to "purchasers," the Court stated:
The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "person." See
80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The Clayton
Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The pending bill does
not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or exempt any special class
of purchasers.").
103 S. Ct. at 1015 n.11.
97. Id. at 1016. It would seem that this "plain language" would also "strongly
suggest" that there is n6 exemption generally for state purchases, not only those that
"compete with private enterprise."
98. Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at 7, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n
v. Abbot Labs., 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983).
99. 103 S. Ct. at 1016.
100. Id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975)).
101. 103 S. Ct. at 1016.
102. Id. at 1019-21.
103. Id. at 1021-22.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1023.
106. Id. at 1014. As Justice Powell stated:
The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with sales to the federal
government, nor with state purchases for use in traditional governmental
functions. Rather, the issue before us is limited to state purchases for the
purpose of competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of
discriminatory prices-in the retail market.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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conclusion that all sales to state and local governments are covered by
the Act."' 1 7 Perhaps to discourage this argument in the future, he
stated the holding very narrowly: "We hold that the sale of pharma-
ceutical products to state and local government hospitals for resale in
competition with private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscrip-
tions of the Robinson-Patman Act."' 08
This narrow language, together with the strong dissent by Justice
O'Connor for four Justices, 10 9 is a good indication that there are not
five votes for any wider Robinson-Patman coverage of state and local
government purchases than that accorded under the facts in this case.
That coverage is wide enough, however, to concern state and local
government-run pharmacies and those who supply them. They might
be subject to treble-damage suits for past transactions," 0 and will
probably have to alter their purchasing and sales practices in the
future. 111
Jefferson County notwithstanding, courts in general have narrowly
construed the jurisdictional requirements of Section 2(a),1 2 and the
107. Justice O'Connor made this point in dissent:
If, absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary, the plain
language of the statute controls, then by the majority's own assertions one
would have to conclude that even purchases for the State's own use or for
resale to indigents would fall within the Act's proscriptions. For, as the
majority remarks ... the terms "person" and "purchasers" are broad
enough to include governmental entities, and the legislative history is "am-
biguous on the application of the Act to state purchases for consumption."
Id. at 1029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 1023.
109. See id. at 1025-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110. The majority noted the holding by both courts below that "the Eleventh
Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against [the state-run pharmacies.]"
Id. at 1014 n.5. Petitioner did not challenge this ruling. Id.
111. Many state laws require competitive bidding for purchases by state and local
government agencies. See Brief for Respondents at 30 n.35, Jefferson County Phar-
maceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983). Yet competitive bidding
conflicts with the proscriptions of the Act. See Workshop Discussion, Pricing and the
Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Antitrust L.J. 147, 161 (1971) ("competitive bidding has
always been very hard to rationalize under the Robinson-Patman Act, whether you
look at it from the standpoint of a buyer or a seller") (statement of H. White); Note,
Competitive Bidding under the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 St. John's L. Rev. 512,
539-40 (1975) ("Bidding and price haggling are often viewed as an ideal manifesta-
tion of the competitive process .... Nevertheless, the uncertainties which the Ro-
binson-Patman Act present may discourage the use of these pro-competitive devices
Moreover, the Supreme Court undoubtedly recognized that its holding would
affect present purchasing policies because it specifically recognized that its interpre-
tation would provide "protection from the competition of [state and local agencies],"
103 S. Ct. at 1023, for the "benefit of small, private retailers," id. at n.39.
112. See supra notes 79-88.
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law concerning these jurisdictional requirements has not been subject
to much criticism. Rather, the application of a broad injury-to-com-
petition test,1 3 and the judicially restricted availability of the defenses
set forth in sections 2(a) and 2(b),1 4 have drawn the most fire. In this
regard, the courts' narrow application of the jurisdictional require-
ments has been a favorable development for critics in that it has
limited the reach and application of the Act.
b. Competitive-injury test
Robinson-Patman cases are divided into categories based upon the
distribution level of the competitor who claims injury. The two most
common classifications are "primary-line" and "secondary-line." Pri-
mary-line cases involve competitors of the seller;" 5 secondary-line
cases involve competitors of the favored purchasers who buy from the
seller."" Third-line cases, which are very rare, involve customers of
the seller's customers."17 Expansive readings of the Act have even
created fourth-line cases." 8 Although there have been no fifth-line
cases, they would also be cognizable under the Act if there were
actually a distribution system that utilized that many levels.",9
The Act does not prohibit all price discriminations; it prohibits only
those that have a proscribed injurious effect on competition. Techni-
cally, three types of injury to competition are cognizable: 1) substan-
tial lessening of competition;12 0 2) tendency to create a monopoly;12'
and 3) injury to, or prevention or destruction of, competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of [the]
discrimination, or with customers of either of them. 12 2 The Clayton
Act provided precedent for the first two types of injury, 12 3 although
the third had no statutory precedent and was intended to enlarge the
application of the price discrimination law. 24 Courts do not generally
focus upon the statutory language, but apply instead the general
injury-to-competition test discussed below.
113. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 191-215 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967).
116. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 (1948).
117. See Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1202 (1983).
118. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 646-48 (1969).
119. See id.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1976)).
124. See supra notes 66-68, and accompanying text.
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Competitive injury is determined under an "incipiency of injury
test." The purpose of the test is to "catch the weed in the seed [to] keep
it from coming to flower."'125 The incipiency test derives from the
word "may" in section 2(a).126 Although the test does not require an
actual injury, neither does it allow a mere or remote possibility of
injury to suffice. 12 7 Rather, the test requires a reasonable possibility' 2
or a reasonable probability 129 of such injury. These two standards are
apparently fungible. 130
In fact, because of what the courts and the FTC have done, the
whole issue of competitive injury has become something of a semantic
exercise with little relationship to the results reached. Perhaps because
of the difficulties involved in making real inquiry into competitive
injury, courts and the FTC have avoided grappling with the facts in
the cases before them. Instead they have relied upon mere inferences
to find injury.
i. Secondary-line cases
In secondary-line cases, the most common actions under the Act,
courts have made the "self-evident" inference of injury to competition
125. S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936) (report of Sen. Logan).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
127. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945).
128. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945); Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 493
F.2d 383, 389 n.13 (8th Cir. 1974); American Motors Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247,
251 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1012 (1968); Forster Mfg. v. FTC, 335
F.2d 47, 51 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co.
v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 843 (1960).
129. See Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29, 35
(7th Cir. 1976); Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163, 1174
(7th Cir. 1972); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 614 (7th Cir.
1969); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 959 (1965); American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964); Standard Motor Prods. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 51 (8th
Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 887
(1954).
130. The distinction "has become an empty quibble without operational signifi-
cance." F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 136; accord International Air Indus. v. American
Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 729 (5th Cir. 1975) ("difference between the two
formulations is trivial"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v.
FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 n.11 (5th Cir.) ("more apparent than real"), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 959 (1965). One district court used both terms disjunctively in its charge to
the jury. International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 728 (5th
Cir. 1975); see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840-41 (7th Cir. 1961);
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). But see William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
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in cases in which the difference in price is substantial or "sufficient in
amount to influence... resale prices."' 31 The Supreme Court has
recently restated this Morton Salt 32 rule as one in which "injury to
competition is established prima facie by proof of a substantial price
discrimination ... over time."'' 33
The Morton Salt rule has been dispositive even in the face of con-
vincing facts to the contrary. For instance, injury to competition has
been found when the competitors have testified that they were not
injured, 34 when the difference in wholesale price did not affect the
retail price, 35 and even when the competitor receiving the better
price performed services for the seller, the cost of which offset the
price advantage. 136
ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1042 (9th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that
standards may differ), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 58 (1982).
131. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47, 50 (1948); accord Bargain Car
Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163, 1174 (7th Cir. 1972) ("While the
bare existence of price differentials does not compel an inference of a substantial
lessening of competition, the cases go far in that direction."). The FTC has consist-
ently taken the position that to prove competitive injury it is not necessary to show
that the favored purchaser passed on the discount as a lower price to its customers.
See, e.g., Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 962, 1054-55 (1971), aff'd, 557 F.2d
971 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); Foremost Dairies,
Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 679-80 & n.11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 959
(1965). See infra note 315.
The Second Circuit has indicated that any price difference is prima facie proof of
injury to competition. See John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., 588
F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Enterprises Indus. v.
Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). Using
this prima facie rule, a district court, which awarded a plaintiff one million dollars in
damages and attorney's fees, disposed of the injury to competition issue in a few lines
in a footnote. See FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 406 F. Supp. 224,
241 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 543 F. 2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977).
132. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
133. Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverages, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (1983).
134. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 959 (1965); see United Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615, 621-22 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966); Standard Motor Prods. v. FTC, 265 F.2d
674, 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d
43, 50 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). Contra Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed,
344 U.S. 206 (1952).
135. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 959 (1965); see E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958).
136. See, e.g., Purolator Prods. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); United Fruit Co., 82 F.T.C. 53, 130 (1973). This is
true even though cost justification is a complete defense under § 2(a). See infra note
195 and accompanying text.
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The conclusiveness of this inference-of-injury rule, like other per se
rules in antitrust law, obviates any close factual scrutiny of competi-
tive consequences. Yet, unless one is willing to assume that all price
discriminations cause injury to competition, it is not an enlightened
rule. Some commentators have therefore advocated limiting its use to
situations characterized by systematic discriminations favoring large
buyers. 137 Others would go even further. Judge Bork recently stated:
If the new economics is right, there is never a case in which price
discrimination injures competition .... In the Robinson-Patman
Act, when Congress said it wanted to forbid price discrimination to
protect competition, they said it with a wink. I don't think it's a
judge's job to enforce winks. 13
The Supreme Court, however, is less hostile to the Act than the
"new economics" and has strongly affirmed the use of the inference.
In 1981, in J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp. ,39 the Court
cited with approval the Morton Salt inference of injury rule. 140 In the
1982 Term, in Falls City Industries v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 141 the
Court specifically rejected petitioner's argument that "the Morton Salt
rule should be applied only in cases involving 'large buyer preference
or seller predation." 42 Justice Blackmun, speaking for a unanimous
Court, found no economic basis for such a distinction, and stated that
only Congress, not the Court, could alter the general applicability of
the Act to all transactions. 43 There have, nevertheless, been some
situations in which the rule has not been applied.144
137. See I ABA Monograph, supra note 30, at 103.
138. Lewin, Antitrust Ideas: Three Problems, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1983, at D2,
col. 1.
139. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
140. Id. at 561-62.
141. 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983).
142. Id. at 1289.
143. Id. The facts in the case were peculiar. Falls City, a beer brewer, sold to
wholesalers in Kentucky and Indiana at different prices. The wholesalers were not
allowed to compete because of Indiana state law restrictions. Id. at 1287. Therefore
no secondary-line injury to competition was alleged. The wholesalers sold to retailers
in their respective states. These retailers, also because of state law, theoretically did
not compete. Because consumers did not observe the restriction on importing beer
from Kentucky, however, the Kentucky retailers actually competed with the Indiana
ones. Id. at 1287-88.
This then was one of the rare third-line cases, in which the injury to competition
was among the customers of the seller's customers. The action was brought, however,
by the secondary-line wholesaler, Vanco, who received the higher price from Falls
City and passed it on to its retailer-customers. Vanco had standing because the
injury-to-competition on the third level caused it injury as well. See id. at 1288.
The Court affirmed the finding that the lower prices to Kentucky wholesalers




Injury to competition is generally harder to prove in primary-line
cases than in secondary-line ones, 145 although for a period, the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Utah Pie Co. v. Consolidated Baking Co. 146
put this distinction in doubt. 147 Utah Pie and other primary-line cases
had focused on the "predatory" nature of the seller's activity and
inferred injury to competition from a finding of predatory intent. 148
Yet such intent was often gleaned from a number of non-economic
factors or factors not related to the price discrimination. 149 In short,
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's findings that "the
major reason for the higher Indiana retail beer prices was the higher prices
charged Indiana distributors . . . thereby causing the retailers to curtail
purchases from Vanco." These findings were supported by direct evidence
of diverted sales, and more than established the competitive injury required
for a prima facie case under § 2(a).
Id. at 1290 (citation and footnote omitted).
144. See, e.g., Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 178-81 (5th Cir. 1967) (private
brand and name brand competition); Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d
694, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1964) (lower-priced product available to disfavored purchaser);
American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104-06 (7th Cir. 1963) (insignificant
duration of price discrimination), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964). Contra Fowler
Mfg. Co. v. H.H. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1012 (1970); Purolator Prods. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that allegations in a complaint that competitors of
the plaintiff received a 12% price reduction, that plaintiff had sustained increased
costs of doing business, and that " 'competition by plaintiff in the photofinishing
trade has been lessened, restrained and eliminated,'" did not state a prima facie
§ 2(a) violation. Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534,
547-48 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added by court).
145. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 552 n.21 (1960).
146. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
147. In Utah Pie, the Court held that injury to competition had been proved, id.
at 702-03, because, as an ex-FTC Chairman put it:
Utah Pie's monopolistic position of 66.5% of the market was reduced to a
commanding 45.3%. This result was reached by the Supreme Court not-
withstanding the fact that Utah Pie had growing sales, had proved its ability
to survive as a "healthy and effective competitor" and to remain "a finan-
cially strong business concern"; and notwithstanding the fact that con-
sumers in Salt Lake City had greatly benefited from reduced pie prices.
Howrey, The Robinson-Patman Act: How-Not Whether-It Should be Amended,
22 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 621, 622-23 (1967). The opinion is best summarized by the
title of one critical commentary, Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court:
The Utah Pie Case, 77 Yale L.J. 70 (1967).
148. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967);
Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Lloyd A. Fy Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277,
282 (7th Cir. 1966).
149. See Austern, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive Effect-An
Evaluation, 37 Antitrust L.J. 22, (1968) [hereinafter cited as Austern II]. As Professor
Austern noted:
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predatory intent, and thus injury to competition, was found in cases
in which no economic analysis of the transaction involved had taken
place. 1 0 Since 1975, however, courts, influenced by the Areeda-
Turner article on predatory pricing,151 have begun to use modern cost
analyses.
Professors Areeda and Turner maintained that pricing above a
firm's short-run marginal cost should be conclusively presumed law-
Predatory intent... will always be found in unrelated, usually unauthor-
ized, and colored characterizations of purpose. Calling a local competitor
an unfavorable factor or a bad actor, or suggesting that he be taught a
lesson, or pointedly claiming "We can take Jones' business," or acting like
. . . Agent 007, can override the most favorable economic analysis to yield a
finding of predatory intent.
Id. at 29; see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 697 (1967);
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1334, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852, 895 (1963), rev'd on
other grounds and remanded, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906
(1965). Predatory intent could also be inferred from persistent unprofitable sales
below cost. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 697 (1967). Thus
injury to competition, through the use of double inferences, could be found from the
pricing practices of the seller.
150. Perhaps one reason for the development of these inferences is the strong faith
the courts and FTC had in the Robinson-Patman doctrine that price discriminations
are generally predatory, not cost related, and eventually lead to monopoly. It has
been argued, however, that even at the time of the passage of the Act, there were
facts available to dispute these assumptions. See Justice Report, supra note 17, at
124-39.
A more cynical view is that these inferences protected certain types of businesses
and methods of distribution regardless of the effect on competition. In any case, these
inferences were compatible with the Supreme Court's per se approach to antitrust in
general. Besides the basic per se rule against horizontal price fixing, see United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940), the Court developed per se
rules against 1) horizontal territorial restraints, United States v. Topco Assoc., 405
U.S. 596, 608 (1972), 2) tying arrangments, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 8 (1958), 3) concerted refusals to deal, Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959), 4) most vertical-distribution restraints, United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967), and even 5) vertical resale price
maintenance of maximum prices when the distributor has a total monopoly over the
product, see Albrecht v. Herald, 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968).
Moreover, a de facto per se approach was applied to mergers under § 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For over 20 years after the
passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp V 1981)), which amended § 7, the Court held every
merger coming before it to be illegal. Perhaps the most extreme example was United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). The Court's general approach to
antitrust law, however, has recently been more flexible. See, e.g., Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418
U.S. 602, 623-25 (1974); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,
510-11 (1974).
151. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
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ful, and that prices below that level should be conclusively presumed
unlawful.152 Although this test was designed to determine whether a
monopolist's pricing is predatory under the Sherman Act, Professors
Areeda and Turner have stated that it is applicable to Robinson-
Patman Act cases as well. 53 They would modify the per se illegality of
the test to allow non-monopolists to invoke the Robinson-Patman Act
defenses.154
In the eight years since it was published, the Areeda-Turner test has
drawn much comment, criticism, and a number of counter-pro-
posals.155 Though no court has adopted the per se test completely, the
152. Id. at 711-13. Marginal cost is defined as "the increment to total cost that
results from producing an additional increment of output." Id. at 700. The conclu-
sive presumption of illegality is subject to the limitation that under conditions of
strong demand, prices may fall below marginal cost if they remain above average
total costs. Id. at 712-13. In 1978, Professors Areeda and Turner modified the test to
treat the presumption of illegality as rebuttable rather than conclusive. See 3 P.
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 154 (1978). Because short-run marginal cost is
usually difficult or impossible to compute, Areeda and Turner suggest using reasona-
bly anticipated average variable cost, which approximates marginal cost. Areeda &
Turner, supra note 151, at 716. Variable costs are defined as "costs that vary with
changes in output. They typically include such items as materials, fuel, labor directly
used to produce the product, indirect labor such as foremen, clerks, custodial help,
utilities, repair and maintenance, and per unit royalties and license fees." Id. at 700.
They are short run costs; they are incurred during "the period in which the firm
cannot replace or increase plant or equipment." Id. at 701. "The average variable
cost is the sum of all variable costs divided by output." Id. at 700.
153. Areeda & Turner, supra note 151, at 727. As Areeda and Turner stated:
The basic substantive issues raised by the Robinson-Patman Act's concern
with primary-line injury to competition and by the Sherman Act's concern
with predatory pricing are identical. If the Sherman Act is properly inter-
preted to permit a monopolist to discriminate in price so long as his lower
price equals or exceeds marginal cost, such discrimination is a fortiori
permissible for firms with lesser degrees of market power.
Id.
154. See id. at 733.
155. Joskow and Klevorick advocate a cost-based rule and propose a two-tiered
predatory pricing test. The first tier analysis involves an assessment of market struc-
ture, performance and other factors to determine if monopolistic conditions exist in
the relevant market. If these conditions exist, the second step of the analysis involves
an assessment of the alleged predatory pricing conduct. Joskow and Klevorick em-
ploy a set of rules to determine if the pricing conduct should be considered predatory.
First, a price below average variable cost is conclusive evidence of predatory pricing.
Second, a price below average variable cost but above average total cost leads to a
presumption of predatory pricing. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence
that the producer possessed excess capacity and that the pricing was not deliberately
exclusionary. Third, a price reduction followed by a price increase within two years
leads to a presumption of predatory pricing even if the price is above average total
cost. See generally Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory
Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213 (1979).
1983] 1139
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
test has influenced the approaches of many courts.'-" General agree-
ment apparently exists with the per se illegality standard for monopo-
lists who price below short-run marginal or reasonably anticipated
average variable costs. 5 7 In addition, most courts agree that pricing
above these costs is some indication of legality. 15 The difference
Williamson advocates a non-cost-based rule and proposes a system of rules that
prevent a dominant firm from increasing output for a limited period after there is a
new entry into the industry. Williamson's pricing restriction rules only apply when
the industry is at least a "loose oligopoly," price reductions are over a long period of
time and demand is not declining. Under such conditions, prices are to be considered
as predatory if they are less than average total cost in the intermediate run or less
than full costs over the long run. If there exists excess capacity, prices are considered
predatory when they fall below average variable cost. See generally Williamson,
Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284 (1977).
Scherer advocates a rule of reason inquiry into all relevant variables to determine
predatory pricing. Scherer calls for a thorough examination of the factual circum-
stances in a case, particularly of producer intent and the structural consequences of
the alleged predatory behavior. The relevant variables to be examined include the
relative cost positions of the firms in the industry, conditions of entry, reactions to
entry and reactions to withdrawal by established firms. See generally Scherer, Preda-
tory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1976). Posner
finds that "proof of sales below average balance-sheet cost [total costs as stated on its
books divided by the number of units of output produced] with intent to exclude
might be enough to establish a prima facie case of predatory pricing." R. Posner,
Antitrust Law 190 (1976). Sullivan suggests that courts look to "human animus" in
market conduct. He would focus on the "traces" a predator leaves behind, such as
documents containing information about competitors. Sullivan, Economics and
More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1214, 1229-30, 1232 (1977). See generally Note, Predatory Pricing: The
Retreat From the AVC Rule and the Search for a Practical Alternative, 22 B.C.L.
Rev. 467 (1981).
156. See, e.g, Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1384-86
(9th Cir. 1983); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 87-
88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co.
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1980); Pacific Eng'g &
Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 879 (1977); National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630,
637-38 & n.34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); International Air
Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 723-25 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 943 (1976).
157. See I ABA Monograph, supra note 30, at 88. But see Transamerica Computer
Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1386 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting per se characteriza-
tion). The ABA Monograph provides an excellent discussion of the treatment given
the Areeda-Turner test by the courts and others. See I ABA Monograph, supra note
30, at 81-96.
158. See I ABA Monograph, supra note 30, at 88; William Inglis & Sons Baking
Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 58 (1982); International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517
F.2d 714, 723 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); see also Transa-
merica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp, 698 F.2d 1377, 1388 (9th Cir. 1983) (prices
above average total cost not per se legal but presumptively legal).
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between the courts' and the Areeda-Turner approaches is that courts
display a willingness to consider other factors as well.' 59
The Justice Department and the FTC each have proposed tests that
appear to give a seller even more leeway before predation is found.
The Department's proposed predation test is based on the Areeda-
Turner test' 60 but would allow a defense that Areeda and Turner do
not.' 6 ' The FTC, in its recent proposed modification of its order in
Borden, Inc.,1162 suggested that predatory pricing by a monopolist
should be determined by comparing a seller's average revenues and
costs, rather than by comparing revenue and cost in a particular
transaction. 16
3
While considerable debate regarding which cost analysis method
should be used continues, the significant result of the Areeda-Turner
article is that courts now focus squarely upon cost-based facts relating
to the price discrimination itself. This does not mean that non-price
information is not considered,164 but it does mean that the days of
finding predatory intent solely from a sales manager's invectives ap-
pear to be gone. This is a significant improvement in the law.
159. See, e.g., 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 348-50 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982);
Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 796-97 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
160. See Appendix A, § 3; Appendix B, § 3; I ABA Monograph, supra note 30, at
90.
161. Theproposed statutes add a new defense to those already in the Robinson-
Patman Act-"elimination of a competitor is not threatened." See Appendix A,
§ 4(d); Appendix B, § 4(d).
162. 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), aff'd, 674 F.2d 498 (1982), petition for cert. filed, 51
U.S.L.W. 3150 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1982) (No. 82-328).
163. Borden, Inc., 48 Fed. Reg. 9023, 9023 (1983) (Proposed Order Modification
with Statement to Aid Public Comment). This standard appears to give 0monopolist
more leeway in pricing than the Areeda-Turner test. See id. at 9031 (Bailey,
Comm'r, dissenting); id. at 9029 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting). As Commissioner
Pertschuk noted:
[I]t is important to note that, though the term "variable costs" is used, the
standard is far from the standard conception of the term. The revised order
actually prohibits total variable costs from exceeding total revenues in a
single quarter in a single sales district. This is a very different idea from
prohibiting pricing products below the average variable cost per unit (a
surrogate for marginal cost), and it leads to easy avoidance of the standard
.... In short, the idea seems to be that a potential predator must obey the
law on average, rather than in particular situations.
Id. (emphasis in original). While Borden was not a Robinson-Patman action, the
proposed proscriptions for a monopolist's pricing would apply, a fortiori, see supra
note 153, to a non-monopolist seller under the Robinson-Patman Act.
164. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the new approaches to finding predatory intent are an
important development for reconciling findings of competitive injury
in primary-line cases with competitive reality.
c. Standing and damages in private actions
Analytically distinct from, but pragmatically related to, the issue of
competitive injury under section 2(a) of the Act, are the issues of
injury, for purposes of private-plaintiff standing, and damages, under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. 165 Only recently have these issues re-
ceived much attention in Robinson-Patman Act cases. 166
The Supreme Court addressed both issues in J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp. 167 On the issue of damages, the Court rejected
the "automatic damages" theory,16 which allows a plaintiff to calcu-
late damages on the basis of the price discrimination differential
alone. 16 9 As to standing, the Court held that a private plaintiff "must
165. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 4 provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
166. Both the law of standing and of damages is influenced by the courts' view on
the substantive law involved. This is particularly clear in constitutional law, yet it is
true for other areas of law as well. Beginning in 1940, the Supreme Court, for three
decades, expansively interpreted the antitrust laws and their prohibitory effect. The
Court appeared to have no interest in restricting standing or damages. See, e.g.,
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648-49 (1969); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 118 (1969). The private plaintiff was not
someone pursuing his own self-interest, but rather a private attorney general who
served as "a vital means for enforcing the antitrust policy of the United States."
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 136 (1968).
The Supreme Court today is less expansive in its approach to the antitrust laws. See
supra note 150. Moreover, the Court appears to be less expansive in its approach to
standing and damages. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 907-13) (1983); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 746-47 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977). But see Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2547 n.12 (1982). See infra
notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
167. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
168. Id. at 561-62.
169. Earlier, the Court in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743
(1947), appeared to have endorsed this theory. Id. at 757 (a plaintiff "would establish
its right to recover three times the discriminatory difference without proving more
than the illegality of the prices"). Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court in J. Truett
Payne, however, dismissed the language in Bruce's Juices as "merely dictum" without
spending much time examining the issue. 451 U.S. at 563 n.3. Rehnquist simply
rejected the automatic-damage theory as being in conflict with the requirement of
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prove more than a violation of section 2(a), since such proof estab-
lishes only that injury may result"; 70 the plaintiff must show that it
"has been actually 'injured.' "'71 On the other hand, the Court in Blue
Shield v. McCready17 2 recently endorsed its expansive view of stand-
ing 173 in Robinson-Patman Act cases in which indirectness of injury is
an issue. 174
§ 4 that the plaintiff be injured. Id. at 561-62. At the same time, however, Justice
Rehnquist appeared to accept in Robinson-Patman cases the lenient proof require-
ments established for Sherman and Clayton Act cases generally. See id. at 568.
An interesting aspect of the J. Truett Payne opinion is the Court's blurring of the
distinction between standing and damages. The standing issue-whether the plain-
tiff has been injured-and the damage issue-how much he has been injured-are
closely related and both require causation, but they are distinct. Standing normally
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 570 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Damages in antitrust actions, as noted above, are subject to a more lenient standard
of proof. See id. at 563-68, 570. By failing to distinguish the two, the Court, by
implication, lessened the burden of proof on standing. As the Court noted, the
lenient damage standard relies in part upon
the difficulty of ascertaining business damages as compared, tor example, to
damages resulting from a personal injury or from condemnation of a parcel
of land. The vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of
what plaintiff's situation would have been in the absence of the defendant's
antitrust violation.
Id. at 566. If this uncertainty also affects the plaintiff's ability to prove the fact of
injury, as opposed to the amount, there is reason to relax the standard of proof for
standing also.
Four Justices argued, however, that the standing standard should not be relaxed.
Id. at 569 (Powell, J., dissenting in part) (joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun, JJ.). It is interesting that three liberal members of the Court would require
more proof than the conservative Justices. The case is also interesting because of the
unanimous view on issues that had divided the lower courts. All nine Justices rejected
the "automatic damages" theory, id. at 561-63; id. at 569 (Powell, J., dissenting in
part), and agreed that the private plaintiff in a damage action must prove more than
the Government must prove in an injunctive action, id. at 561; id. at 569 (Powell, J.,
dissenting in part). In effect the opinion eliminates the automatic damages theory
and it may institute a lenient injury standard for private plaintiffs in damage actions.
Because four Justices would require the normal standard of proof of standing,
however, and because Justice Rehnquist was not explicit in lessening the standard, it
may be that the ultimate effect will be merely the elimination of the automatic-
damage theory. Nevertheless, one court, in discussing J. Truett Payne, referred to the
" 'lenient' antitrust rules governing proof of injury." Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield
Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1981).
170. 451 U.S. at 562 (emphasis in original).
171. Id.
172. 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
173. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648-49 (1969).
174. 102 S. Ct. at 2547 n.12 ("Focusing on the substantive terms of the Robinson-
Patman Act, we found no warrant in its 'language or purpose' to engraft an 'artifi-
cial' limitation on the reach of the remedy to bar what the court below had termed a
'fourth level' injury.") (quoting Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648-49
(1969)).
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In the 1982 Term, in Associated General Contractors v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 75 a Sherman Act case, the Court at-
tempted to set general guidelines for "antitrust standing."' 176 The
Court rejected the use of any one specific antitrust standing theory,
such as the target area 177 or zone of interest theory. 178 Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, stated instead that "courts should analyze each
situation in light of [four] factors:"' 171 1) causal connection between
the violation and the harm; 180 2) defendant's intent to cause harm to
the plaintiffs;"" 3) nature of the plaintiff's injury-"whether it is of
the type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall"; 82 and 4)
directness or indirectness of injury to the plaintiff. 18 3 The effect Associ-
ated General Contractors will have on the law regarding standing in
Robinson-Patman actions is unclear. What is clear, however, is that
the decision puts in doubt the validity of any case that decided the
issue relying upon one theory only. 184
An issue not yet addressed by the Court is what happens to the
Clayton Act J. Truett Payne standing analysis when a plaintiff also
sues for an injunction. All private injunction actions under the anti-
trust laws are governed by section 16 of the Clayton Act. 85 Under
175. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
176. Id. at 4144 n.31. The Court recognized that:
the focus of the doctrine of "antitrust standing" is somewhat different from
that of standing as a constitutional doctrine. Harm to the antitrust plaintiff
is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in
fact, but the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiff
is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action.
Id.
177. Two courts had held that the plaintiff must do business in the "target area" of
the antitrust conspiracy; that area threatened by a breakdown in competitive condi-
tions. Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546-47 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier
Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1979).
178. One court stated that standing depends upon whether the injury "arguably
comes within the zone of interests protected by the [antitrust laws]." Malamud v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1152 (6th Cir. 1975).
179. 103 S. Ct. at 907 n.33.
180. Id. at 908. Causation is the one factor that if not present would preclude
standing.
181. Id. In the Court's analysis this appeared to be the least important factor. "We
are also satisfied that an allegation of improper motive, although it may support a
plaintiff's damages claim under § 4, is not a panacea that will enable any complaint
to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id. (footnotes omitted).
182. Id. at 910.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 47-49 (2d Cir.
1980) (indirect purchaser must be in the "target area" of the seller's price discrimina-
tion).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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section 16 a private plaintiff may bring suit to enjoin "threatened loss
or damage." 16 It appears that this standard is something less than an
"actual injury" though something more than a possibility or probabil-
ity of injury. Thus, a private plaintiff in a Robinson-Patman Act case
may be able to survive a standing challenge under J. Truett Payne by
seeking an injunction as well as damages. 187
d. Defenses
The defenses to a prima facie section 2(a) case are set forth in
provisos in section 2(a) itself and in section 2(b). The defenses are: 1)
the price differential was cost-justified; 18 8 2) the price differential was
made in good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor; 189
and 3) the price differential was made in response to changing condi-
tions affecting the market for, or the marketability of, the goods
concerned. 190
i. Cost justification
The cost-justification defense contained in section 2(a) 191 reflects
the economic premise that a seller should not be required to charge an
artificially high price to a particular buyer if it actually costs less to
sell to that buyer than to others. 92 Since the Act's inception, however,
186. Id.
187. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 491 (1977);
0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 362-63 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). Of course, to recover damages the
plaintiff would have to show the requisite § 4 injury under J. Truett Payne.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
189. Id. § 13(b).
190. Id. § 13(a).
191. Id. The provision containing the defense states:
[N]othing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodi-
ties are to such purchasers sold or delivered.
Id.
192. See H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). The House Report stated:
Any physical economies that are to be found in mass buying and distribution
... whether those economies are from more orderly processes of manufac-
ture, or from the elimination of unnecessary salesmen, unnecessary travel
expenses, unnecessary warehousing, unnecessary truck or other forms of
delivery, or other such causes-none of them are in the remotest degree
disturbed by this bill.
H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936); see also Standard Motor Prods.




interpretations of the cost-justification defense have been character-
ized by a requirement of meticulously exact data. 193 Consequently,
over the years various commentators, courts and members of the FTC
have recognized that the defense "is largely a legal mirage." 14 In fact,
Professor Areeda has asked "[whether] the cost justification defense
ought to be repealed because it is a mere illusion that entraps the
unwary and obscures from Congress and the courts the real impact of
§ 2(a).' 95
It is evident from the legislative history (of the Act) that Congress sought to
curtail the concentration of economic power in the distributive area of the
economy by eliminating inequalities derived from sheer economic power,
while at the same time not stifling competition based on real cost savings
and increased efficiency.
Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
193. An example of this is the following statement of the FTC Chairman in 1937:
Such [cost justification] information can seldom be derived from the present
books of account. Packing costs have been determined by a stopwatch. Costs
of handling invoices have been determined by counting the number of
invoices or the number of entries for a period of time and attributing to each
operation a charge based upon the personnel it took and the space it occu-
pied during that period. Sales costs have been worked out by the timing of
calls, the recording of the number of each type of call made to each type of
customer, the analysis of the comparative number of productive and non-
productive calls, and the use of various devices for apportioning salesmen's
salaries, commissions, and expenses in accord with the facts discovered.
Freer, Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 J. Acct. 480, 485
(1938), quoted in A. Sawyer, Business Aspects of Pricing Under the Robinson-Patman
Act 120 (1963).
194. F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 303; see Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC,
346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953) ("Proof of cost justification being what it is, too often no one
can ascertain whether a price is cost-justified."); Sylvania Elec. Prods., 51 F.T.C.
282, 290 (1954) (Howrey, Chairman, concurring) ("the fact remains that the cost
defense has proved largely illusory"); Attorney General's Nat'l Comm. to Study the
Antitrust Laws, Report 171 (1955) ("largely illusory in practice") [hereinafter cited as
Att'y Gen. Rep.]; Day, Pricing and Discrimination, 44 Antitrust L.J. 312, 322 (1975)
("cost justification . . .[has] proved to be of little value to defendants"); Kintner,
The Revitalized Federal Trade Commission: A Two-Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1143, 1162 (1955) ("the bright promise of the cost-justification proviso of
Section 2(a) has proved largely delusive") (at the time the author was the FTC
General Counsel) [hereinafter cited as Kintner I].
195. P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 895 (2d ed. 1974). Several reasons explain the
ineffectiveness of the cost-justification defense. First, there is the lack of guiding
principles from the FTC. In 1953 an Advisory Committee to the FTC attempted to
produce reliable guidelines so that "sellers who wish[ed] to facilitate a determination
of compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act would be able to organize their cost
records accordingly." FTC Press Release, Nov. 30, 1953, quoted in F. Rowe, supra
note 27, at 301. FTC Chairman Howrey hoped that the effort would produce
standard guidelines because, he reasoned:
[T]hen distribution cost accounting could be built into the seller's formal
books of account. This would permit business firms to keep their costs in a
form which would enable them to compute directly the distribution costs
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applicable to specific products, to specific classes of transactions, or to
specific classes of customers.
Howrey, Reevaluation of Commission's Responsibilities, U. Mich. Inst. on Fed.
Antitrust L. 207 (1953), quoted in F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 301. The Advisory
Committee's Report (Report) was published by the FTC in 1956, Advisory Comm. to
the Fed. Trade Comm'n, Report on Cost Justification (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Advisory Comm. Rep.], and contrary to Chairman Howrey's hopes, the Report
concluded that the nature of cost accounting and the data it required precluded
development of a day-to-day system that would satisfy Robinson-Patman needs and
found that "[t]he need for special studies in the event of a Commission investigation
or complaint cannot be eliminated." Id. at 14, quoted in F. Rowe, supra note 27, at
302.
The FTC has taken no formal action regarding guidelines, prompting Rowe to
complain:
[N]ot one of the final FTC dismissals of a formal proceeding to date by
reason of successful cost justification reveals an adjudication in light of
criteria or rules, either legal or accounting ....
[E]fforts at cost justification have been foiled by a reluctance on the part
of FTC accountants to formalize their criticisms and objections to a com-
pany's cost project. Although written critiques by the Commission's staff
may have been prepared in connection with a respondent's cost study, a
practice of nondisclosure has withheld the contents of this report except for
sporadic informal disclosures. Enlightenment and guidance in published
form thus came neither from the tribunal nor the staff.
F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 299-300 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Obviously,
no company would institute a costly and complex cost accounting system without
some assurance that the system would be acceptable to courts and the FTC.
Another reason for the ineffectiveness of the cost-justification defense is the ambi-
guity of the § 2(a) proviso itself. The Attorney General's Report summarized the
problem:
At one point the cost proviso expressly recognizes the propriety of price
differentials reflecting economies in manufacturing, as well as sales and
delivery, costs; yet elsewhere the proviso evidently insists that legally cogni-
zable costs derive exclusively from methods or quantities of sale or deliv-
ery-thus demanding that efficiencies in manufacturing be specifically re-
lated to distribution techniques before qualifying as a basis for permissible
variations in price.
Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 194, at 172 (emphasis in original).
Perhaps the most formidable problem with the defense is the difficulty inherent in
cost accounting, which is far from an exact science. As the FTC Advisory Commit-
tee's Report noted, cost data radiate "an aura of precision that is not warranted
[because] cost differences at best include elements of opinion and approximation."
Advisory Comm. Rep., supra, at 10, quoted in F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 302. One
commentator has observed that one must "desert the bookkeeper and take on the
techniques of the appraiser." A. Sawyer, supra note 193, at 122. Moreover, for
accountants, who conventionally deal with average costs rather than cost differences,
cost accounting is a "completely new field." Massel, The Robinson-Patman Act: Cost
Justification, in Conference on the Antitrust Laws and the Attorney General's Com-
mittee Report 197, 208 (1955). Moreover, not only are there no FTC guidelines, there
are no guidelines within the accounting profession comparable to those for financial
acccounting. Id.
Additionally, there is the practical problem of segregating costs. Justice Jackson
recognized this problem when he referred to "the elusiveness of cost data, which
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apparently cannot be obtained from ordinary business records [and which are]
ordinarily obtainable . . . only after a detailed investigation of the business." Auto-
matic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1953). The ex-chief econo-
mist for the FTC concluded similarly that "[s]egregated costs for particular commod-
ities can be ascertained easily only where the commodities sold are few, or each is
produced and sold separately from the rest." C. Edwards, supra note 43, at 593.
Although cost accounting advances have alleviated some of these problems there is
still the problem of how to allocate costs by customers, i.e., the pro-rated cost per
product of a salesperson visiting large and small purchasers.
Finally, the "exorbitant expense" of record-keeping contributes to the ineffective-
ness of the defense. Id. at 612. If the FTC would accept accounting estimates, this
burden might not be so great, but it does not. As the Supreme Court stated in
Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953):
[W]henever costs have been in issue, the Commission has not been content
with accounting estimates; a study seems to be required, involving perhaps
stop-watch studies of time spent by some personnel such as salesmen and
truck drivers, numerical counts of invoices or bills and in some instances of
the number of items or entries on such records, or other such quantitative
measurement of the operation of a business.
Id. at 68 (footnote omitted); see Freer, supra note 193, at 485; Att'y Gen. Rep., supra
note 194, at 171-75.
There has been some judicial broadening of the defense in that the use of average
cost data for similar and non-arbitrary customer groups has been permitted. See
United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 468-69 (1962). Use of reasonable approxi-
mations, however, rather than actual cost data, is still not allowed. Moreover,
Commission action indicates that a cost-justification analysis "must be done over
when a concern decides to change the boundaries of its discount classes or the
character of its discounts." Freer, supra note 193, at 486. As Freer noted:
In one case . . . the commission had no sooner examined and found not
unlawful a quantity-discount system established by a large manufacturer
than the manufacturer decided to inaugurate a system of volume discounts.
Thereupon, when certain customers complained and the commission re-
newed its investigation, the manufacturer found that an entirely new analy-
sis of his costs was necessary.
Id. And unfortunately for smaller companies, "the cost and complexity of a Robin-
son-Patman cost study does not decrease proportionately with the size of the respon-
dent." Taggert, Cost Justification Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 101 J. Acct. 52,
54 (June 1956).
Compounding these problems has been the hostility to the defense of the FTC and
the courts. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 760-68 (1969), afJ'd sub
nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971); Thompson Prods., 55 F.T.C. 1252, 1264-66 (1959). Although in pre-com-
plaint negotiations the FTC had been less hostile to cost justifications that were made
before the price discrimination and that concerned only a few products, this limited
flexibility was not reflected in the case law. Moreover, some courts have indicated
that even if the defendants were to prove cost justification, usually a complete
defense, Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 241 (1951), they might still be held
liable; see Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213, 216, 219 (9th Cir. 1962)
(dictum) (a complete defense unless Commission establishes that such defense is
"available on proportionally equal terms"); American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices,
Inc., 187 F.2d 919, 923-24 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951). But see
American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 58-59 (8th Cir. 1951)
("court could not concern itself with the question whether the system was fair and
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ii. Meeting competition
Under section 2(b), price differentials may be justified if they are
made to meet the equally low price of a competitor. 19 In Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC,197 the Supreme Court held that the meeting-competi-
tion defense is a "complete defense" to a section 2(a) price discrimina-
tion charge. 198 In theory, this defense serves to balance the Robinson-
Patman Act with the Sherman Act. 199
equitable and functionally available to all customers"). Consequently, few litigants
have successfully asserted the defense. In a rare example of a successful defense, a
district court accepted the defendant's cost-justification defense on a motion for
summary judgment. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hoff & Thames, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1060,
1071-72 (S.D. Miss. 1981). Most cases go the other way. See, e.g., Barry Wright
Corp. v. ITT Grinnel Corp., 1980-81 Trade Cas. 63,862, at 78,572-73 (D. Mass.
1981).
It appears still true that the cost-justification defense is practically unavailable
because "only the most prosperous and patient business firm could afford pursuit of
an often illusory defense." Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 194, at 173. Rowe has
concluded that the defense is "a bonanza for the accountants, but fool's gold for the
affluent respondent." Rowe I, supra note 2, at 12.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). The section provides in part:
That nothing herein ... shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case
.. . by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities
to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a compet-
itor.
Id.
197. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
198. Id. at 251; see FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 514 (1963). Meeting
competition is also a defense under § 2(f), see Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v.
FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 71 (1953), and under § 2(d)-(e), see Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 305
F.2d 36, 38 (7th Cir. 1962); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499,
504-06 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962); Guides for Advertising
Allowances, 16 C.F.R. § 240.16 (1982) (Guide 16), but not under § 2(c), see FTC v.
Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1959). Standard Oil
"sparked violent excitement in Congress," Rowe, Expectation versus Accomplish-
ment Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936-60: A Statement of the Issues, 17 A.B.A.
Antitrust Sec. 298, 306 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Rowe III], and Representative
Patman and Senator Kefauver introduced a number of ultimately unsuccessful bills
to overrule the decision, H.R. 11, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 1840, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); see MacIntyre, The Role of the Robinson-Patman Act in the
Antitrust Scheme of Things-The Perspective of Congress, 17 A.B.A. Antitrust Sec.
325, 337-39 (1960).
In any case, until recently the supporters' fears were more theoretical than real. A
"complete" defense has little meaning if it cannot be established. The meeting-
competition defense has rarely been successful, and as the General Counsel of the
FTC said four years after the Supreme Court decision, "[t]he effect of Standard Oil
on price-discrimination cases, despite the alarms of its critics, has been precisely nil.
... The good-faith meeting-competition defense has not been successful in a single
case." Kintner I, supra note 194, at 1167 (footnote omitted). The author was citing
this record as a positive achievement of the Commission. See id. at 1166-68.
199. Rowe, Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Antitrust L.J. 98, 98 (1971)
("Section 2(b). . . has been the prime axis for accommodating the inherently restric-
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Although the meeting-competition defense has fared better than the
cost-justification defense, this is not attributable to a lack of effort on
the part of the FTC, which attempted in the past to limit the practical
utility of the defense.200 Moreover, because the heart of the defense is
tive provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act to the Sherman Act's mandates for
vigorous competitive pricing by sellers.") (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Rowe IV]; see E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 178, 193 (1970). As Kintner
stated:
This defense has the effect of sanctioning certain instances of discriminatory
concessions and constitutes a congressional resolution to encourage "hard
competition"-lower prices-in certain competitive situations even though,
by definition, adverse comjpetitive effects continue. The [defense constitutes
a] safety [valve] against excessive pressure for "soft competition" capable of
being read into Section 2(a).
Id.; see also ABA Antitrust Developments 143 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust
Developments].
200. See, e.g., Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1966)
(products must be of like grade and quality); Purolator Prods. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874,
884-85 (7th Cir. 1965) (prices must be in response to an individual competitive
situation), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47,
55-56 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965) (competitor's price must be
verified); Forster Mfg. Co., 68 F.T.C. 191, 196-97 (1965) (seller must have knowl-
edge of specific competitor's actual price); Cabin Crafts, Inc., 64 F.T.C. 799, 806
(1964) (evidence must show that meeting of price was on goods of comparable
quality).
FTC majority pronouncements have 1) required a seller to show facts indicating
that his competitor's price was legal, American Oil Co., 60 F.T.C. 1786, 1799
(1962), vacated on other grounds, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 954 (1964), 2) disallowed the meeting-competition defense for any seller who
maintained a pricing "system," Standard Motor Prods., 54 F.T.C. 814, 831 (1957),
af-'d, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959), 3) limited § 2(b) to
instances in which competitors had extended pre-existing lower price offers to the
seller's customers rather than to the competitor's own customers, American Oil Co.,
60 F.T.C. 1786, 1799 (1962), vacated on other grounds, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964), 4) barred the § 2(b) defense for any seller
whose competitive price reductions also gained rather than only retained business,
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 674, 681 (1961), vacated, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.
1962), 5) questioned whether a large seller could fully use the § 2(b) defense against a
small competitor, see Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852, 915-16 (1963), vacated, 335
F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), and 6) attempted to read the § 2(b) defense entirely out of §
2(d) cases, Shulton, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 106, 112 (1961), vacated and remanded, 305
F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962).
The first time that the Commission accepted the defense in a litigated proceeding
was in Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071 (1963), in which the respondent had
an exceptionally strong case. Continental had previously refused to grant discrimina-
tory discounts even though its competitors had done so. It had lost substantial
business as a result of its refusals. Continental subsequently offered discounts only to
customers who had been offered an equal or greater discount by a competitor.
Furthermore, it asked its sales representatives to verify customer's claims and it never
undersold its competitor. Id. at 2150-52. The staff had reportedly dropped prior
investigations because it anticipated successful meeting-competition defenses. To
Amend Section 2(b) of the Clayton Act: Hearings on S. 11 and S. 138 before the
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the amorphous standard of good faith, much discretion has been given
to the trier of fact,20' and this discretion, coupled with the fact that
the burden of proof is on the seller,202 has made succeeding on this
defense difficult.20 3
The practical meaning of the meeting-competition defense is that
no injury to competition has occurred, and it thus appears that the
defense is compatible with both antitrust's concern for competition
and the Act's supporters' concern for small businessmen. 20 4 The past
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 324 (1959); see Rowe III, supra note 198, at 306 'n.31. But one
commentator, paraphrasing Justice Jackson's definition of a valid patent, defined a
valid meeting-competition defense as "one that hasn't reached the F.T.C. yet."
Pollack, The Robinson-Patman Act: How-Not Whether-It Should be Amended,
22 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 624 (1967).
201. FTC Commissioner Elman has stated: "[A]t the heart of Section 2(b) is the
concept of 'good faith.' " Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963). The
Commission has recognized that the term "good faith" is subject to differing interpre-
tations: "Such a standard, whether it be considered 'subjective' or 'objective,' is
inherently ad hoc. ... Thus, the same method of meeting competition may be
consistent with an inference of good faith in some circumstances, inconsistent with
such an inference in others." Id. Such an amorphous standard permits a court, jury
or the Commission to decide a case almost any way it chooses.
202. See Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 704 (9th Cir. 1964);
Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963).
203. Although courts have been more receptive to the defense than the FTC, see
e.g., Harbor Banana Distribs. v. FTC, 499 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1974); Cadigan v.
Texaco, 492 F.2d 383, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1974); Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d
435, 441 (5th Cir. 1966); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 55-56 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); McCaskill v. Texaco, 351 F. Supp. 1332,
1337-40 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd mem. sub nom. Harrelson v. Texaco, 486 F.2d 1400
(5th Cir. 1973), they have also adopted requirements that make this a complicated
and difficult defense. Some of these requirements include: 1) "meeting, not beating"
the competitor's price, see National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 523
(7th Cir.), cert. denied: 393 U.S. 977 (1968), 2) defensive retention of old customers
rather than aggressive pursuit of new ones, see Cadigan v. Texaco, 492 F.2d 383, 387
(9th Cir. 1974); Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1962);
Standard Motor Prods. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
826 (1959). Contra Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282, 1294-
95 (1983), 3) meeting the price of one's own competitor rather than that of competi-
tor of one's customer, see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 129
(1978); Belliston v. Texaco, 455 F.2d 175, 182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 928
(1972); Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 997-98 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1966); Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 965 (1959), vacated,
294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (1963), 4) individual competitive
situation rather than pricing system, see Standard Motor Prods. v. FTC, 263 F.2d
674, 677 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); Ingram v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 259 F. Supp. 176, 184 (D.N.M. 1966). Contra Falls City Indus. v.
Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282, 1295 (1983); Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362
F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1966).
204. Consider the following example. If the price of seller A to buyer X is lower
than its price to buyer Y, X's competitor, but the price to X was made to meet the
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hostility to the defense is therefore difficult to understand on any
principled basis. Moreover, this hostility has been a roadblock to
making the Act compatible with competitive principles.
Fortunately, the law in this area has experienced a dramatic turn-
around recently. The Supreme Court has considered the meeting-
competition defense three times in the last five years. Although in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,205 the Court, concerned
with the use of the defense to aid price-fixing, appeared to indicate
that the defense might be further limited, 206 the Court's subsequent
price of seller B, then X would have received a lower price in any case, either from A
or from B. A's price, therefore, aided competition and caused no harm to Y. See P.
Areeda, supra note 195, at 901; Dairy Price Discrimination Hearings, supra note 11,
at 691. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reasoned similarly in a recent § 2(e)
case. See Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 24-25 (1st Cir.
1981).
205. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
206. In Gypsum, a criminal price-fixing action, the Court considered the defend-
ants' argument that inter-seller price verification was permissible under the Sherman
Act because it was necessary in order to meet the requirements of the meeting-
competition defense under the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 447-48. The Court
rejected this argument, stating that the flexibility of the "good-faith" standard would
protect sellers in most situations without the need to resort to price verification. Id. at
454. In addressing the specific situation of a seller that desired to verify a market
price quotation furnished by a possibly lying buyer, the Court stated:
The so-called problem of the untruthful buyer which concerned the
Court of Appeals does not in our view call for a different approach to the
§ 2(b) defense. The good-faith standard remains the benchmark against
which the seller's conduct is to be evaluated, and we agree with the Govern-
ment and the FTC that this standard can be satisfied by efforts falling short
of interseller verification in most circumstances where the seller has only
vague, generalized doubts about the reliability of its commercial adver-
sary-the buyer.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Court was particularly concerned that such verifications
would lead to price stability and price-fixing. Id. at 457-59. The Court recognized
that its efforts to make Robinson-Patman practices compatible with the Sherman Act
rules against price-fixing might preclude the availability of the meeting-competition
defense in some limited situations. It was willing, however, to accept this result for
the sake of the broader antitrust objectives. Id. at 459 n.32. As the Court stated:
That the § 2(b) defense may not be available in every situation where a
competing offer has in fact been made is not, in our view, a meaningful
objection to our holding .... [I]t seems clear that inadequate information
will, in a limited number of cases, deny the defense to some who, if all the
facts had been known, would have been entitled to invoke it. For reasons
already discussed, interseller verification does not provide a satisfactory
solution to this seemingly inevitable problem of inadequate information.
Moreover, § 2(b) affords only a defense to liability and not an affirmative
right under the Act. While sellers are, of course, entitled to take advantage
of the defense when they can satisfy its requirements, efforts to increase its
availability at the expense of broader, affirmative antitrust policies must be
rejected.
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expansive approach to the defense in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. FTC,20 7 and Falls City Industries v. Vanco Beverage, Inc. ,208
should allay any such fears.2 0 9 The Court's present approach still
leaves much discretion to the trier of fact to determine good faith,210
and, admittedly, this discretion builds into the defense a degree of
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the outlook for the successful assertion of
the defense is the best it has ever been.2 1 '
207. 440 U.S. 69 (1979). In this case, the Commission charged A & P, the buyer,
with inducing Borden, the seller, to discriminate in setting milk prices in violation of
§ 2(f) of the Act. Id. at 74. Neither the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) nor the
Commission considered the merits of Borden's meeting-competition defense because,
under their interpretation of § 2(f), it was unavailable to A & P on the facts of the
case. Id. at 74 n.5, 82. Both the ALJ and the Commission, however, expressed doubts
about the merits of the defense. Id. at 90-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The Court rejected the Commission's § 2(f) analysis, and held that Borden's
meeting-competition defense was relevant to A & P's liability. Id. at 81. Rather than
remanding the case to the FTC for the initial consideration of this "fact specific"
defense, the Court resolved the issue itself. Id. at 82-85. This approach is in marked
contrast to the Court's remand to the court of appeals in J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981), of an injury-to-competition issue for
consideration of the district court's factual determination. Id. at 568. The decision
not to remand may have reflected the Court's lack of faith in the FTC's ability to
resolve the issue properly, considering its past hostility to the defense. But see Falls
City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (1983). But see infra note
417 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the decision could have reflected the
Court's view of the level of factual scrutiny necessary to resolve the issue. In any case,
the Court found that Borden's meeting-competition defense was valid. 440 U.S. at
83-84.
The Court noted that A & P would not divulge the amount of the bid and that
Borden could not ask its competitors directly about their bids to A & P without
risking Sherman Act liability. Id. at 84. Yet, rather than concluding that this inabil-
ity to verify a competitor's bid precluded a finding of "good faith," the Court used
the restrictions on Borden's ability to verify as support for its conclusion that Borden
did all that it could and was therefore acting in "good faith." Id. The Court simply
did not address the possibility that someone in Borden's position might be precluded
from using the defense at all. The Court appears to have been influenced by the fact
that Borden was "[flaced with a substantial loss of business." Id. at 84. The seeming
ease with which the Court disposed of the issue contrasts sharply with the close
scrutiny courts had applied in the past. This change in approach has since been
reflected in some lower court opinions. See Hillside Dairy Co. v. Fairmont Foods
Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,375, at 74,725-26 (6th Cir. 1981); Linmont
Prop. v. Alan M. Newman, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,773, at 78,118
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
208. 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983). The Court held that the meeting-competition de-
fense may be available even though: 1) there is a sustained price discrimination, id.
at 1291-92, 2) the seller raises prices, id. at 1292, 3) the raised price increases profits,
id., 4) the price discrimination is intended to gain new customers, id. at 1293, and 5)
the price discrimination is part of a territorial pricing system, id. at 1295-96.
209. See supra notes 207-08.
210. Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (1983).
211. The FTC and the Justice Department, in an amicus curiae brief in Falls
City, supported the expansive approach to the meeting-competition defense. See
1154 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
iii. Changing conditions
The changing-conditions defense contained in section 2(a)2 12 con-
templates two possible justifications for a price differential: 1) an
alteration in market conditions;2 13 and 2) an alteration in the market-
ability of the product.2 14 As to the former possibility, courts have
restricted the defense to the proviso's specific examples.2 15 This inter-
pretation, however, unnecessarily limits the availability of the de-
fense.
The exemption for changing conditions in the marketability of the
product, on the other hand, has enjoyed more success. Courts have
recognized the defense's applicability to the off-season sales of Ameri-
can cars2 1 6 and Christmas ornaments.2 1 7 The FTC has taken a more
restrictive view, however, than the courts.2 18
generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Falls City Indus. v. Vanco
Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The section provides in part:
That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to
time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or
the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual
or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal
goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinu-
ance of business in the goods concerned.
Id. As Representative Patman stated:
[This proviso] provide[s] for continuance of the normal and economically
justifiable freedom of action that will permit a seller to dispose of goods on
hand where he is threatened with immediate or imminent loss as the result
of changing marketing conditions, deterioration, or obsolescence of the
goods themselves, or any other similar circumstance that requires the sud-
den and immediate movement of goods on hand to avoid losses resulting
from conditions beyond his control.
W. Patman, supra note 2, at 88-89.
213. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); W. Patman, supra note 2, at 88-89.
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); W. Patman, supra note 2, at 88-89. The
burden of proof for each defense is upon the seller. See Fredrick W. Huber, Inc. v.
Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., 30 F. Supp. 108, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
215. Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 190 F.2d 540, 541 (10th Cir. 1951) ("the plain
language of the statute limits the exceptions to those which are 'such as' or similar to
those named"), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 902 (1952); see Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden
Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 369 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956);
Fruitvale Canning Co., 52 F.T.C. 1504, 1515 (1956); see also Bargain Car Wash,
Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1972) (retail price
fluctuations do not constitute "changing condition").
216. See Peter Satori of Cal., Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 1964 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 71,309, at 80,291 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Valley Plymouth v. Studebaker-
Packard Corp., 219 F. Supp. 608, 611-13 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
217. See Willow Run Garden Shop, Inc. v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 1973-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 74,816, at 95,642 (D.N.J. 1973).
218. In Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, 63 F.T.C. 1308 (1963), aff'd, 347 F.2d 785,
787 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the Commission held that discounts granted prior to the
introduction of a new line of merchandise because old merchandise was "slow-
moving," were not covered by the changing conditions defense. Id. at 1344-45.
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3. Section 2(c)
Section 2(c)2 19 is a self-contained enactment, unrelated to the other
sections of the Robinson-Patman Act.220 Its provisions, as generally
interpreted, prohibit a party to a sales transaction from paying a fee
or its equivalent to the other party, his agent or his controlled interme-
diary.22' The section is intended to reach dummy brokerage payments
that are in reality "under the table" price concessions to the buyer.222
Section 2(c) "was enacted by Congress because § 2(a) was not consid-
ered adequate to deal with abuses of the brokerage function."223
The scope of section 2(c) is broader than that of section 2(a). Price
discrimination is not normally required,22 4 and consequently, there
219. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976). The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value
as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or
discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the
sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party
to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary
therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is
subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction
other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
Id.
220. See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 170-71 (1960).
221. See H. Shniderman, supra note 30, at 44. Shniderman observed:
In any transaction involving the sale of goods, a violation of Section 2(c) is
established when the following three elements are proved: (1) the person
charged is engaged in commerce and makes or receives the prohibited
payment in the course of such commerce; (2) the transaction involves a
payment or a receipt by "any person" of a commission, a brokerage, or
other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof; (3) the
payment is made to the other party to the transaction or to his agent
representative, or controlled intermediary.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
222. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168-69 (1960). The Court
observed:
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all
devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power. A lengthy investi-
gation revealed that large chain buyers were obtaining competitive advan-
tages in several ways other than direct price concessions and were thus
avoiding the impact of the Clayton Act. One of the favorite means of
obtaining an indirect price concession was by setting up "dummy" brokers
who were employed by the buyer and who, in many cases, rendered no
services. The large buyers demanded that the seller pay "brokerage" to these
fictitious brokers who then turned it over to their employer. This practice
was one of the chief targets of § 2(c) of the Act.
Id. (footnotes omitted); accord H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1936).
223. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 171 (1960) (footnote omitted).
224. See Herbert R. Gibson, Sr., 95 F.T.C. 553, 740 (1980), aff'd, 682 F.2d 554
(5th Cir. 1982), petitionsfor cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1982) (No.
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need not be two consummated sales. The subsection also covers export
sales,22 5 but does not specifically require that the relevant purchase be
"in commerce." Significantly, it does not require that competition be
injured. 226
Moreover, not only is the reach of section 2(c) broader than that of
section 2(a), the defenses to a section 2(c) action are limited: The
meeting-competition, cost-justification and changing-conditions de-
fenses do not apply.227 The only clearly accepted defense derives from
the "services rendered" language in the subsection.22 8 Although this
language appears to recognize the valid economic function of services
provided by the buyer or his agents, courts quickly limited the defense
to those services performed by the seller's own broker.2 29 This limita-
tion effectively places section 2(c) violations in a per se category. As
one commentator observed, "the exception is substantively meaning-
less, since no one would have contended that the subsection even
without the clause barred such a payment. '2 30
82-972) and (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982) (No. 82-984); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150
F.2d 607, 609 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945). "In drawing an inference
that an allowance is brokerage or in lieu of brokerage, however, the prices charged
other customers sold through brokers may have to be compared with the price
involved in the transaction being challenged." H. Shniderman, supra note 30, at 46
n.22. Recently some courts have required a showing of price discrimination. See infra
notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
225. Section 2(c), unlike § 2(a), is not restricted to goods "sold for use, consump-
tion, or resale within the United States or [its territories]." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
Therefore, exports are covered by § 2(c). Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Love-
man & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829, 833-34 (N.D. Ohio 1964); see Baysoy v. Jessop Steel
Co., 90 F. Supp. 303, 305 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
226. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959) (dictum); see Webb-
Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638
(1940); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 769 (4th Cir. 1939). A recent case,
however, required competitive injury. Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount
Co., 653 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1981).
227. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959) (dictum); see also
Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Benco Inc., 529 F.2d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 1976) (meeting
competition); FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir.
1959) (same).
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).
229. See, e.g., Quality Bakers of Am. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393, 398-99 (1st Cir.
1940); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 673-74 (3d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687, 691 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
230. H. Shniderman, supra note 30, at 54. This de facto per se approach to § 2(c)
is illustrated by the early Seventh Circuit case, Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v.
FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945). The court stated:
[Section] 2(c) prohibits the payment for services rendered by a broker who is
related to the opposite party in any of the ways designated in the provision.
... [W]here such relationship exists it is immaterial whether the services
rendered the seller were genuine or fictitious and whether they were inci-
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This much-criticized 231 per se approach to section 2(c) appears to
have softened since the Supreme Court considered section 2(c) for the
first, and only, time in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.2 3 2 In Broch the
Court stated:
There is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the
seller or to the respondent nor that anything in its method of
dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price by means of a
reduced brokerage charge. We would have quite a different case if
there were such evidence and we need not explore the applicability
of § 2(c) to such circumstances. 233
dental or otherwise. Even good faith on the part of both the broker and the
seller cannot be utilized to escape the condemnation of the provision.
Id. at 978. Violations of § 2(c) are easy to prove, and thus it is not surprising that
most FTC orders have been issued under this section. Elman, supra note 2, at 22 ("At
one time, enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act meant principally enforcement
of section 2(c)."); Rowe III, supra note 198, at 303 ("Nearly one half of all Robinson-
Patman orders issued by the FTC until 1957" were under section 2(c) (emphasis in
original)). Since 1957, the number of § 2(c) orders has been second only to § 2(d)
orders. See Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. II], supra note 7, at 187-91. Commissioner
Elman complained in 1962 that the FTC's use and interpretation of § 2(c) "threat-
en[ed] to swallow up much of the territory covered by the more general statutory
provisions which it was intended to supplement." National Retailer-Owned Grocers,
Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1208, 1241-42 (1962) (Elman, Comm'r, dissenting), vacated sub
nom. Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
231. Elman, supra note 2, at 21-22. The FTC's enforcement efforts, which
focused on buying groups of small purchasers, see Independent Grocers Alliance
Distrib. Co. v. FTC, 203 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1953); Modem Marketing Serv., Inc. v.
FTC, 149 F.2d 970, 973-94 (7th Cir. 1945); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d
687, 691 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938), have also been criticized
because they protected the position of independent brokers at the expense of small
businesses and consumers, see Rowe III, supra note 198, at 304 ("featherbedding
guarantee for the organized food brokers protected from competing forms of distribu-
tion at the ultimate expense of the consumer." (footnote omitted)); id. at 304 n.25. As
then Professor Posner stated:
The greatest irony of section 2(c) is that it has so often been used to
oppress small business. Many of the defendants in section 2(c) cases have
been buying cooperatives composed of small food stores, which sought to
obtain a discount for having adopted methods of centralized purchasing
that dispensed with a need for a food broker and so made them more
competitive with the chain stores. And the principal beneficiaries of section
2(c) have been food brokers, seemingly not a specially deserving group of
small businessmen-or even a group of particularly small businessmen.
R. Posner, supra note 14, at 46 (footnote omitted). The FTC's enforcement efforts
against buying groups of small purchasers changed in the 1960's. See Mezines, Group
Buying-When Is It Permitted under the Robinson-Patman Act?, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
729, 751 (1969) ("the Commission does not look unfavorably on small buyers combin-
ing to purchase collectively if they do not unreasonably restrict entry by competing
buyers").
232. 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
233. Id. at 173.
1983] 1157
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
This language, although dictum,2 34 has sent ripples through lower
courts. The tendency now is to look at the services rendered by the
buyer or its agents to see if they provide cost-savings to the seller, and
thereby justify the price differential..2 35
Additionally, some courts require, at least in some circumstances,
proof of price discrimination. 236 This would make section 2(c) more
consistent with section 2(a). Although the FTC has flirted with the
idea that discrimination is an element of a section 2(c) violation, 237 it
recently concluded in a "dummy brokerage" case that "a general
requirement that discrimination be shown cannot and should not be
read into Section 2(c). ' '238
Undoubtedly, the per se nature of section 2(c) is undergoing some
change,2 39 although the scope of this change is unclear. Nevertheless,
234. In Broch, J.M. Smucker Co., a buyer, negotiated with Canada Foods
through a broker, Phipps, for apple concentrate. Smucker asked for $1.25 per gallon,
and Canada Foods offered to sell at $1.30. Canada Foods told Phipps, and Broch, a
competing broker, that if the brokerage commission was reduced from 5 % to 3 %, it
would sell for a net price of $1.25 per gallon. Broch agreed, and the sale went
through Broch. Id. at 167-68. The Commission attacked this as a violation of § 2(c).
Its theory, which the Supreme Court adopted, was that the discount to the buyer was
in lieu of brokerage fees because it was made possible only by Broch's agreement to
accept a reduction in its normal brokerage commission. Id. at 175-77. The Court's
holding extended the reach of § 2(c) to an explicit price discount with no reference to
brokerage, simply because the reduction in price was made possible by a reduction in
the broker's fee at the request of the seller. Id. at 174-75. This holding, which is at
odds with the main purpose of § 2(c), see R. Posner, supra note 14, at 45 ("totally
perverse once it is accepted that the purpose of that statute is to force price discrimi-
nations disguised as brokerage payments into the open"), causes higher prices for
consumers and less competition among brokers.
235. See Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1962);
Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410, 412-15 (7th Cir. 1963);
Herbert R. Gibson, Sr., 95 F.T.C. 553, 742 (1980), aff'd, 682 F.2d 554 (5th Cir.
1982), petitions for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1982) (No. 82-972)
and (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982) (No. 82-984).
236. See Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 364 F.2d 491, 492
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC,
306 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1962).
237. See Food Fair Stores, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1213, 1229 (1973) (Initial Decision);
Modern Marketing Serv., Inc., 71 F.T.C. 1676, 1685-86 (1967); Tillie Lewis Foods,
Inc., 65 F.T.C. 1099, 1138 (1964), modified, 74 F.T.C. 776 (1968).
238. Herbert R. Gibson, Sr., 95 F.T.C. 553, 739 (1980), aff'd, 682 F.2d 554 (5th
Cir. 1982), petitionsfor cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1982) (No. 82-
972) and (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982) (No. 82-984). Because the Commission was focusing on
the dummy brokerage situation, it is not clear how it would treat other situations.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed but limited its holding to the facts. 682 F.2d at 570.
239. The trend to reconcile § 2(c) with § 2(a) reached its furthest point in Allen
Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1981). Plaintiff, Allen
Pen, was a wholesaler of stationery and school supplies. The defendant, Springfield,
manufactured scrap books, photo albums and other similar items. Springfield re-
quired Allen Pen to buy through its sales agent. A direct competitor of Allen Pen was
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certainty still exists as to one aspect of section 2(c). Section 2(c) has
traditionally been used to attack corporate bribery. 240 Today, the
FTC uses section 2(c), together with section 5 of the FTC Act,241 to
enjoin bribes of foreign government officials. 242 The bribery cases
have retained the per se approach to section 2(c).243
The bribery cases, and the dummy-brokerage cases in which there
is no price discrimination, show the non-antitrust character of section
2(c). This section is perhaps the best illustration of the original pur-
pose of Robinson-Patman-to influence certain kinds of marketing
practices without regard to their competitive effects.
4. Sections 2(d) and 2(e)
Sections 2(d)244 and 2(e)2 45 prohibit a seller from granting advertis-
ing and promotional allowances or services to customers unless such
allowed to buy directly from Springfield and received lower prices. Id. at 20. The
First Circuit rejected Allen Pen's § 2(c) claim:
To show. . . no more than the existence of a price difference between two
customers, one of which purchases through a broker and one of which
purchases directly, is not sufficient to show that the price difference is an
allowance of discount in lieu of brokerage.. . . Rather, appellant must
show that the sales agent... was interposed as a device or sham to give the
favored customer a competitive advantage through a lower price. . . . In
any event, even if Allen Pen had made such a showing, it still would have
had to establish injury, for § 2(c) is designed to prevent violation of the basic
§ 2(a) price discrimination prohibition under different guise.
Id. at 25 (citations omitted). Allen Pen illustrates a new judicial attitude toward the
Robinson-Patman Act. Some courts recognize the policy problems with the Act and
try to resolve them through judicial construction. The approach in Allen Pen to § 2(c)
is not unreasonable. At this point, however, it is something of a tour de force. This is
especially true to the extent that it requires proof of injury to competition in a § 2(c)
case. The opinion speaks of the § 2(c) plaintiff proving injury. 653 F.2d at 25-26.
Because the court bases this on § 2(c)'s relationship to § 2(a), it follows that this is
injury to competition, rather than the injury in fact which all private plaintiffs must
prove under § 4 of the Clayton Act. See supra notes 165-84 and accompanying text.
240. See Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12, 15-16 (6th
Cir. 1943).
241. Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719-21 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
242. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 92 F.T.C. 976 (1978); Boeing Co., 92 F.T.C.
972 (1978); Lockheed Corp., 92 F.T.C. 968 (1978).
243. See Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 856-60 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1976). The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or
contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or
in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such
customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for
sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale
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allowances are available to all competing customers on proportionally
equal terms. 246 Congress' purpose was "to scotch evasions of the Clay-
ton Act's ban on price discrimination by subterfuge arrangements
which cloaked discriminatory favoritism to large buyers in the garb of
cooperative promotional arrangements. ' 247 Thus, it is not surprising,
as the FTC recently noted, that "[t]he traditional use of these sections
has been in the realm of cooperative promotional arrangements.
2 48
by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on propor-
tionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of
such products or commodities.
Id.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1976). The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one pur-
chaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for
resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing,
or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity
so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally
equal terms.
Id.
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(d)-(e) (1976).
247. F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 365 (footnote omitted); accord P. Lorillard Co. v.
FTC, 267 F.2d 439, 443 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923 (1959); General Foods
Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 822 (1956); 80 Cong. Rec. 9418 (1936) (remarks of Rep.
Utterback). Representative Utterback stated:
The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is, of course, the
grant of discriminations under the guise of payments for advertising and
promotional services which, whether or not the services are actually ren-
dered as agreed, results in an advantage to the customer so favored as
compared with others who have to bear the cost of such services themselves.
The prohibitions of the bill, however, are made intentionally broader than
this one sphere in order to prevent evasion in resort to others by which the
same purpose might be accomplished, and it prohibits payment for such
services or facilities whether furnished "in connection with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale" of the products concerned.
Id.
248. Herbert R. Gibson, Sr., 95 F.T.C. 553, 725 (1980), aff'd, 682 F.2d 554 (5th
Cir. 1982), petitions for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1982) (No. 82-
972) and (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982) (No. 82-984). As the Commission stated:
In the classic Section 2(d) and 2(e) case, a manufacturer has compensated a
high volume retailer via a discriminatory plan, sometimes in an amount far
in excess of that retailer's actual promotional costs, and in so doing has
utilized a scheme not realistically available to small retailers. In addition,
the manufacturer often rebates a "promotional allowance" to a retailer in
an amount tied to the number of units resold by the retailer to the public,
but not linked to the retailer's actual promotional expenditures. Plainly,
such a transaction is in connection with a resale and within the ambit of
Section 2(d) and 2(e). Similarly, making employees available or arranging
with a third party to furnish personnel for purposes of performing work for




Sections 2(d) and 2(e) "perhaps provide the best example to be
found anywhere of the ineptitude of statutory draftsmanship.1 24 The
sections were intended to be "sister" sections, yet their language is not
parallel 25 0 and they contain so many omissions and differences that
"[n]either section completely describes an intended violation. " 251
Courts, however, have read the sections together 252 so that they now
present a somewhat "harmonious whole. 253
The practices proscribed by sections 2(d) and 2(e) are interrelated.
If the seller pays the buyer to make and display posters advertising the
seller's products, section 2(d) applies. If the seller makes the posters
and furnishes them to the buyer, section 2(e) applies.2 4 The "eco-
nomic evil sought to be outlawed . . . is the same whether the services
and facilities are furnished to the customer or by the customer with
reimbursement, so long as discrimination is practiced."92 5
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) have been called per se provisions. 25 6 This is
based in part on the opinion in FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,257 in
which the Supreme Court called the sections "absolute" proscriptions
that require no showing of competitive injury and permit no cost-
justification defense. 258 On the other hand, however, the meeting-
competition defense has been held to be available in actions under
249. Fisher, Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisited, 11
Vand. L. Rev. 453, 467 (1958). The draftmanship has received almost univeral
condemnation. E.g., Stedman, Twenty-Four Years of the Robinson-Patman Act,
1960 Wis. L. Rev. 197, 218 (the relationship of sections 2(d) and 2(e) "is a hodge-
podge of confusion and inconsistency that any competent, order-loving lawyer must
find offensive").
250. For delineation of the specific inconsistencies, see C. Edwards, supra note 43,
at 153 n.1; F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 390; Levi, supra note 3, at 61.
251. E. Kintner, supra note 199, at 227.
252. See, e.g., Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904, 909-10 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d
480, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1962); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499,
502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962); American News Co. v.
FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Elizabeth
Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806
(1947); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 992-93 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At. &
Pac. Tea Co., 154 F. Supp. 471, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1957), aff'd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part, 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959).
253. Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 194, at 189.
254. For other specific examples of this interrelationship, see P. Areeda, supra
note 195, at 928-29; C. Edwards, supra note 43, at 154.
255. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
256. See Antitrust Developments, supra note 199, at 153.
257. 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
258. Id. at 65; see Alterman Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993, 1000 (5th Cir.
1974).
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these sections, 259 and this availability takes the sections out of a strict
per se category and puts them into what may be called a "semi" per se
one. This distinction may be without a practical difference, however,
because the meeting-competition defense, rarely successful, at least
until recently, in actions under section 2(a) ,260 has been even less
successful in section 2(d) and 2(e) cases. 26 1
Enforcement of sections 2(d) and 2(e) has led to a series of court and
FTC decisions and the promulgation of FTC guidelines262 that deline-
259. See Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 503-04 (D.C. Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
260. See supra notes 200-11 and accompanying text.
261. This may be due in part to the strict FTC requirement that the seller must
have already established a promotional plan of its own from which to deviate in
order to invoke the defense. See Rabiner & Jontow, Inc. 70 F.T.C. 638, 682-83
(1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1004 (1968);
Surprise Brassiere Co., 71 F.T.C. 868, 940-42 (1967), enforcement ordered, 406 F.2d
711 (5th Cir. 1969). Nevertheless, the recent approach of one court indicates a
greater receptivity to the defense. See Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co.,
653 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1981). See supra note 239.
262. The FTC has established Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Mer-
chandising Payments and Services (Guides). 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 39,035. The
first Guides, were considered a "useful primer" on §§ 2(d) and 2(e). F. Rowe, supra
note 27, at 364.
On May 29, 1969, following dicta from the Supreme Court opinion in FTC v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 355-58 (1968), the FTC revised the Guides. See 34 Fed.
Reg. 8285 (1969); 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 3980. These have been commonly
known as the "Fred Meyer Guides." As one commentator noted, the Fred Meyer
Guides "expanded certain concepts, including who is a customer, the seller's duty to
inform, availability to all competing customers, meeting competition in good faith,
and checking the customers' use of payments." C. Hills, Antitrust Advisor 278 (1971).
The Guides were issued over the strong dissent of Commissioner Elman:
The Commission has disregarded the Supreme Court's mandate to de-
velop practical, realistic, and workable Guides implementing [Fred Meyer].
It is no service to the business community for the Commission to issue
Guides which (a) do not provide reasonable guidance, (b) do not conform to
the provisions of the statute, and (c) the Commission lacks the capacity to
enforce.
E. Kintner, supra note 199, at 371 app. VI (dissenting statement of Commissioner
Elman). Elman has not been the only critic. One commentator noted that the Guides
"have been criticized as stiff, commercially unrealistic and as a manifestation of
administrative overkill." Applebaum, Promotional Allowances and the Fred Meyer
Guides, 42 Antitrust L.J. 355, 355-56 (1973). And an Assistant Director of the Bureau
of Competition in the FTC testified that the Guides
present a special problem because they do not appear to have been devel-
oped with a real world understanding of how advertising allowances oper-
ate. I am afraid they are a little bit like prohibition laws; they are not well
obeyed because nobody really wants to enforce them and they are against
human nature.
Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. II], supra note 7, at 162. The Guides were amended
again in 1972, although the changes were not numerous. See 37 Fed. Reg. 15,699
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ate the business practices within their scope,26 3 define the jurisdic-
tional elements of the provisions26 4 (some of which are different from
(1972). It should be remembered that they have no application in private actions and
even the Commission has indicated it may not always follow them. See Alterman
Foods, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 298, 340-41 (1973), order enforced, 497 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.
1974).
263. Some of the cooperative promotional services or facilities held to be within
the scope of the sections include: 1) special package sizes for some stores, e.g.,
General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 826 (1956); Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658, 664-
65 (1940); FTC Guide 5, 16 C.F.R. § 240.5(b) (1982), 2) demonstrator services, e.g.,
Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 806 (1947); FTC Guide 5, 16 C.F.R. § 240.5 (1982), 3) factory service, e.g.,
Dantzler v. Dictograph Prods., 272 F.2d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 1959), 4) advertising in
customer-owned publications, e.g., State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959), 5)
accepting returns, e.g., Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785, 789 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); FTC Guide 5(b), 16 C.F.R. § 240.5(b) (1982), and 6) "push money" or
"spiffs," e.g., United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., 107 F. Supp
89, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The 1960 and 1969 editions of the FTC Guides included
"push money" as an example of an applicable "service or facility" but it was omitted
in the 1972 edition in response to criticism from consumer groups, which argued that
this practice by sellers was misleading to consumers who might assume the sales-
person had no personal reason not to give objective advice. See S. Oppenheim & G.
Weston, Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 959 (3d ed. 1974).
The extension of credit to a distributor is not normally a service or facility covered
by § 2(e). See Craig v. Sun Oil Co., 515 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 829 (1976); Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762, 765-66 (5th
Cir. 1956); Cook v. Ralston Purina Co., 366 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (M.D. Ga. 1973);
Clausen & Sons v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148, 155 (D. Minn.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968); Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665, 668 (D. Mass. 1959). But see Standard Oil Co.
v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 1967) (credit card privileges are services or
facilities within § 2(e)), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 642 (1969); American
Candle Co., 78 F.T.C. 1158, 1159-62 (1971) (consent order in connection with § 2(e)
allegation of preferential credit terms).
Discrimination in delivery services or allowances is not covered by § 2(d) or § 2(e).
See McGeorge Car Co. v. Leyland Motor Sales, Inc., 504 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Chicago Spring Prods. Co. v. United States Steel
Corp., 371 F.2d 428, 429 (7th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Cecil Corley Motor Co. v.
General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819, 848 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Sano Petroleum
Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 355-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). But see
Centex-Winston Corp. v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 447 F.2d 585, 588-89 (7th Cir.
1971) (consistent late deliveries within scope of § 2(e)), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921
(1972). The FTC recently criticized the expansive approach of Centex-Winston. See
Herbert R. Gibson, Sr., 95 F.T.C. 553, 727-28 (1980), aff'd, 682 F.2d 554 (5th Cir.
1982), petitions for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1982) (No. 82-972)
and (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982) (No. 82-984).
264. There must be: 1) two or more sales, 2) reasonably close in point of time, see
Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1958), 3) of commodi-
ties, see Lang's Bowlarama, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (D.R.I.
1974), 4) for resale, see Clairol, Inc. v. FTC, 410 F.2d 647, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1969), 5)
of like grade and quality, see Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 709
(9th Cir. 1964); General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 826 (1956), 6) by the same
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those under section 2(a))26 5 and set forth the basic elements of avail-
ability266 and proportionality.2 67
seller, 7) to two or more different competing customers, see England v. Chrysler
Corp., 493 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), 8) in
interstate commerce, 9) where the seller pays for, 10) or furnishes, 11) promotional
services or facilities, 12) in connection with the sale of his product, 13) without
making proportionately equal treatment available to all competing customers. See H.
Shniderman, supra note 30, at 61-78.
265. One difference is in the commerce requirement. Promotional arrangements
have been proscribed under §§ 2(e) and 2(f) even though the sales were intrastate
transactions, when the discrimination was between customers competing at least
partially in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d
211, 220 (7th Cir. 1944), aJj'd, 324 U.S. 726 (1945). The FTC Guides broadly define
the commerce requirement to be satisfied "if there is any part of a business which is
not wholly within one State (for example, sales or ... deliveries of supplies or raw
materials)." FTC Guide 4, 16 C.F.R. § 240.4 (1982). In addition, FTC rulings have
even proscribed local discriminatory promotional payments on the ground that the
recipient was an "integrated interstate operator" that utilized interstate communica-
tions media for the advertising financed by the supplier. See J.H. Filbert, Inc., 54
F.T.C. 359, 370 (1957); F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 394. The Ninth Circuit recently
held, however, that it "would therefore be incongruous to hold" that these sections
have a broader reach or different commerce requirement than § 2(a). Zoslaw v.
MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 1982).
Also, unlike § 2(a), the allowance or service must be "in connection with" the
resale of the product. See Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762, 765
(5th Cir. 1956).
266. The terms "available" in § 2(d) and "accorded" in § 2(e) have been treated as
synonymous. See Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 484-85 (2d
Cir. 1962). "Availability" requires: 1) notification to all competing customers of the
promotional program, and 2) a program that is "functionally available" to those
customers. "[A] supplier must not merely be willing, if asked, to make an equivalent
deal with other customers, but must take affirmative action to inform them of the
availability of the promotion programs." Alterman Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d
993, 1001 (5th Cir. 1974). Thus, a plan does not fulfill the notification requirement if
it has been concealed. See Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 485
(2d Cir. 1962). On the other hand as Judge Friendly noted in Vanity Fair, "the
legislative history... argues against a construction that would require the seller to
make an actual 'offer' to all customers, including many who might not be inter-
ested." Id. The Commission has recognized that the Act "does not specifically require
that all competing customers be individually notified regarding the particulars of a
promotional program." Advisory Opinion Digest No. 195, 73 F.T.C. 1310 (1968).
The same opinion ominously goes on to state, however, that "whenever a seller
selects any method of notification short of actual notice to each dealer, he bears full
responsibility under the law for seeing that the method selected gives each dealer the
notice he is entitled." Id. at 1311. The notice to which he is entitled is not set forth.
Despite the recognition that sellers have no duty to individually inform customers,
the Commission in the past has, in effect, required individual notice. See Chestnut
Farms Chevy Chase Dairy, 53 F.T.C. 1050, 1060 (1957); Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52
F.T.C. 1535, 1548 (1956); Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89, 95 (1954). And
even though all customers may have a general knowledge of the cooperative promo-
tional program, the Commission has required that notice as to the actual terms be
given to all customers. See Chestnut Farms Chevy Chase Dairy, 53 F.T.C. 1050,
ROBINSON-PA TMAN LAW
If sections 2(d) and 2(e) were enacted to prevent sellers from cir-
cumventing section 2(a) by discriminating between buyers in respects
other than price,268 why the competitive-injury requirement and the
cost-justification defense should not apply to these hidden price dis-
criminations is not clear. Nevertheless, they do not,26 9 and therefore
the determination whether a seller's action is a price discrimination
under section 2(a) or a promotional allowance under section 2(d)
becomes crucial.
1060 (1957); FTC Guide 10, 16 C.F.R. § 240.10 (1982). The FTC has softened its
rigid requirements somewhat by holding that "it is [not] necessary to make known a
promotional plan where such would be a useless or futile gesture." Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 56 F.T.C. 221, 253 (1959). The FTC Guides allow some leeway by
adopting a "good faith" standard. FTC Guide 8, 16 C.F.R. § 240.8(a) (1982) ("The
seller should take reasonable action, in good faith, to inform all his competing
customers ....").
Determining functional availability requires "a frank recognition of the business
limitations of each buyer. An offer to make a service available to one, the economic
status of whose business renders him unable to accept the offer, is tantamount to no
offer to him." State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Aft. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831,
839 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959).
Programs have been held not to be functionally available when the suppliers
purchased advertisements in customer-owned publications while competing cus-
tomers did not have comparable publications, id. at 837-39; when demonstrations
offered were only practically available to large department stores, Elizabeth Arden,
Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947);
when the seller's offer was to pay 50 % of a customer's newspaper lineage cost, and
when the competing customers were "too small" or otherwise unable to engage in any
kind of newspaper advertising, House of Lords, Inc., 69 F.T.C. 44, 48 (1966). If the
program is functionally unavailable alternatives must be provided. See FTC Guide 9,
16 C.F.R. § 240.9 (1982). If proper alternatives are available, however, competing
customers have no complaint, when, for their own convenience, they elect a more
expensive alternative or do not participate at all. See United Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 245 F. Supp. 161, 177-78 (D. Conn. 1965), afJ'd, 362 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.
1966); FTC Guide 9, ex. 1, 16 C.F.R. § 240.9 (1982).
267. Sections 2(d) and 2(e) require more than that some promotional assistance be
made available to all competing customers; they require that the assistance be on
"proportionally equal terms." 15 U.S.C. § 13(d)-(e) (1976). This phrase is not
defined in the Act. The FTC Guides state that any "payments or services should be
proportionalized on some basis that is fair to all customers who compete in the resale
of the seller's products. No single way to proportionalize is prescribed by law. Any
method that treats competing customers on proportionally equal terms may be used."
FTC Guide 7, 16 C.F.R. § 240.7 (1982) (emphasis added). Yet the Guides specifically
approve only two methods of proportioning: 1)"basing payments or services on dollar
volume; or 2) basing them on the quantity of goods purchased during a specified
period. Id. The Commission does not permit proportionality to be achieved on the
basis of the value of the services rendered. See 16 C.F.R. § 240.9, ex. 1, n.2 (1982)
("Allowances that have little or no relationship to cost or approximate cost of the
service provided by the retailer may be considered to be in violation of section 2(d) or
subject to the prohibitions of section 2(a) ....").
268. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 68-69 (1959).
269. See Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 708 (9th Cir. 1964).
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Courts have devised two principal tests to distinguish price discrim-
inations from promotional allowances. One test concludes that a seller
has discriminated in price and that section 2(a) therefore applies if the
allowance is intended to "facilitate the original sale" of the product.
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) apply if the allowance or service is related to the
product's resale.2 70 The other test concludes that section 2(a) applies if
the seller simply pays the buyer outright, but section 2(d) applies if the
seller anticipates some services for its payment from the buyer. 27 1 The
trouble with this test is that outright payment is, if anything, more
dangerous to competition than the payment for, or provision of,
services, 72 yet it is the latter that is proscribed without regard to
competitive effects and which is subject to limited defenses. The
thrust of the sections is therefore not compatible with basic antitrust
policy.27 3
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are also not compatible with commercial
reality.2 74 Cooperative advertising, an important and legitimate pro-
motional device, has been loaded down with restrictions that produce
irrational results and, contrary to the purpose of the Act, hurt small
businesses. For instance, using an example of ex-Commissioner
Elman, if a small dress manufacturer with a restricted budget wished
to engage in a cooperative promotional program, it would want to
choose only those retail outlets with the greatest prestige and avoid
those that could not or would not effectively promote its product or
those having a public image such that the manufacturer would not
want to affirmatively link its product with them. Under sections 2(d)
and 2(e), however, the manufacturer would be required to make the
program available on proportionally equal terms to all its customers.
This obligation forces the manufacturer to "allocate [its] advertising
resources irrationally and uneconomically. ' ' 27 5 Moreover, the small
270. See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 546 (9th
Cir. 1983) (§ 2(e)); Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 708 (9th Cir.
1964) (§ 2(d)).
271. See American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 824 (1962).
272. See Greenberg, The Robinson-Patman Act: How-Not Whether-It Should
be Amended, 22 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 628, 629 (1967).
273. Id. at 629-30; see R. Posner, supra note 14, at 48 ("The short of it is that the
Robinson-Patman Act subjects advertising allowances, even where wholly genuine,
to a stricter scrutiny than explicit price discounts-and there is no conceivable
justification for this.").
274. Elman, supra note 2, at 26 (Treating "all promotional allowances as dis-
guised price rebates obviously conflicts with commercial realities.").
275. Id. at 27. Edwards has stated the issue very well:
The general policy of the law in a free private-enterprise system is to leave
buyers free to choose their sources of supply, to buy as much as they want
from these sources in such proportions as they wish, and to pay the market
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manufacturer's large competitors could avoid this dilemma: Because
of superior resources they could engage in direct advertising and
bypass the cooperative promotional programs.2 76
Another requirement that is at odds with commercial reality is that
cooperative promotional programs must be "functionally available" to
all competing customers.2 77 This requirement forces a supplier that
wishes to have a television or print program also to spend its time and
resources developing a point of purchase or other type of campaign for
its customers too small to engage in the television or print programs.
The requirement applies regardless of the value such a campaign
would have. As a result the supplier either: 1) allocates resources for
wasteful or useless programs,2 78 which the small businesses do not
always want;279 or 2) cuts off small buyers entirely, so that it may be
free to engage in an efficient cooperative promotional program. The
latter result, of course, does not help small businesses. 2 0
Two recent cases have attempted to narrow the scope of sections
2(d) and 2(e). In Herbert R. Gibson, Sr. ,281 the FTC cautioned that
"[b]ecause of the easier threshold of proof carved out for Sections 2(d)
and 2(e), the Commission and the courts have an obligation to ensure
that the jurisdictional prerequisites of those sections are reasonably,
and not expansively, construed. 12 82 In Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield
value of what they buy. The application of these principles to purchasers of
advertising would suggest that it is inappropriate to require a buyer of
advertising service to buy it from all his customers if he buys it from any and
to buy it from them in stated proportions to which proportionate values are
arbitrarily assigned. One might, with similar logic, require a steel manufac-
turer to buy railway transportation service from every railroad in propor-
tion, not to his need for service from each, but to the amount of his steel
products purchased by each.
C. Edwards, supra note 43, at 158-59.
276. Elman, supra note 2, at 27.
277. See supra note 266.
278. See Elman, supra note 2, at 28.
279. See Justice Report, supra note 17, at 93.
280. One administrative report concluded that the FTC no longer used § 2(d) to
compel sellers to compensate small retail outlets for services that are not economically
beneficial. See Report of Task Force on Productivity and Competition (1969) [herein-
after cited as Stigler Report], reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
413, at X-3 (June 10, 1969). Neither this FTC practice, however, nor the fact that
many businessmen might ignore the requirements of the section, change the law or its
availability to private plaintiffs. The conscientious businessmen who diligently try to
comply with the Act or those fearing private suits are therefore still saddled with
these requirements.
281. 95 F.T.C. 553 (1980), aff'd, 682 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1982), petitionsfor cert.
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1982) (No. 82-972) and (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982)
(No. 82-984).
282. Id. at 726. The Commission went on to overrule its decision in Alterman
Foods, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 298 (1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1974), which held
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Photo Mount Co. ,283 in rejecting a section 2(e) claim, the First Circuit
gave broad scope to the meeting-competition defense, 2 4 and indicated
that it might also require a showing of injury to competition in the
future.2 15 These opinions are positive steps but it is too soon to deter-
mine to what extent they represent a trend in the law.
5. Section 2(f)
Section 2(f) makes it unlawful "for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or re-
that discriminatory payments to a private trade show were allowances subject to
§ 2(d) requirements. Id. at 343. The Commission stated:
In general, marketing assistance, if discriminatorily granted, does run afoul
of Sections 2(d) and 2(e). But in the present case, it is clear that the principal
function of the trade show was to funnel a high volume of products from
manufacturing to participating retailers at a discount price, and not to
provide promotional assistance.
95 F.T.C. at 729. The Commission was concerned that "to accept the Alterman
holding would mean opening up sections 2(d) and 2(e) to practices that Congress
intended to be challenged solely under Section 2(a)." Id. It was therefore necessary to
"look realistically at transactions as a whole before deciding to apply [these sec-
tions]." Id. The Commission distinguished R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445
(2d Cir. 1964). In that case Macy's had solicited sellers to contribute $1000 apiece to
defray advertising and promotional costs of its 100th anniversary celebration. The
court held that the solicitation was proscribed by § 2(d). Id. at 449-50. The Commis-
sion's complaint counsel argued in Gibson that Macy was controlling. The Commis-
sion stated, however, that in Macy the payments were not "general revenue," but
rather "for advertising purposes." 95 F.T.C. at 729 n.10. Yet, it is difficult to see a
meaningful distinction between the two cases. A "realistic" assessment of the facts in
Macy should lead to the same conclusion as reached in Gibson-that "plainly the
suppliers' principal purpose in engaging in these acts was to induce retail store buyers
to make the original purchases, not to provide marketing or promotional assistance to
them." Id. at 729.
283. 653 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1981).
284. Id. at 25. The court stated:
[T]he evidence suggests little more than an occasional effort by Springfield
[the seller defendant] to use the [display] racks to meet the competition of its
competitors . . . .If so, the offer of racks to an Allen Pen competitor is
unlikely to have hurt Allen Pen, for in its absence that competitor would
have accepted some equivalent advantage from a Springfield competitor.
Id.
285. The court stated:
Allen Pen provided no evidence of any systematic effort to provide some
customers, but not others, with promotional advantages. Unless evidence of
any occasional advantage provided any competitor is sufficient to make out
a prima facie case of a § 2(e) violation-and we have found no case suggest-
ing that it is-Allen Pen did not show a substantive violation of § 2(e). We
believe that § 2(e), like the rest of the Robinson-Patman Act, is aimed at
significant harm to competition; and therefore the injury suffered from its
violation must be something more than failure to obtain a sporadic advan-
tage once made available to a single competitor.
Id. (emphasis in original). See supra note 239.
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ceive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by [section
2(a)]."2 8 6 In addition to the elements of a section 2(a) violation, the
plaintiff in a section 2(f) case must establish three elements: 1) the
defendant must have been engaged in interstate commerce; 2 7 2) the
purchase in question must have been made in the course of such
commerce;288 and most importantly, 3) the defendant who induced or
received the price must have had actual or constructive knowledge
that the price differential given by the seller was violative of section
2(a) .289 All the defenses available against a section 2(a) claim are
available against a section 2(f) claim .290
286. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976).
287. Id.
288. Id. The wording of the commerce requirement of § 2(f) theoretically makes it
more difficult to prosecute a buyer than a seller for violating the Act. Under the
"flow of commerce" doctrine, see supra note 86, the § 2(f) commerce requirement
may be satisfied when the buyer purchases from a seller located in another state even
if the buyer resells only locally. However, a buyer purchasing from an in-state seller,
who sells at higher prices to the buyer's out-of-state competitors, in theory, would not
be liable under § 2(f), even assuming the seller was liable under § 2(a). See, e.g.,
Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 184 F. Supp. 312, 319 (N.D.
Ill. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961).
289. This last element was imposed by the Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen
Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). Prior to the Automatic Canteen decision,
culpable knowledge by the buyer had never been required as an element of a § 2(f)
offense. The Court, however, concerned with reconciling the Robinson-Patman Act
with "broader antitrust policies," did not want to put "the buyer at his peril when-
ever he engage[d] in price bargaining." Id. at 73-74.
290. Id. at 74; see Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 82 (1979).
There have been very few private actions under § 2(f). See Holleb & Co. v. Produce
Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29, 33-34 (7th Cir. 1976); Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d 793, 803-06 (9th Cir. 1969); Kainz v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 744 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952); Ameri-
can Coop. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 917 (7th Cir.) (Major,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946); Rutledge v. Electric Hose &
Rubber Co., 327 F. Supp. 1267, 1276-77 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 511 F.2d 668 (9th
Cir. 1975); Metropolitan Dry Cleaning Mach. Co. v. Washtex Mach. Corp., 1969
Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,686, at 86,441-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Big Value Stamp Co. v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 1967 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71, 978, at 83,459 (S.D. Ohio
1967); Krug v. ITT Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230, 237-38 (D.N.J. 1956). One of the
reasons for this dearth of private actions is the heavy burden placed by courts on
private plaintiffs. For example, in Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 327 F.
Supp. 1267 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975), the court stated:
Plaintiffs' task was to take each coupler they intended to prove a 2(f) claim
against and show that by reason of conversations had with a seller of hose,
or by some other conduct, that coupler induced the seller to sell to him at a
lower price which was discriminatory and which was, as known to the
coupler, not cost justified. In a Robinson-Patman action he is required to
make this showing by a meticulous attention to details.
Id. at 1276-77 (citation omitted). The Commission has rejected this heavy burden,
and holds that its complaint counsel need only come forward with a prima facie
showing that "a reasonable and prudent businessman should have known that the
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The Supreme Court emphasized recently that without a section 2(a)
seller violation there can be no section 2(f) buyer violation. 21 The
FTC had attempted to abrogate this requirement 92 in Beatrice Foods
differential it received could not be cost justified." Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 73
F.T.C. 1269, 1273 (1968). Complaint counsel need not submit evidence concerning
the actual absence of cost justification. Id. In this case Commissioner Elman dis-
sented, stating that the Commission complaint counsel must not only prove "guilty"
knowledge, but must also go forvard with "objective evidence that the price received
was not in fact cost justified." Id. at 1280 (Elman, Comm'r, dissenting).
Of the over one thousand complaints filed by the FTC only approximately 50 have
contained a § 2(f) count. See Klein, Hard Bargaining Under § 2(f) of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 32 Ohio St. L.J. 734, 734 n.2 (1971) ("less than 50 complaints").
Between 1971 and 1975 there was only one § 2(f) order by the Commission. Recent
Efforts Hearings [pt. II], supra note 7, at 191; see Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 87
F.T.C. 962 (1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
Since 1976 there has been only one § 2(f) complaint. See Boise Cascade Corp., 97
F.T.C. 246 (1981). Moreover, since Automatic Canteen in 1953, there have been
only four litigated FTC proceedings against individual buyers: Boise Cascade Corp.,
97 F.T.C. 246 (1981); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 87 F.T.C. 962 (1976), aff'd, 557
F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); White Drug Co. of Jamestown,
Inc., 77 F.T.C. 1200 (1970); Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), aff'd sub
nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971). Ironically, the other proceedings have been against very small buyers who
formed group purchasing organizations to compete with big buyers. See American
Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
884 (1960); cf. Standard Motor Prods. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 675 (2d Cir.) (§ 2(a)
proceeding against seller that sells to group purchasing organizations), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 826 (1959); E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 153 (7th Cir. 1956)
(same), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1957); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 46 (8th
Cir. 1956) (same), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). The policy of proceeding
against group purchasers has been widely criticized, and is certainly at odds with the
basic purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act. See Rowe III, supra note 198, at 303-04.
The FTC's enforcement efforts against buying groups of small purchasers changed in
the 1960's. See Mezines, supra note 231, at 751.
291. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 85 n.18 (1979).
292. In Beatrice Foods, the Commission held that the buyer, Kroger, was liable
under § 2(f) even though the seller, Beatrice, was not liable under § 2(a). 76 F.T.C.
at 823. Beatrice was not liable because it had a valid meeting-competition defense.
"Beatrice representatives did everything in their power to find the right price level in
a cautious and prudent manner; they made specific investigations, tested rumors and
tried by legitimate means to find out what their competitors were doing." Id. at 809.
Interestingly enough, the three-commissioner majority which upheld the § 2(b)
defense consisted of Commissioner Jones and the two commissioners who dissented
from the finding of liability for Kroger. Therefore, only Commissioner Jones con-
curred in the entire opinion. Commissioner Jones candidly announced that Kroger
could be held liable even though Beatrice had not been held liable because Kroger
had "bargained too hard," id. at 818, "failed to convey any correct information
about price levels being quoted by others," id. at 819 (emphasis in original), and thus
had "stepped over the bounds of proper negotiation," id. at 818.
On appeal, Justice Clark sought to restrict this rather startling view of § 2(f).
Commissioner Jones' statements, Justice Clark said, without explaining the distinc-
tion, were "but a warning, not a command." 438 F.2d at 1378. In any case, Justice
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Clark held that "[t]he controlling point ... is not the 'hard bargaining' nor the
'price levels' but the misrepresentation of the [competitor's] bid." Id. (emphasis in
original). This established the so-called "lying buyer" exception to the principle of
derivative liability in § 2(f). Justice Clark set out the rationale for the lying-buyer
exception in the following passages:
Kroger [contends] that as a matter of law the discharge of Beatrice requires
the acquittal of Kroger because there cannot be a violation of section 2(f)
without there being one under section 2(a). While ordinarily this may be
true-a matter we need not and do not pass upon-it is not true under the
peculiar circumstances here, where Kroger was found by the Commission to
have given "false price information" to Beatrice as to Broughton's compet-
ing bid which induced Beatrice in perfect good faith to meet Broughton's
equally low price .... Automatic Canteen ... holds only that buyers may
avail themselves of discriminatory prices that a seller may lawfully grant or
those that are "not known by him [the buyer] not to be within one of these
defenses."... To hold otherwise in this case would put a premium on the
buyer's artifice and cunning in inducing discriminatory prices.. . . In order
for the buyers to be sheltered through the exoneration of the seller under
section 2(b) the prices induced must come within the defenses of that section
not only from the seller's point of view but also from that of the buyer.
Id. at 1374-77 (citation omitted) (quoting Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC,
346 U.S. 61 (1953)).
In a vigorous dissent to the original FTC determination, Commissioner Elman had
objected to any such exception, arguing that "[i]t puts too heavy a burden on the
Robinson-Patman Act to convert it into a 'truth-in-bargaining' statute." Beatrice
Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 828 (1969) (Elman, Comm'r, dissenting), aff'd sub nom.
Kroger Co. v FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
The Commission was not content with Justice Clark's "lying buyer" gloss on its
Beatrice Foods opinion and continued to pursue cases of "hard bargaining." It again
vent after a "silent buyer," this time A & P. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 87 F.T.C.
962 (1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 69 (1979). The A & P
complaint alleged neither a § 2(a) violation nor misrepresentation by the buyer.
According to the FTC's complaint counsel, A & P's sin was not that it induced or
coerced, honestly or dishonestly, a price discrimination from a weak seller. Rather,
its sin was accepting from Borden, the mammoth of the dairy industry, a price bid
"granted for the purpose of meeting competition," without notifying Borden that its
bid was "substantially" below another bid. Id. at 965. The complaint alleged in
Count I that this conduct was in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act, id., and in Count II
that it was in violation of § 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, id. at 966. Count III
alleged that Borden, and A & P had violated § 5 of the FTC Act by combining to
stabilize and maintain the retail and wholesale prices of milk and other dairy
products. Id. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) later dismissed this count, id. at
1037-38, and the Commission affirmed, id. at 1047.
The ALJ, after a hearing that lasted over 110 days, held that A & P violated both
the FTC Act and the Robinson-Patman Act because its conduct was unfair and
unethical. Id. at 1037. On review, the Commission affirmed in part and reversed in
part. Id. at 1047. It rejected the ALJ's conclusion that the conduct of A & P violated
§ 5 of the FTC Act, stating:
The imposition of a duty of affirmative disclosure applicable to a buyer
whenever a seller states that his offer is intended to meet competition, is
contrary to normal business practice and, we think, contrary to the public
interest .... We fear a scenario where the seller automatically attaches a
meeting competition caveat to every bid. The buyer would then state
whether such bid meets, beats, or loses to another bid. The seller would
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Co.2 '3 and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,294 but the Court con-
cluded that the Commission's construction of section 2(f) was contrary
to the "plain meaning" of the Act,295 Supreme Court precedent, 211, and
then submit a second, a third, and perhaps a fourth bid until finally he is
able to ascertain his competitor's bid.
Id. at 1050-51.
In an interesting turnaround, however, the Commission also held that this conduct
was in violation of § 2(f), even though there was no § 2(a) violation, and no
misrepresentation. Id. at 1056-57. According to the Commission, A & P should have
either refused Borden's bid, or affirmatively disclosed to Borden that its bid was too
low for the meeting-competition defense. See id. The Commission never discussed
why this affirmative-disclosure requirement, which it had just held "contrary to the
public interest" in the FTC Act context, should apply under the Robinson-Patman
Act. On appeal the Second Circuit addressed the issue but stated only that "the
seeming inconsistency ... is . . .more apparent than real." 557 F.2d at 983. The
Court went on to state: "A & P's liability under § 2(f) must be independently assessed
without regard to any other statute, so that a finding that A & P has not engaged in
unfair trade practices does not, ipso facto absolve A & P under § 2(f)." Id. at 984.
The court had no problem with the Commission's affirmative disclosure requirement
because it saw no difference between the situation in which "the buyer lies [and the
situation in which he] merely keeps quiet about the nature of the competing bid." Id.
at 983. The Court granted enforcement of the Commission's order in all aspects. Id.
at 988.
The Supreme Court dismissed the Commission's "attempt ... to rewrite § 2(f)."
440 U.S. at 79. Borden had asserted both a cost-justification defense and a meeting-
competition defense. The Commission rejected the former, but decided it did not
have to reach the meeting-competition defense because A & P knew that Borden's bid
was too low. The Supreme Court, perhaps reflecting its belief that the Commission
would not reach the right result, did not remand for consideration of this defense.
Rather, it decided the issue on the record before it, holding that a meeting-competi-
tion defense was clearly available to Borden, and therefore that the complaint
against A & P had to be dismissed, regardless of what it knew. Id. at 82-85. Justice
White would have remanded for consideration of the meeting-competition defense.
Id. at 85 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Marshall dis-
agreed with the Court's conclusion that § 2(f) liability was totally derivative, and
would have remanded for consideration of the meeting-competition defense. Id. at
89-92 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
293. 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), af-'d sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
294. 87 F.T.C. 962, 965 (1971), aff'd, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440
U.S. 69 (1979).
295. 440 U.S. at 76. The Court stated:
Liability under § 2(f) thus is limited to situations where the price discrimi-
nation is one "which is prohibited by this section." While the phrase "this
section" refers to the entire § 2 of the Act, only subsections (a) and (b)
dealing with seller liability involve discriminations in price. Under the plain
meaning of § 2(f), therefore, a buyer cannot be liable if a prima facie case
could not be established against a seller or if the seller has an affirmative
defense. In either situation, there is no price discrimination "prohibited by
this section."
Id. (footnote omitted); accord id. at 81.




antitrust policy. 297 The Court held that a section 2(f) violation is
derivative in nature, and therefore must be accompanied by a section
2(a) violation.298 The Court specifically declined to decide, however,
whether a "lying buyer"-one who misrepresents competing bids to a
seller-can be held liable under section 2(f) even if the seller is not
liable under section 2(a) .299
Ironically, section 2(f) was given little legislative consideration.
Although the Act was a reaction to the chain-store phenomenon, 0
and despite the Congressional view that huge buying power com-
pelled the seller, usually in self-defense, to grant concessions, 301 no
buyer liability provisions were included in the various bills until sec-
tion 2(f) was added almost as an afterthought on the Senate floor.302
The section, which is very brief, does not mention discriminatory
allowances or services. Though this omission is significant for poten-
tial plaintiffs who are thus without a cause of action, 30 3 the Commis-
297. 440 U.S. at 80-81. The Court noted:
In the Automatic Canteen case, the Court warned against interpretations
of the Robinson-Patman Act which "extend beyond the prohibitions of the
Act, and, in so doing, help give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in
open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation." 346 U.S., at
63. Imposition of § 2(f) liability on the petitioner in this case would lead to
just such price uniformity and rigidity.. .. [A] duty of affirmative disclo-
sure would almost inevitably frustrate competitive bidding and, by reduc-
ing uncertainty, lead to price matching and anticompetitive cooperation
among sellers .... As in the Automatic Canteen case, we decline to adopt a
construction of § 2(f) that is contrary to its plain meaning and would lead to
anticompetitive results.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
298. See id. at 85 n.18.
299. Id. at 81 n.15. Although the "lying buyer" exception to derivative liability
would seem to have been precluded by the Court's analysis, see supra notes 295 &
297, the Court decided it did not need to reach the issue, and reserved decision on the
validity of this exception. Id. ("Because A & P was not a 'lying buyer,' we need not
decide whether such a buyer could be liable under § 2(f) even if the seller has a
meeting-competition defense.").
300. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
301. See 80 Cong. Rec. 8111 (1936) (statement of Rep. Patman); 79 Cong. Rec.
9078 (1935) (same).
302. F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 421. When § 2(f) was added on the floor of the
Senate, the only comment made was that it was "sound in principle." 80 Cong. Rec.
6428 (1936) (statement of Sen. Robinson). In the House, only Representative Utter-
back, in presenting the report of the conference committee, addressed this section.
He stated that § 2(f) would enable a seller to "resist the demand for sacrificial price
cuts [made by large buyers,] since it enables him to charge them with knowledge of
the illegality of the discount." Id. at 9419 (statement of Rep. Utterback).
303. See, e.g., General Beverage Sales Co.-Oshkosh v. East Side Winery, 396 F.
Supp. 590, 596 (E.D. Wis. 1975) ("Neither § 2(d) nor § 2(e) can give rise to a private
cause of action against a buyer. The statutes simply fail by their own terms to provide
any sanction against one who knowingly accepts discriminations in price, services, or
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sion has overcome the omission by using the "inducement or receipt of
discriminatory prices" language to attack such practices as "unfair
methods of competition" in violation of the FTC Act. 3 4
C. Methods of Enforcement
The Robinson-Patman Act may be enforced by the FTC, 3 5 the
Department of Justice 306 and "private attorneys general" through tre-
ble-damage 30 7 and injunctive actions.3 0 8 Until recently the FTC has
played the major enforcement role, and indeed, it has been said that
"Congress has charged [the Commission] with primary responsibility
for enforcing the Act. ' 30 9 The principal enforcement role, however,
appears to have fallen to the Commission more by default than by
design.3 10 Today, again by default, private plaintiffs have the princi-
pal enforcement role. 31 1
1. Federal Trade Commission
In the past, FTC enforcement of antitrust matters in general has
been criticized in a succession of studies.312 An FTC General Counsel
facilities."), rev'd on other grounds, 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978); Mark Plastic
Prods. v. Exxon Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,784, at 95,492 (E.D. Mich.
1973).
304. See, e.g., Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382, 415 (1960), modified and af-'d,
300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); FTC Guide 14, 16 C.F.R. § 240.14 (1982) ("[A] customer
who knows, or should know, that he is receiving payments or services which are not
available on proportionally equal terms to his competitors engaged in the resale of
the same seller's products, may be proceeded against by the Commission under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act . ).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976).
306. Id. § 25.
307. Id. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
308. Id. § 26 (1976).
309. Elman, supra note 2, at 4.
310. No preference is expressed in the Act itself. Nor is there one found in the
legislative history. For instance, Representative Patman expressed no particular pref-
erence for a method of enforcement before enactment:
Question. Who will enforce this Law?
Answer. Since this will be an amendment to the Clayton Act, it is backed
by all of the remedies afforded by the Clayton Act:
First. By cease-and-desist order of the Federal Trade Commission, en-
forced if necessary by order of the Federal courts, and punishable for its
disobedience.
Second. By injunction suit, prosecuted by the Attorney General.
Third. By similar suit or injunction or damages prosecuted by anyone
injured by its violation.
80 Cong. Rec. 7760 (1936) (extension of remarks of Rep. Patman concerning H.R.
8442). And later he cited the "concurrent authority" of the Commission and the
Justice Department. W. Patman, supra note 2, at 186.
311. See infra notes 319-26, 350-51 and accompanying text.
312. The more notable ones include: 1) the study by Gerard Henderson in 1924,
G. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission (1924); 2) the Hoover Commission's
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summarized the criticism: "[F]irst, [we] don't know what [we're]
doing or why [we're] doing it, second, [we] haven't enlisted the help
of the staff in straightening out the mess, and, third, even if [we] had,
it would have been a waste of time." 313
For years the Commission had been described as "the little old lady
of Pennsylvania Avenue." The intended characterization was of the
Commission's general lack of consumer protection and antitrust en-
forcement activities. In contrast, the Commission had been until re-
cently an activist in Robinson-Patman matters; its sins were of com-
mission, not omission. It almost unfailingly construed the Act to
produce the most anticompetitive and inefficient results. It broadly
construed prohibitory provisions and narrowly construed exemptory
provisions. 314 Its interpretations weakened the competitive injury re-
quirement, 31 5 restricted the statutory defenses,316 and extended the
area of per se illegality.3 17 Even when its decisions were denied en-
1949 Report, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions app. N (1949); 3) the Landis
Report in 1960, Landis Report, supra note 34; 4) the Auerbach Report in 1964,
Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48
Minn. L. Rev. 383 (1964); 5) the Nader Study in 1969, E. Cox, R. Fellmeth & J.
Schulz, The Consumer and the Federal Trade Commission-A Critique of the Con-
sumer Protection Record of the FTC, reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 1539 (1969); and
6) the ABA Study in 1969, ABA, Report of the Commission to Study the FTC (1969)
[hereinafter cited as ABA Report]. There were also critical evaluations in the Neal
Report, Neal Report, supra note 80,at 9-10, the Stigler Report, Stigler Report, supra
note 280, at X-3, X-8, and the 1955 Attorney General's Report, Att'y Gen. Rep.,
supra note 194, at 155-221.
313. Dietrich, The Inside View of the Revitalization Question, 41 Antitrust L.J.
489, 490 (1972).
314. See Barton, Provisions and Provisos, in New Theories of Federal Trade
Commission Enforcement, Trade Reg. Reports (No. 153, extra ed.) (CCH) 94, 96
(1960) (remarks at 1960 Antitrust Law Symposium).
315. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948). In the
automotive parts cases in the 1950's and early 1960's, injury to competition was
found even when the often insignificantly lower prices received by the members of
jobber buying groups were not reflected in lower resale prices, and although the
buyers paying less actually performed inventory functions that increased costs, thus
offsetting their nominal price advantage. E.g., Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44, 46-
47 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964). In American Oil Co., 60
F.T.C. 1786 (1962), vacated, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
954 (1964), the Commission had found injury to competition from temporary selec-
tive price cuts quoted by the supplier to several dealers in economic self-defense,
when faced with prior cuts by competitors in the context of a transient local gasoline
price war. Fortunately, here the Seventh Circuit vacated. American Oil Co. v. FTC,
325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
316. See supra notes 195 & 260 and accompanying text.
317. The FTC, for example, extended the scope of § 2(c), a per se provision, from
the prohibition of "dummy" brokerage arrangements to include the prohibition,
unconditionally and irrespective of competitive considerations, of lower prices to a
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forcement on appeal, the Commission persisted in subsequent cases to
follow the same interpretations.3 18
Today the Commission has turned almost 180 degrees away from its
activist enforcement policies. It has even very recently gone beyond
the approach of benign neglect, characteristic of the recent past, 319 to
customer made possible by the reduction of a legitimate broker's fee on a large
volume transaction. Henry Broch & Co., 54 F.T.C. 673, 698-99 (1957), vacated, 261
F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 363 U.S. 166 (1960). Subsequently, the Commission
enlarged the sweep of Broch by barring not only prices reflecting savings in brokers'
fees, but also price reductions based on lower commissions by manufacturers' sales
agents. Thomasville Chair Co., 58 F.T.C. 441, 442-43, 448-51 (1961), vacated, 306
F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962). The Commission also enlarged the scope of per se illegality
by its expansive interpretation of § 2(d) and 2(e). For instance, it read § 2(d)'s
condition that promotional payments be "available" to require that they be affirma-
tively offered or made available. See, e.g., Chestnut Farms Chevy Chase Dairy, 53
F.T.C. 1050, 1060 (1957).
318. For instance, the FTC's application of a "diversion of business test" for
competitive injury had been denied enforcement in two cases: Minneapolis-Honey-
well Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 398-99 (1948), vacated, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277,
299-300 (1957), vacated, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961). Yet, when an FTC examiner
in International Milling Co., 63 F.T.C. 1123 (1963), expressly discarded the "diver-
sion of business" formula, the Commission majority deleted those passages of the
examiner's opinion. Id. at 1137-38.
This persistence in following its own interpretations was especially questionable
when the Commission chose not to seek review of courts of appeals' decisions. After
being reversed in Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 1962),
for example, the Commission did not seek review in the Supreme Court. Neverthe-
less, it stated that it intended to adhere to its position disapproved by the Fifth
Circuit. See Thomasville Chair Co., 63 F.T.C. 1048, 1049 (1963) (memorandum
accompanying final order).
Just as the Commission's substantive interpretations of the Act were anticompeti-
tive, so were its cease and desist orders. These orders were generally of perpetual
duration and broader in scope, both in terms of products and geography, than the
alleged violations. See Kauper, Cease and Desist: The History, Effect, and Scope of
Clayton Act Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1095, 1147-
57 (1968). With the threat of criminal contempt, these orders would freeze the
respondent's pricing practices without regard to changes in conditions or the compet-
itive environment. See Justice Report, supra note 17, at 33-34.
319. After three decades of active enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act by the
FTC, FTC enforcement diminished to the point where Frederick Rowe noted in 1966
that "a new trend appears to be emerging at the FTC: the quiet .chloroforming of
Robinson-Patman." Rowe I, supra note 2, at 14. The contrast in activity was dra-
matic. In 1963 there were 225 orders under § 2(d) of the Act alone. Recent Efforts
Hearings [pt. II], supra note 7, at 189. In 1966 there were only 72 orders in total. See
id. at 187-91. More importantly, however, only six new Robinson-Patman com-
plaints had been filed. See id. at 186-91. See infra note 323.
The 1970's saw a continued lack of enforcement. In 1973, for example, only five
new Robinson-Patman investigations had been started, id., and from 1971-1976




one of reaching out to correct past mistakes.3 20 The present Chairman
of the FTC, who is not a lawyer but a professional economist, requires
from every complaint both a legal and an economic case. 3 21 And his
economics appear to be influenced by those of the Chicago School.3 22
Thus, if the FTC is a sinner now, it is only in the eyes of the Act's
supporters.
What does this mean for Robinson-Patman enforcement? Probably
even less of what little there was. The statistics indicate the FTC's
disinclination to enforce the Act over the recent past.3 23 Recently, the
Director of the Commission's Bureau of Competition in testimony
before Congress identified three situations in which the Commission is
320. Recently the Commission has filed, with the Department of Justice, an
amicus brief in Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983),
urging reversal, and taking a position on the meeting-competition defense which is in
contrast to its past position. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Reversal at 8, 15, Falls City. It also recently filed a proposed order in the Borden
litigation reversing its decision, and adopting a very new approach to what pricing
practices by monopolists are permissible. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying
text. Borden was not a Robinson-Patman action but, a fortiori, the Commission's
views as to a monopolist's pricing should also be applicable to a non-monopolist's
price discrimination.
321. Interview with James C. Miller, III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission,
51 Antitrust L.J. 3, 5 (1982).
322. Id. at 9. Chairman Miller stated that he was "greatly influenced by Bob Bork
and Dick Posner." Id. For some of their views on Robinson-Patman, see supra notes
138, 231, 234 and accompanying text.
323. See Impact Hearings, supra note 20, at 70-72 (statement of Thomas J.
Campbell, Director, Bureau of Competition, FTC) (Statistical Appendices). The
following tables are relevant excerpts from the statistics prepared by the FTC for this
House subcommittee hearing:








This includes correspondence referred to the Bureau on all subjects, in-
cluding mergers, monopolization and other matters as well as R-P and
vertical restraints.
2 Through August 27. The number of letters is unusually high because of
correspondence concerning well-publicized mergers this year (e.g., Mobil/
Marathon).
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ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-INVESTIGATIONS
Fiscal Initial Phase Formal Complaints Consents IP Closed FI Closed Litigated
Year Investigation Investigation Issued Issued w/o Action w/o Action Order
The complaints reported under this accounting treat multiple respondents as one, and do not
include complaints issued in immediate conjunction with a consent order. Accordingly, the
number of complaints reported is smaller here than in some alternative tabulations.
Data reflects investigations through 6-30-82, and orders through 8-30-82.
ROBINSON PATMAN... CONSENT DECREES AND
LITIGATED ORDERS SINCE [1975]
Robinson Patman'
Fiscal









I Robinson-Patman orders and consents reflected in this table may total
more than the number actually issued in a given year because some cases
were prosecuted under several different sections of the Act.
2 Cases tabulated for Fiscal Year 1976 include consents and orders between
July 1, 1975 and November 30, 1976.
SIZES OF RESPONDENTS IN [ROBINSON-PATMAN] CASES









I In terms of sales in current dollars.
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most likely to bring a Robinson-Patman action, 32 4 and five situations
in which it would not expect to bring one. 325 These examples indicate
a limited "window of enforcement." The current economic approach
of the Commission is a welcome one, though of course it is subject to
change after the next presidential election.
32 6
324. Id. at 66-67. Campbell described the three situations as follows:
The first group of cases involves predation or attempted monopoly. A
large, dominant firm may use selective price cuts in a campaign to drive its
smaller rivals from the market. If the price cuts result in the goods being
sold below cost it constitutes predation, and may be illegal. The standards
for actionable predation are quite strict. Where predation is present, how-
ever, the tools by which it was carried out will often include Robinson-
Patman Act violations. The price cuts will often have been focused on
particular groups of customers or geographic markets, resulting in a dis-
crimination between those sales and sales made outside the target area. In
addition to challenging the predation directly, therefore, the Commission
may also challenge the price discriminations used to carry it out.
In a second group of cases the price discrimination originates with a
dealer rather than with the manufacturer. This is the so-called "power
buyer" situation. A powerful dealer may demand a special price concession
from the factory and threaten to withhold its business, or to reduce its
orders, if the concession is not granted. The resulting reduced demand may
well lessen the nation's total output of goods and services. This is, moreover,
bad competition policy since price breaks have been given on a basis other
than efficiency or "the merits." Where this situation exists we would want
the Commission to be especially vigilant on behalf of the smaller competi-
tors. At least two of our internal investigations presently involve such allega-
tions, one focusing on a department store's purchase of housewares, and the
other on a chain store's purchase of books.
A third group of cases involves attempts by a manufacturer to confer
market power on one of his dealers. This practice unfairly burdens the
competitors of the favored dealer. The Commission has a complaint out-
standing against General Motors which raises some of these issues. The
complaint charges that GM has given discriminatory advertising allowances
to the largest car rental agencies. If true, it would suggest that the company
has increased its chances of making large fleet sales, but that the smaller
rental firms have been unfairly disadvantaged as a result.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
325. Id. at 67. These are:
(1) where the price difference merely reflects the actual differences in the
costs of servicing dealers; (2) where a price difference is offered to meet a
good-faith price of a competitor; (3) where the discrimination is not large
and is unlikely to last long before being corrected by the market; (4) where
alternative sources of supply at the discounted price are readily available;
and (5) where our action, by demanding uniform charges, would tend to
stabilize prices among members of an oligopoly.
Id. (footnote omitted).
326. It appears that two Commissioners might welcome such a change. See, e.g.,
Borden, Inc., 48 Fed. Reg. 9023, 9028-30 (1983) (Proposed Order Modification with




2. Department of Justice
The Department has concurrent authority to enforce the Robinson-
Patman Act amendments to section 2 of the Clayton Act and exclusive
authority to enforce section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act-the crimi-
nal provisions.3 27 Yet its enforcement activities, both civil 328 and crim-
inal, 329 "have been few and episodic, ' 330 and even when the Depart-
ment has invoked the Act, it usually has been only as an alternative
theory in a predominantly Sherman or Clayton Act suit. 33'
A combination of factors appears to have contributed to this lack of
enforcement. The underlying and basic factor is probably what one
official called the "philosophic bias" against the Act 332-the feeling
that the Act is at odds with the competitive mandate of the Sherman
Act. Also important, however, are various pragmatic considerations
that have reinforced the philosophic disinclination.
One such consideration is the difficulty of developing an expertise in
Robinson-Patman. It is very much a discrete area of antitrust law.
327. Private plaintiffs were also allowed to sue under § 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act until January 1958 when the Supreme Court held that § 3 was not one of the
"antitrust laws" under § 1 of the Clayton Act. See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation
Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 (1958).
328. The lack of Justice Department civil enforcement is illustrated by the testi-
mony of one Antitrust Division official before a House Subcommittee 22 years after
the passage of the Act. He stated in connection with the then upcoming trial on the
remand of United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1954), "to my recollection [this
is] the first time that the Department of Justice will be involved in the arduous task of
proving a civil Robinson-Patman Act violation." Dairy Price Discrimination Hear-
ings [pt. III], supra note 11, at 678. And that case never did go to trial.
329. The lack of criminal enforcement is indicated by the statement of a Chair-
man of the ABA Antitrust Section that in "the jungle of Robinson-Patman . . . the
potential liability is only civil." Symposium, Risk Taking Under the Antitrust Laws,
44 Antitrust L.J. 375, 422 (1975). Of course, this statement is technically incorrect,
see supra notes 75 & 327 and accompanying text, but it represents the perception of
the bar after years of Department inaction. See H. Shniderman, supra note 30, at
151-52 & n.2.
330. C. Edwards, supra note 43, at 67; accord Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 194, at
199.
331. See C. Edwards, supra note 43, at 682 app. B.
332. Then Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sims stated in an interview
that the recent Antitrust Division arguments against the Robinson-Patman Act were
based "on 'logic,' anecdotal information, and 'philosophic bias."' Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 729, at A-20 (Sept. 30, 1975). He also noted that the Depart-
ment "has 'never been a strong supporter of Robinson-Patman." Id; accord Liebeler,
supra note 6, at 20 ("the Antitrust Division has never cared much for the Robinson-
Patman Act"). It is interesting to note how others view this "bias." The critics of the
Act naturally see it as in the public interest. See, e.g., Liebeler, supra note 6, at 43.
On the other hand, the Act's supporters see this "bias" as either a sinister "conflict of
interest" in the Department's enforcement duties, Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. I],
supra note 7, at 607-08 (remarks of Rep. Gonzalez), or the cause of the Department's
failure to understand the merits of the Act, id. at 271 (remarks of Kintner).
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Years of trust-busting under the Sherman Act would not prepare one
to litigate a Robinson-Patman case. "[C]onventional antitrust precepts
cannot supply the beginnings of wisdom [in Robinson-Patman, in
which] legal judgment is lost in a maze of provisos and quibbles. 333
Besides the basic legal incongruities, the ever-present accounting
intricacies require an expertise "most of [the Department's] attorneys
do not have.'334 The natural inclination to avoid the unfamiliar is
compounded by the Antitrust Division's multi-step investigation and
complaint process, 335 which requires that a number of different law-
yers be familiar with the applicable law.
Another, pragmatic reason for non-enforcement by the Department
is that the FTC has had much experience with the Act and until
recently was eager to enforce it. 336 It is no wonder, then, that a
"rough-and-ready allocation" of Robinson-Patman cases to the Com-
mission has been made.
337
To summarize the Department's enforcement practices, familiarity
bred contempt and disuse, unfamiliarity also bred disuse and this
combination, together with active FTC enforcement, created the
present nonenforcement posture of the Department.
338
Most critics of the Act and its enforcement have spared the Depart-
ment from their criticisms because the Department "has had little or
nothing to do with [the Act]. ' 339 Still, while lack of enforcement,
especially when compared to the results of active enforcement by the
FTC, may be something of a virtue, total lack of activity in this area is
not. Rather than abstaining, the Department could have attempted to
persuade courts and the Commission to adopt a more pro-competitive
interpretation of the Act, along the lines, for instance, of the sugges-
tions in the Attorney General's Report. 340 Yet the Department, until
recently, did not heed those suggestions.
341
333. Rowe II, supra note 27, at 541.
334. Dairy Price Discrimination Hearings [pt. III], supra note 11, at 678.
335. For a good discussion of the Antitrust Division's investigation and complaint
process, see E. Kintner, Primer on the Law of Mergers 319-47 (1973).
336. See Liebeler, supra note 6, at 20 ("The Commission has usually been enthusi-
astic about its opportunities to enforce [the Robinson-Patman Act].").
337. Dairy Price Discrimination Hearings [pt. III], supra note 11, at 678; Recent
Efforts Hearings [pt. I], supra note 7, at 594.
338. Or, using merger analysis, if the Department's enforcement activities were
the relevant product market, the purists in the Division would exclude Robinson-
Patman from the relevant market because it does not serve the same purpose as the
Sherman Act (no cross-elasticity of demand), and those sympathetic to the Act, if
any, would exclude Robinson-Patman because of the difficulties of retooling to
effectively enforce it (no cross-elasticity of supply or production).
339. Liebeler, supra note 6, at 20. Liebeler did criticize the Division's "early and
badly misconceived foray against the A&P." Id.
340. See Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 194, at 129-221.
341. Perhaps feelings of comity prevented active public participation before the
Commission, but there could have been high-level liaison between the Attorney
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Today, the Antitrust Division seems to be working more closely
with the FTC, 342 and to be actively seeking to influence the direction
of antitrust law, including that of Robinson-Patman, 343 in the Su-
preme Court. 344
3. Private Plaintiffs
The Act may also be enforced through suits by private plaintiffs
"injured in [their] business or property" by a violation of the Act. 345
General, the Commissioners and their staffs. See Stigler Report, supra note 280, at X-
4. But see E. Kintner, supra note 199, at 287 ("The [liaison] system has been
remarkably effective in practice, and this alone is a tribute to the practical bent of
those charged with the enforcement of the act."). The Stigler Report in its study of
general antitrust policy concluded that if such a system were instituted "the Commis-
sion [would] pay some heed to the Department's views, if forcefully expressed, on
antitrust and trade-regulation policy." Stigler Report, supra note 280, at X-4. In the
Department's favor are its few amicus briefs filed on petitions for certiorari before
the Supreme Court, stating the Department's disagreement with the Commission's
view of the law. For instance, in Purolator Prods. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968), the Department filed an amicus brief in
support of the petition for certiorari, contending that the Commission's interpreta-
tion of the Act to require a split-function distributor to pay the same price as an
independent jobber who performed no warehousing function would impede competi-
tion in distribution and protect existing and possibly antiquated distribution systems
from normal pressures of competition and innovation. Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 23, id.
In Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1009 (1966), the Solicitor General also filed an amicus brief. While
stating that he "agrees with the Commission that the present case does not warrant
further review," he also noted that "the Commission's decision suggests an interpreta-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act that could impose serious and perhaps unjustifiable
limitations upon economically beneficial vertical integration of concerns engaged in
the wholesale and retail distribution of merchandise." Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, id.
And in the most radical show of disagreement, the Solicitor General in Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 340 U.S.231 (1951), refused to
represent the Commission on appeal. While these briefs represented movement in the
right direction, they were merely reactions to cases thrust before the Department by
the appellate process. The Department never pursued these or subsequent cases
before the Commission or lower courts.
342. The FTC and Department filed a joint brief for the United States as amici
curiae in Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983); Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, id.
343. See supra note 342. It did not, however, submit an amicus brief in Jefferson
County Pharmaceutical Ass'n. v. Abbott Labs., 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983).
344. The Department recently filed an amicus brief in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Serv. Corp., cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983), to ask the Supreme Court to
reconsider the per se restriction on resale price maintenance. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 1,
1983, at D5, col. 4.
345. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Plaintiffs may seek treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees 340 as
well as injunctions against future violations.3 47 Private plaintiffs, how-
ever, may sue neither under section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act 348
nor under section 5 of the FTC Act.3
49
Although private actions have always been permitted under all
antitrust laws, only fairly recently have they come of age.35 0 Today,
according to a leading plaintiffs attorney, the private action "is the
only game in town."' 35' This observation is certainly true with regard
to the Robinson-Patman Act, which neither the FTC nor the Depart-
ment is currently enforcing. Recent developments, however, may
serve to reduce the number of private actions.352
Until recently, private antitrust actions have been favored by
courts. This favor has been demonstrated in such subtle ways as by
346. Id.
347. Id. § 26 (1976). Permanent injunctions have been granted in Robinson-
Patman actions. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 346 F.2d
661, 667 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965). Plaintiff may also seek and be
granted a preliminary injunction. In such cases, however, the plaintiff must meet the
usual requirements for obtaining such relief. See Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 307 F.2d 725, 726 (3d Cir. 1962).
348. See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 377 (1958).
349. Despite the longstanding rule that no private right of action can be implied
from the FTC Act, see, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 998(D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973), a
district court in the face of this precedent held that there was such a right when the
defendant allegedly was engaged in practices "nearly identical" to those proscribed in
a 1963 FTC consent decree. Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 1976-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 60,740, at 68,178 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
350. Between 1890 and 1940 only 175 cases involved private actions, and in only
thirteen of those did the plaintiff recover. Comment, Proof Requirements in Anti-
trust Suits: The Obstacles to Treble Damage Recovery, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 130, 138
(1950). This situation began to change in the 1960s, and by the year ending June,
1973, a total of 1152 private antitrust cases had been filed in federal courts. Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 634, at A-5 (Oct. 16, 1973). In the year ending June
1981, 1292 were filed. Director of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 367
(1981).
351. Alioto, The Role of the Private Antitrust Action in Antitrust Enforcement, 43
Antitrust L.J. 67, 67 (1973).
352. See infra note 361 and accompanying text. Separate statistics for the number
of private Robinson-Patman actions are not maintained by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts. Such actions remained rare until recently. R. Posner,
supra note 14, at 29. Even today they are a very small percentage of the total number
of private antitrust actions. See id. ("For example, in all of 1975 only nineteen
decisions in private Robinson-Patman suits were reported in the federal trial or
appellate courts, and eight of these involved other charges under the federal antitrust
laws as well as a Robinson-Patman charge.") (footnote omitted). Of course, the
reported cases do not reflect the true number of such actions, as many are settled and
some opinions are unpublished.
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denominating private plaintiffs "private attorneys general," and in
such more direct ways as limiting the in pari delicto defense.35 3 In
antitrust generally, and in Robinson-Patman law specifically, how-
ever, it appears that such actions present a serious "public interest
gap. ' 354 First, the term "private attorney general" is a misnomer. As
one lawyer accurately noted, the term itself is internally inconsistent:
"An attorney general is someone who is supposedly thinking of the
overall public good. 'Private' indicates selfish and individual inter-
ests. ' 355 Everyone agrees that private plaintiffs, in the words of one
plaintiff's attorney, are "dominated by selfish motives" 356 and not the
public good. Recognition that plaintiffs can only be expected to pur-
sue that which will bring benefit to them points out the need to
consider the results of such self-motivated litigation.
The typical plaintiff, as defined by one plaintiff's attorney, is the
businessman "backed up against the wall" who will go out of business
if he does not sue. 357 With bankruptcy as the sure alternative, he will
not likely care whether he has a valid Robinson-Patman cause of
action. 358
Significantly, some of the most successful plaintiffs' lawyers view
antitrust litigation as a morality play devoid of economics. 359 And
morality plays affect more than juries. Courts are at times equally
353. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140
(1968). See generally Symposium, The Private Action-The Corporate Manager's"
Heavy Artillery, 43 Antitrust L.J. 5, 6-7 (1973) (remarks of Areeda); id. at 25
(remarks of Blecher) [hereinafter cited as Symposium I]. Mr. Blecher even questioned
whether "in today's more enlightened or hospitable [court] environment whether
indeed in some eases a jury is desirable." Id. at 31.
354. Panel Discussion, Private Actions-The Purposes Sought and the Results
Achieved, 43 Antitrust L.J. 73, 124 (1974) (statement of Willis) [hereinafter cited as
Panel Discussion].
355. Id.
356. Alioto, supra note 351, at 70.
357. Symposium I, supra note 352, at 28 (remarks of Blecher).
358. One view of the "backed up against the wall" plaintiff was voiced by one
commentator who noted that a recent Robinson-Patman case, Continental Baking
Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975
(1973), was "representative of that category of private antitrust case which is brought
by unsuccessful businessmen who have already gone out of business (or in some cases
by their trustees in bankruptcy) who are simply trying the antitrust alchemy to create
gold out of grave dust." Panel Discussion, supra note 354, at 92 (statement of Bohon).
Old Homestead is perhaps an example of the "private attorney general" system at its
worst. There the jury was allowed to infer "predatory intent" and award treble
damages of more than $3 million in a primary-line case in which the defendant had
constructed a new bakery doubling its former production capacity and had entered
into a private label contract with a group of independent grocery retailers. 476 F.2d
at 101-04.
359. One "candidly admitted that he preferred economists to stay clear of private
antitrust suits because such suits involved 'issues of morality."' Panel Discussion,
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susceptible to trying to find a way to help a small and financially
troubled litigant.
Traditionally, there is little disincentive for a financially troubled
businessman to sue. As Professor Areeda has noted: "[T]he order of the
day seems to be-by my lights, unhappily-'Sue! You have nothing to
lose but your lawyers' fees, and much to gain through windfalls or
settlement.' "360 Yet, because of recent developments in the law,361
and the traditional contingency-fee arrangement for hiring attorneys,
it may be harder for the private Robinson-Patman plaintiff to obtain a
favorable settlement, and consequently an attorney.3 62
supra note 354, at 97 (remarks of Elzinga commenting on Belcher's candidness).
Another proclaimed "[a]ntitrust is no longer economically oriented. It is now the
slingshot by which the greed, rapacity, or overzealousness of the Goliaths are curbed
by the Davids." Alioto & Blecher, Antitrust in Galbraith's New Industrial State, 13
Antitrust Bull. 215, 220 (1968). In another article the same attorney stated that the
essential rationale of the antitrust laws is to "protect the little fellows from the big
bullies." Alioto, Against Power Abuse: Antitrust Expands, Trial, Apr.-May 1969, at
16. Another attorney stated:
I proceed on the premise that the jury's decision is not reached by applying
highly technical, sophisticated, legal concepts to a relatively complex fact
situation. It is, in my judgment, made on the simple basis of morality. The
plaintiff wins because the jury, through the mysterious chemistry that oper-
ates inside the jury room, has determined that the plaintiff has been
wronged or, in the language of the street, has been kicked around by the
defendants and is thus entitled to some recompense.
Blecher, The Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 38 Antitrust L.J. 50, 52 (1968).
360. Symposium I, supra note 352, at 11.
361. These developments include the elimination of the "automatic damages"
remedy, see supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text, and expansion of the meet-
ing-competition defense, see supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
362. Thus, it is likely that more Robinson-Patman actions will be in the form of
alternate counts in a Sherman Act complaint. Unless it is a price-fixing class-action
suit in which the plaintiff wants to demonstrate price rigidity, a plaintiff has nothing
to lose by adding a Robinson-Patman count, and with the confusion of judges, both
those familiar and those unfamiliar with the Act, who knows what might come of it.
The confusion surrounding the Act was illustrated in FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 406 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 543
F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977). In this case, the district
court dismissed the Sherman Act count that plaintiff had primarily relied upon, but
awarded him approximately one million dollars in treble damages and attorneys' fees
on the Robinson-Patman count, 543 F.2d at 1021, despite clear infirmities in the
plaintiff's Robinson-Patman claim. In particular, on the issue of standing, the same
district court judge had ruled against the plaintiff's position only one year before in a
similar Robinson-Patman complaint. National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 376 F. Supp. 620, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). The busy district court, apparently unaware of its
own precedent, ruled in plaintiff's favor in FLM. The defendants appealed on
various issues including standing but the Second Circuit reversed the award without
addressing the standing issue, holding instead that there had been no discrimination
in price. 543 F.2d at 1024-28. As weak as plaintiff's Robinson-Patman case was, it
went pretty far before the bubble burst. For a recent example of a creative Robinson-
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Nevertheless, the conclusion remains tempting that it is very hard to
justify treble damage suits as being equitable. This is not to say that
there should not be private actions under the Robinson-Patman Act,
but only that their "favored" position should be reevaluated.363
D. Effects of the Robinson-Patman Act
One longtime Robinson-Patman commentator made this very pessi-
mistic assessment of the ability to gauge the effects of the Robinson-
Patman Act accurately:
No one has satisfactorily related the semantic gymnastics that
pervade Commission and judicial opinions to the commercial reali-
ties and their ultimate economic effects throughout the American
business world....
Accordingly, anyone who essays historical evaluations about this
statute is wholly at large, unembarrassed by any full economic
facts, entirely free, indeed required, to speculate, and inescapably
treading the quicksands of controversy. Elementary caution dic-
tates therefore that he only ask questions, rather than offer an-
swers. 
3 6 4
To the extent that judging the effects of the Robinson-Patman Act is
harder than, for instance, those of the Fair Trade Laws, 365 this assess-
ment is correct. Through the use of simple analysis, logic and the
available anecdotal and statistical information, however, some an-
swers may be offered.
1. Beneficial Effects
The Act may have some beneficial effects. One "cynical view [of the
beneficial effects] is that [the Act's] existence keeps Congress from
passing a worse law in the field. ' 366 A less cynical view is that the Act
may have: 1) caused a simplification of "complex pricing structures
and discount formulas which made little sense from a business stand-
Patman theory, see Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 552-61 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
363. See infra text following note 458 (advocating single damage instead of treble-
damage awards). The Department has announced proposals for limiting the avail-
ability of treble damages in antitrust actions to "flagrant" or per se offenses. See N.Y.
Times, Mar. 30, 1983, at D1, col. 6. This supports the views discussed above, and
would undoubtedly apply to Robinson-Patman actions.
364. Austern I, supra note 7, at 19.
365. See Liebeler, supra note 6, at 43 ("[I]t is harder to see the adverse effects of
Robinson-Patman as compared with Fair Trade. The latter permitted open price
fixing with consequences clear to all. The Patman Act is more subtle, more clandes-
tine in its operation.").
366. Rowe III, supra note 198, at 306.
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point"; 36 7 2) discouraged under-the-table deals in the area of advertis-
ing and promotion arrangements;3 6 and 3) prevented predatory pric-
ing practices, to the extent they really exist. 369 Finally, some think
there is a psychological benefit for small businesses to know that at
least one law is concerned with "fair dealing" and was passed for their
specific benefit. 370
2. Harmful Effects
The harmful effects are much easier to determine. The businessman
is confronted with a statute and case law that penalize active and
vigorous competition. Under the Sherman Act he is told to "go out and
compete," while under the Robinson-Patman Act he is told in effect to
"go out and compete, but don't get caught."' 371 This produces harmful
social and commercial costs.
a. Social costs
Often overlooked in appraising Robinson-Patman law are the social
costs, which, though hard to quantify, are nevertheless important.
367. Rowe I, supra note 2, at 11.
368. Austern, Tabula in Naufagio-Administrative Style: Some Observations on
the Robinson-Patman Act, 1953 Antitrust Law Symposium (CCH) 105, 107 [herein-
after cited as Austern III]; Rowe I, supra note 2, at 11.
369. Case studies by such economists as McGee, Telser, Killer and Elzinga have
cast considerable doubt on the proposition that predatory pricing is customary in the
real world. As one recently stated:
This is not to say that businessmen are too ethical to make use of predatory
tactics, but rather that these practices tend to be ineffective. It is hard to get
rich selling below cost or withholding your best product. So my ... point is
that genuine predatory behavior will be rare.
Panel Discussion, supra note 354, at 99 (remarks of Elzinga).
370. See Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. I], supra note 7, at 429.
[My] survey documents another quasi-sociological aspect, the value of Ro-
binson-Patman enforcement in improving morale of small buyers ....
Even in markets where handicaps do not exist, small buyers might be
demoralized by the feeling of unjust handicaps in bargaining, were it not
for the reassurance provided by the presence of Robinson-Patman enforce-
ment.
Id. This conclusion, however, is contradicted by the testimony of small business
representatives who said that the unfulfilled promise of enforcement by the FTC was
demoralizing to small business. E.g., id. at 53, 457.
371. For instance, in one recent seminar on the Act for businessmen, a questioner
was incredulous when told that a manufacturer could not give a bigger functional
discount to a distributor who performs extra services, such as warehousing and
servicing of retailers, than to one who did not. He simply refused to believe that the
law could require that result. Who can blame him? Yet that is the teaching of the
case law. See, e.g., Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401, 403-04 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1009 (1966); Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44, 45-48
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964).
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When the "law is an ass," and so at odds with economic reality, it
produces disrespect. Disrespect for the law is an unfortunate situation,
and with Robinson-Patman law it is a widespread one. This disrespect
often produces evasion-both legal 372 and illegal. Some lawyers even
counsel that in "the jungle of Robinson-Patman ... some risk-taking
[i.e. illegal evasion] may be inevitable. ' 37 3 Those not having the
benefit of counsel probably do not realize that their normal competi-
tive behavior is illegal. In any case, substantial evasion is widely
believed to exist. 374
When normal competitive, but unlawful, behavior is attacked ei-
ther before the FTC in the form of a competitor's complaint, or in
court, the FTC and courts will sometimes wink at the requirements of
the Act. This then produces frustration and disrespect for the legal
process in the complainant.
In short, in the world of Robinson-Patman someone will always be
led to have contempt for the law. When considering the Act's costs,
this effect should not be minimized.
b. Commercial costs-higher prices
The harmful social costs would be sufficient justification to criticize
the Robinson-Patman Act. Yet the commercial costs resulting from the
application of and compliance with the Act have wider effect. In a
nutshell they are higher prices. These result because the Act 1) in-
creases costs of doing business, 2) fosters price rigidity, and 3) facili-
tates price-fixing.
i. Increased costs of doing business
Although the recurrent criticism that the Act leads to higher prices
is difficult to prove statistically because of the lack of comparative
statistics for non-Robinson-Patman situations, 375 the Act undoubtedly
sets in motion a sequence that logically should lead to higher prices.
One such indirect cause has already been discussed-evasion. While
illegal evasion may produce more social than accounting costs, legal
evasion can easily lead to higher prices. For instance, a slight change
372. For a discussion of legal forms of evasion, see Rowe III, supra note 198, at
307.
373. Risk Taking Under the Antitrust Laws, 44 Antitrust L.J. 375, 422 commen-
tary (1975) (remarks of Izard).
374. For example, one commentator remarked that "except for Prohibition, I
know of no other instance of such wholesale evasion of rules laid down by a Govern-
ment agency." Pollack, supra note 200, at 625; accord Rose, supra note 8, at 5
("[T]he Robinson-Patman Act is so at odds with economic reality that it is apparently
disregarded in many transactions in various sectors of the economy.").
375. Some attempt, however, has been made to quantify this phenomenon. See
Liebeler, supra note 6, at 33, 35.
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in the physical design of a product to avoid the "like grade and
quality" requirement 376 of section 2(a) causes extra production costs
directly attributable to the Act.
Costly attorneys' fees also tend to drive prices upwards. Those
businesses seeking to comply with the Act in part or in whole cannot
do it alone; they need lawyers. There may be some truth to the claim
that the Robinson-Patman Act "gives lawyers more reasons for writing
opinions than any other section of the antitrust laws."'377 The complex-
ity of the Act requires that each significant pricing or promotional
decision be "certified by counsel. ' 378 While this requirement benefits
the legal profession, it may cost businesses substantial sums of
money-amounts that may well be reflected in higher prices.
Forcing businesses into inefficient methods of distribution is another
way in which the Act causes price increases. A direct buying retailer,
for instance, cannot legally receive from sellers discounts that reflect
the buyer's cost of performing brokerage or wholesaler functions,
thereby foreclosing the chance that any savings derived from eliminat-
ing a middleman will be passed on to the consumer. Moreover, this
bar naturally discourages backward integration into marketing and
wholesaling, steps that for many retailers would produce cost-saving
efficiencies. 379 Finally, to circumvent this bar the retailer might be
tempted to integrate backward one more step-into production-a
step that on its own terms might be inefficient, but which becomes
economically attractive because of the restrictions of the Act.
Another cause of inefficient business practices is the Act's require-
ment in sections 2(d) and (e) and the FTC Guides that a manufacturer
develop and distribute promotional programs for small retailers even
though the cost of such programs far outweighs any possible return.
This requirement on its face increases costs to the manufacturer,
leading to higher prices for the consumer. 3 0
The Act also increases prices by discouraging producers from enter-
ing new markets. This is the result of cases such as Utah Pie Co. v.
376. See, e.g., Universal-Rundle Corp., 65 F.T.C. 924 (1964), vacated, 382 F.2d
285 (7th Cir. 1967). Universal-Rundle sold bathtubs to Sears, Roebuck for a lower
price than it charged its distributors. Id. at 926. The FTC held that this price
discrimination was outside the reach of the Act because of slight design differences
such as a one-inch difference in height. Id. at 945.
377. 1 M. Hoffmann, Hoffmann's Antitrust Law and Techniques 39 (1963).
378. Rowe III, supra note 198, at 306.
379. For example, A & P very effectively integrated backward into marketing.
See M. Adelman, supra note 65, at 160-61.
380. Ironically, an increasing response of manufacturers to these commercially
uneconomical restrictions is the termination of direct selling to small buyers. See,
e.g., Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. I], supra note 7, at 455-56; Liebeler, supra note 6,
at 32. Such termination not only hurts those small buyers that the Act was meant to
protect, but also increases prices to consumers since another layer of distribution is
now needed for those small buyers to receive the products for resale.
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Continental Baking Co. 381 In that case, national manufacturers en-
gaged in geographic price discrimination, which caused a local com-
petitor to reduce prices drastically. Although the local competitor
enjoyed an increase in its sales volume, retained the largest share of
the market and continued to make a profit, the court nevertheless held
that the jury could reasonably have concluded that the local pie
company would in time feel the financial pinch and be a less competi-
tive force.3 2 Utah Pie therefore, to the extent it is still good law,
33
makes any sustained territorial price variation risky and makes expan-
sion safe only if unsuccessful.84
ii. Price rigidity
For competitors within any particular market Robinson-Patman
"introduces rigidities of various kinds into the pricing structure all the
way from the manufacturer to the ultimate retailer. ' 385 This price
rigidity is no surprise because "[tihe concept that a business should
charge a single price for its goods" is "deeply embedded" within the
Act.: 8 Thus, with respect to a business' amount of understanding of
Robinson-Patman law, ignorance is bliss. The "deeper the company's
381. 386 U.S. 685 (1967). For a very good critique of this case, see Bowman, supra
note 147.
382. 386 U.S. at 703. Justice Stewart was correct in his criticism that "the Court
has fallen into the error of reading the Robinson-Patman Act as protecting competi-
tors, instead of competition." Id. at 705 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
383. Rather than using the analysis in Utah Pie, many lower courts in primary-
line cases have adopted modifications of the Areeda-Turner predatory pricing test.
See supra notes 151-64 and accompanying text. There is still a great risk involved,
though, in ignoring this Supreme Court precedent.
384. Successful expansion will almost always require an initial lowering of prices
in the new market. Such expansion will invite a lawsuit by a local competitor who
under Utah Pie can get to a jury on the issue of injury to competition by showing the
entry, lower prices than charged elsewhere and a general lowering of prices in the
market.
385. Baxter, Testimony before the Domestic Council Review Group on Regula-
tory Reform, Dec. 8, 1975, Transcript at 40 [hereinafter cited as Baxter]; accord
Campbell & Emanuel, A Proposalfor a Revised Price Discrimination and Predatory
Pricing Statute, 13 Harv. J. on Legis. 125, 132-36 (1975); Liebeler, supra note 6, at
28-33; Rose, supra note 8, at 6, 8; Shniderman, The Impact of the Robinson-Patman
Act on Pricing Flexibility, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 173 passim (1962).
386. 1 M. Hoffmann, supra note 377, at 39. As one leading commentator on the
Act has noted:
With a price differential equated with a price discrimination, with injury to
competition virtually presumed from the existence of the price difference,
and with the statutory justifications devitalized, legal caution must inevita-
bly discourage bold or aggressive maneuvers in favor of the conservative and
the safe pricing routine.
Rowe III, supra note 198, at 306 (footnotes omitted).
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understanding of the decisional law under the act, the more hesitant it
is apt to become. 387
Compounding the stabilizing effect on pricing caused by a height-
ened awareness of Robinson-Patman law is the fear of the un-
known. 388 In much of Robinson-Patman law there are only one or two
opinions covering a particular question. While these may dictate the
result in cases having nearly identical circumstances, they do not
establish with any certainty what the result will be in the cases having
many variations of those facts, or even cases with the same facts in
other jurisdictions. Faith in the sound enforcement policies of the
government agencies or in the ability of the courts to reach economi-
cally realistic results could alleviate this uncertainty. While the busi-
nessman is faced with greatly improving records of courts and the
FTC, he knows that a "private attorney general" may be policing the
market and "will take advantage of all the broadest interpretations
against any defendant, and will inevitably strive to push the bounds of
the law to the utmost extreme." 389
Thus, the company that wishes to make selective price cuts has
much going against it. If it can determine with reasonable certainty
that the prices can be defended under the Act, it still must evaluate
the costs and probability of a lawsuit, adverse publicity, trade associa-
tion animosity, complaints to the FTC or Congress, FTC investiga-
tions, increased attorneys' fees, and the need for cost accountants and
market experts. It may even be that the cost of determining the
Robinson-Patman consequences of the price cut alone might outweigh
the possible benefits of the price reduction.
This uncertain balancing is in sharp contrast to the effortless, cost-
less certainty that no change in price means that it will be completely
beyond the Act's proscriptions. 3 0 The path of least resistance, even for
competitive-minded companies, therefore, is price uniformity. Need-
less to say, the company that is disinclined to make price cuts to begin
with will have many reasons not to make them, and can piously tell its
customers that such cuts would be illegal. 391
387. Shniderman, supra note 385, at 176.
388. See id. at 173. ("Any broad-gauged evaluation of the Robinson-Patman Act's
impact on pricing flexibility must take into account the basic uncertainty of the law.
This doubt as to the conduct proscribed may itself tend to discourage pricing innova-
tions, including changes in the level of prices.") (footnote omitted).
389. Rowe IV, supra note 199, at 107-08 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
390. See, e.g., Jones, Testimony before the Domestic Council Group on Regula-
tory Reform, Dec. 8, 1975, Transcript at 33 [hereinafter cited as Jones]. This still
leaves the alternative of an across-the-board cut, but this is an unusual and costly
response to an isolated competitive situation.
391. It is unlikely that a customer would seriously challenge such a statement.
Such a challenge ,ight lead to requests from the seller for cost figures or verifications
of competitors' bids in records that the customer does not have or would not want to
disclose.
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The buyer liability provisions of the Act further enhance price
rigidity.3 92 The ability of an individual buyer to bargain freely for a
lower price is essential to effective competition. 3 3 For this reason,
some think buyer liability has no place in the antitrust laws at all .31
In any case, the watchwords to a competitive buyer are "caveat
emptor."' 39 5 This potential liability is especially troublesome given
that usually only strong or aggressive buyers can exert the pressure
necessary to force price concessions from sellers in oligopolistic mar-
kets or in markets controlled by price collusion.3 96 Put another way,
"the formula for competition is simple: add one part of Sears Roebuck
to twenty parts of oligopoly. 397
392. See supra notes 286-304 and accompanying text.
393. See Elman, supra note 2, at 9 ("[P]rice differences will naturally arise from
the ordinary pressures of everyday bargaining and haggling in a competitive market.
A price discrimination law which results in the elimination of such pressures would
impair or obstruct the competitive process. Especially in a sellers' market that is
oligopolistically structured, the ability of a few buyers to obtain lower prices may be
the only way in which a general reduction of prices in such a market can come
about.") (footnote omitted).
394. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 390, at 23.
395. Id. As Professor Jones stated in his testimony: "One reads anti-trust cases in
this area with amazement [and] increasing incredulity that this conduct could possi-
bly be considered antithetical to competitive pricing." Id.
396. See Elman, supra note 2, at 9. As one scholar observed:
A strong, alert buyer, large enough so that the loss of his patronage is not a
matter of indifference, constantly on the watch for a break which he can
exploit by rolling up the whole price front, able to force concessions first
from one and then from all, and followed by other buyers, can collapse a
structure of control or keep it from ever coming into existence. Small
wonder, as the NRA experience showed, that sellers attempt to keep big
buyers out of the market or to restrict their bargaining power.
Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289,
1300 (1948) (footnote omitted).
397. Wilcox, quoted in F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance 191 (1973) (footnote omitted); see Liebeler, supra note 6, at 29. It may
be significant that both price-fixers and supporters of Robinson-Patman dislike "se-
cret" price concessions to l'dyers.
The Commission's efforts against "power buyers" when the seller makes the ad-
vances are also troublesome. One commentator has described this situation:
When a seller hungry for business decides to make a price concession, to
whom will he make a concession? Almost inevitably [the large buyer].
There is more payoff in it, and therefore it is more likely than not that the
first beneficiary of a break from the prevailing prices in such an industry
will be to a large buyer.
Baxter, supra note 385, at 42. This in turn may cause a process of price erosion
throughout the industry. As explained further by then Professor Baxter:
Assuming that Seller No. 1 has gained a large buyer, somone has lost a good
customer, and in that sense now has excess capacity, and has to go looking
for some other buyer. So, the pressures are magnified for another price
concession.
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The Supreme Court opinion in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC,3 8 by allowing the buyer to invoke the seller's meeting-competi-
tion defense, 319 gives some solace, but it still leaves both the buyer and
the seller at the mercy of the fact-finder's determination of "good
faith. ' 400 Thus, the buyer has to be very careful when it knows that
the seller's bid depends upon the meeting-competition defense, espe-
cially if the seller can allege that he dealt with a "lying buyer."
40 1
Moreover, A & P did nothing to remove the hazards a buyer encoun-
ters by accepting a bid based on the cost-justification defense. Thus,




The Act fosters price fixing 40 3 in basically three ways. First, by
requiring uniform prices the Act provides an enforcement tool for
price-fixing agreements, which are illegal under the Sherman Act.
"Cheaters" may be subjected to actual or threatened lawsuits under
Indeed, to the extent he finds out how he lost this good customer, the
second seller is motivated for a variety of reasons to respond in kind, and
perhaps attack a large customer of the first seller. And the process is typi-
cally generalized until these offlist prices filter down through most of the
retail categories. Perhaps ultimately the industry rationalizes its pricing
process by printing new list prices which reflect the now somewhat lower
level of prices and more nearly reflecting real cost.
Inflation of course may be disguised in this process largely, but histori-
cally real costs of most commodities do come down, and then the whole
process may start again.
Id. at 42-43 (emphasis in original).
398. 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
399. See supra note 207.
400. See infra notes 412-17 and accompanying text.
401. See infra text accompanying note 496.
402. It has also been suggested that price inflexibility may be promoted by the fact
that a seller may be liable for third- and fourth-line injury to competitors. See
Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 385, at 135 n.44. The authors noted:
If Seller knows that he may be held liable for injury to competitors of Buyer
A's customer, he may police Buyer A's pricing practices, to keep him from
price discriminating. This will result in Buyer A's charging higher prices to
the third level than he otherwise would, and price inflexibility will be
promoted on the first, second, and third levels. . . . Seller might engage in
such policing tactics even if he believes that his own price differential is
lawful. As long as there is a possibility that he may be held liable for third,
fourth, and possibly even fifth level effects, he may decide that the safe
policy is to police his customers rather than risk liability.
Id.
403. Over 20 years ago Dean Levi noted that the Act "tends to be a price-fixing
statute hiding in the clothes of anti-monopoly and pro-competition symbols." Levi,
supra note 3, at 61. This remains true today.
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the Act, complaints to enforcement officials, bad publicity, and the
anguished cries of competitors before sympathetic congressional com-
mittees. Such actions, which might evidence illegality under the Sher-
man Act, may be defended under the Robinson-Patman Act as the
public-spirited policing of a "private attorney general."
Second, the ambiguous nature of the "good faith" requirement 40 4
imposed on the meeting-competition proviso in section 2(b) 4 5 also
fosters price fixing. One of the elements of good faith is the require-
ment that the seller attempt to verify the lower price offered by its
competitor. 40 6 Although "good faith" in section 2(b) "does not require
the seller to justify price discriminations by showing that in fact they
met a competitive price, "407 what exactly is required, short of obtain-
ing proof positive, remains an open question. In Viviano Macaroni
Co. v. FTC,408 the Third Circuit, in rejecting a section 2(b) defense,
held that the seller should have verified the buyer's oral report and
investigated the buyer himself "in view of the 'tendency of buyers to
secure the most advantageous terms of sales possible."' ' 4 9 The court
also held that the seller should have verified its salesman's report of
"an inroad" by a competitor, even though the salesman had eighteen
years of service and the dollar amount involved was not large. 410
Although other indicia of lack of good faith were present in Viviano,
the case was a warning to businessmen of the dangers of verifying
solely through their customers, and left doubts whether they could
rely on their salesmen, however senior, to do the verifying. Even if
Viviano, decided before Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC,41 1
merely represents an extreme or isolated case, it nevertheless illus-
trates how the "good faith" standard gives tremendous discretion to
the Commission, courts and juries in judging a seller's verification
efforts. 412 This discretion is especially troublesome to a businessman
404. See Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2121-22 (1963) See supra note
201 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text. It is ironic that the provision
that is touted as making possible the compatability of the Robinson-Patman Act with
the Sherman Act, see Antitrust Developments, supra note 199, at 143; E. Kintner,
supra note 199, at 178, facilitates price-fixing, which is per se illegal under the
Sherman Act.
406. See supra note 206.
407. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945) (emphasis added).
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
408. 411 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1969).
409. Id. at 259 (quoting FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945)).
410. 411 F.2d at 259.
411. 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
412. As the Commission itself has noted, the "standard, whether it be considered
'subjective' or 'objective,' is inherently ad hoc [and further that] the same method of
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who knows that the trier of fact years later may be a hostile jury
sitting in the home town of the plaintiff.
The recent Supreme Court opinions in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.41 3 and A & P, as salutary as they are, provide little
comfort to sellers. Gypsum established that direct inter-seller price
verification is not only not required under the Robinson-Patman Act,
but will be subject to "close scrutiny under the Sherman Act." 41 4 It left
the seller on its own, however, as to what it should do to establish its
"good faith," a defense the Court noted was very "fact-specific." 41 5 In
A & P, the Court appeared on the facts to require very little action on
the part of the seller to establish the necessary good faith. 41 6 It is not
likely, however, to grant certiorari to rectify incorrect "good faith"
determinations too frequently, given its recent statement that the
question whether there is good faith is "for the trier of fact, not this
Court." 41 7 Thus, determinations of good faith by the fact-finder are
still controlling, a fact that causes sellers who expect to rely on the
meeting-competition defense to take whatever means possible, short
of actual inter-seller verification, to learn the prices of its competitors.
Finally, the Act encourages price fixing by imposing liability for so-
called third-line injury. In third-line injury cases the seller becomes
responsible for the pricing practices of its customers. 418 Many com-
meeting competition may be consistent with an inference of good faith in some
circumstances, inconsistent with such an inference in others." Continental Baking
Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963). Nor has the literature designed to serve the
businessman and his lawyer been more specific. One guide notes that the "courts
require only.. . a reasonable effort to identify the individual competitive price in a
businesslike manner." C. Hills, supra note 262, at 314.
413. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
414. Id. at 458-59.
415. Id. at 455.
416. See 440 U.S. at 83-85. See supra note 206.
417. Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983).
418. In Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946),
modified, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), for example, the
Commission held that the oil company violated § 2(a) by selling to gasoline jobbers at
a lower price than to its retailers. Id. at 272-73, 283. The jobbers had resold to their
retailers at a price (over which Standard had no control) lower than Standard had
charged its retailers. The Commission held that this conferred upon the customers of
the jobbers a competitive advantage. Id. at 275-76. The Seventh Circuit affirmed,
stating that Standard "had given a club to its wholesalers which they passed on to
their retailers to bludgeon their competitors." 173 F.2d at 216. In a rare act, the
Solicitor General refused to represent the FTC before the Supreme Court. The Court
never reached the third-line injury issue because it held that the Commission should
have considered the meeting-competition defense. The majority opinion did note,
however, the possible policy conflict between the Sherman and Robinson-Patman
Acts. 340 U.S. at 249 & n.15.
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mentators have noted that this theory of liability virtually requires the
dual distribution seller to control the resale price of its customers in
violation of the Sherman Act.419 Of course, this facilitation or encour-
agement of vertical price fixing would also tend to raise consumer
prices.
II. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
The record of Robinson-Patman to date compels the conclusion that
some form of change is necessary. This part of the Article first evalu-
ates the alternatives available, and then proposes specific changes in
the Act.
A. Alternative Methods of Change
Three main options are available to change the Robinson-Patman
status quo: 1) more enlightened enforcement and administration of
the Act; 2) complete repeal; or 3) statutory amendment. Each has its
advantages and disadvantages, and its adherents.
1. Better Enforcement
Many have advocated better enforcement of the Act. The Attorney
General's Report, for instance, took the position that the Act could be
harmonized with the Sherman Act by proper interpretation and en-
forcement. 42 0 Yet there are also those who think such an approach is
hopeless. 42 1'
Standard Oil Co. may be viewed as a secondary-line case because the disfavored
purchaser was a direct-buying retailer. This labeling, of course, does not change the
effect of the requirements on sellers in multi-level distribution to favored purchasers.
419. See, e.g., C. Hills, supra note 262, at 292 ("concept poses a problem in that it
induces the supplier to engage in resale price maintenance contrary to prohibitions of
the Sherman Act"); F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 200 ("in context of dual distribution
[third-line injury theory of liability] inherently promotes resale price maintenance");
Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 385, at 135 n.44 ("the most efficient way for seller
to police [buyer's] pricing practices might be by imposing a resale maintenance
agreement... a result in contravention of § 1 of the Sherman Act").
420. Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 194 at 164-65. Rowe has similarly concluded:
[I]t is my personal belief that many undesirable manifestations of the Act
are amenable to improvements by enlightened administration and interpre-
tation within the framework of the present statutory text. I also feel that
important progress could be achieved in reducing some existing areas of
disagreement between enforcement officials and the antitrust bar by a
program of joint effort and discussion in a spirit of professional competence
and good faith.
Rowe III, supra note 198, at 314 n.58.
421. Handler noted: "There were many in the past who felt that a reconstituted
Commission and the courts could bring some measure of clarity to its turgid wording.
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Robinson-Patman law is very complex and confusing, even for those
with years of experience, and thus is not conducive to enlightened
interpretation by judges who have only momentary exposure necessi-
tated by the particular case before them. 42 2 Considering the record of
the FTC, in light of its continued exposure and its expert legal and
economic staff, it is unrealistic to expect better results from courts.
Nevertheless, recent cases indicate that courts and the FTC both are
doing much better in reconciling Robinson-Patman law with the Sher-
man Act. 423 While this is a promising development, it is too early to
tell whether this trend will continue or how successful it will be. One
reason for the uncertainty is that no matter how well intentioned the
courts may be, the language of the Act, its legislative history, and
older precedents all point not to the protection of competition, but
rather to the protection of competitors. 42 4 While courts have given lip-
service to an "injury-to-competition" test, the "inference-of-injury"
rule for secondary-line cases, recently reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court, 425 protects competitors usually at the expense of competition.
Moreover, the Court has come close to explicitly recognizing the
protectionist character of the Act, and labeling it as the intended
purpose of Congress. 426
In light of the above, courts can attempt to reconcile the Act with
the competitive principles of antitrust in general in two ways.427 One
is simply to start fresh and try with a broad brush to read competitive
principles into all sections of the Act. 428 This approach has the advan-
tages of being quick and effective. But few courts are likely to be
informed or motivated enough to be this bold, especially in light of the
Court's admonition twice in the 1982 Term against courts using policy
interpretations to change the express legislative intent or effect of the
Act. 429
The other way is to give greater weight to the expressly stated
defenses in the Act itself. While there does not appear to be much
But these hopes have never been realized, and I believe there is no escape from our
undertaking a comprehensive legislative overhaul." Handler, supra note 14, at 457-
58.
422. Indeed, judges have complained about the problems of dealing with Robin-
son-Patman. See F. Rowe, supra note 27, at xi, & nn.9-10. And, as noted, one judge
in two cases reached opposite results on the same issue, and apparently was not even
aware of it. See supra note 362.
423. See supra notes 164, 281-85, 324-26 and accompanying text.
424. Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 194, at 166.
425. See Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983).
426. See supra note 28.
427. But see supra note 69 (discussion of protectionist strain in antitrust law).
428. See supra notes 239, 283-85 and accompanying text.
429. See Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282 (1983);
Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs. 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983).
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movement with regard to the cost-justification defense as yet, 430 the
Supreme Court has breathed new and invigorating life into the meet-
ing-competition defense.431 The Court's broad approach to the scope
of the defense in Falls City Industries432 and its application of the
defense in A & P 433 indicate that it can be in some pricing situations an
effective vehicle to make the Act compatible with the Sherman Act.
The lower courts have been given the means; time will tell how well
they use it.
Finally, another tool to reconcile the enforcement of the Act with
competitive principles is already available but not in use. The Depart-
ment, which frequently advocates protection of competition before
both regulatory agencies and courts as an amicus on Sherman Act
matters, could establish a section to advise courts on Robinson-Pat-
man matters in private litigation. Robinson-Patman litigations are not
so numerous that staffing would be a problem. Besides, it would be
interesting to see how often the public attorney general and the pri-
vate attorneys general agree.
2. Repeal
In the first few decades after the passage of the Act, repeal was not
seriously advocated by Robinson-Patman critics. 434 This may have
been in part because of the view that the Act's problems would
disappear with maturity. For some, however, it became apparent that
the problems were not caused by growing pains, but instead were
congenital. Dean Levi was one of the first to ask whether the time had
come for repeal. 435 Others have since answered the question in the
affirmative. 436 Clearly, repeal is the most effective way to eliminate
the anticompetitive aspects of Robinson-Patman law.
The possibility of repeal, however, is not very great. While the
abolition of the Fair Trade Laws might seem encouraging, 437 it is not
really instructive as to Robinson-Patman. With respect to the Fair
Trade Laws, consumers and congressmen alike could see that outright
price-fixing existed, which visibly raised prices in Fair Trade states.
The consumer groups were united in opposition to the Fair Trade
430. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
432. See supra note 208.
433. See supra note 207.
434. See Austern III, supra note 368, at 106 ("so far as I am aware no legal
commentator over the past sixteen years (since the passage of the Act) has advocated
outright repeal") (footnote omitted).
435. See Levi, supra note 3, at 73.
436. See, e.g., Liebeler, supra note 6, at 18; Rose, supra note 8, at 15.
437. See supra note 24.
1198 [Vol. 51
9ROBINSON-PA TMAN LAW
Laws and it, therefore, was a fairly safe vote for members of Con-
gress.
The Robinson-Patman Act, on the other hand, because it is so
complex, allows for no clear statistical proof of adverse effects. No
consumer groups have supported its repeal, and even Ralph Nader
and his organization have not responded to appeals from the Antitrust
Division to support its proposals. And while states anticipated the
repeal of the federal Fair Trade enabling statute by repealing their
own fair trade laws, the trend, if any, is just the opposite with price
discrimination laws-states that do not presently have such laws are
considering enacting them. 43
Moreover, those groups strongly opposed to repeal not only can
lobby effectively but also have many strong supporters in Congress.
The plight of the small businessman is a sympathetic one, likely to
take precedence over abstract benefits to consumers. Moreover, many
congressmen have a gut feeling, perhaps not articulated, that even if
Robinson-Patman does hurt competition and the consumer, its contri-
bution to the survival of small business is worth the costs. Finally, a
congressman knows that a vote against Robinson-Patman will gain
him no votes, and may instead lose him some. His next opponent is
sure to publicize his "sell out of the little guy to the big corporations."
Assuming that repeal is possible, has it any drawbacks? Most truly
predatory practices could presumably be attacked under section 2 of
the Sherman Act. 439 Nevertheless, some advise that caution should
prevail. For instance, one critic is concerned that a sudden outright
repeal of the secondary-line provision of the Act would
visit severe economic changes on smaller businesses which have
been created and nourished with the reasonable expectation of
Robinson-Patman shelter from the onslaughts of full-blown price
competition. It would be wrong to destroy those underpinnings in
one fell swoop, no matter how ineluctable the logic for repeal. 440
Another concern might be the effect repeal would have on the
Sherman Act. Although one critic who argues for repeal claims that
the Act's continued "existence provides a continuing impetus for the
'Robinson-Patmanization' of [the antitrust] laws,"' 441 repeal might
438. For instance, Vermont's legislature passed a resolution to initiate a study of
the desirability of enacting a price discrimination law. See 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
50,174, at 55,316 (1973).
439. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 151, at 726-28. Moreover, the extent to
which predatory pricing can be successfully undertaken is questionable. See Koller,
The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev.
No. 4, at 105 (1971). Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J.L. &
Econ. 259, 259-60 (1966).
440. Panel Discussion, 45 Antitrust L.J. 59, 61 (1976) (remarks of Greenberg).
441. Liebeler, supra note 6, at 19.
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paradoxically increase this danger. Robinson-Patman law as it exists
now at least is a discrete body of law confined to some extent by
narrow jurisdictional limits. 442 With repeal, there might be even more
pressure to expand section 2 into "a federal tort prohibiting unfair
[practices]." ' 443 Nor by any means is it certain that either precedent or
legislative history could prevent the courts from the expansion of the
"attempt" provision. 444
442. See supra text accompanying note 112.
443. Workshop III: Emerging Theories-Attack, Counterattack and Defense, 43
Antitrust L.J. 185, 200 (1973) (remarks of Spivack). At present § 2 of the Sherman
Act requires a specific intent to monopolize, see United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 105 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 814 (1946)-
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1304 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
431-32 (2d Cir. 1945), and a "dangerous probability" of success, Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); see Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons
Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269, 285 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973); Bernard
Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 912 (1970); but see Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.)
(dangerous probability of success is not an essential element of proof), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 993 (1964), including proof of a relevant market, see Walker Process
Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965), Acme
Precision Prods. v. American Alloys Corp., 484 F.2d 1237, 1240 (8th Cir. 1973);
Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walter-Hoeffer, 289 F. Supp. 550, 576-79 (D. Md. 1968);
but see Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474-75 (9th Cir.) (relevant market
is not in issue when the charge is an attempt to monopolize), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964). But these requirements are under attack. An Assistant Attorney General
was not speaking only for himself when he argued that "[t]o eliminate the 'dangerous
probability' and 'market' requirements from Section 2 attempt to monopolize cases
would make it a much more effective tool for dealing with indefensible single firm
conduct." Baker, Section 2 Enforcement-The View from the Trench, 41 Antitrust
L.J. 613, 620 (1972).
444. Two cases indicate the facility with which courts have disposed of unfavor-
able precedents and legislative history. In Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest,
1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,740 (N.D. Ind. 1976), the district court created out of
whole cloth a private right of action under § 5 of the FTC Act, despite direct
precedent denying such rights to both consumers and competitors. The judge's princi-
pal justification seemed to be that the effectiveness of FTC enforcement efforts was
"suspect" and because otherwise "[miost defrauded customers [would] have no rem-
edy at all." Id. at 68,177. The judge noted that "complaints of this nature have
become more frequent, [and yet] Congress has not seen fit to alter the basic statutory
plan." Id. Yet rather than see this congressional inaction to complaints as a constraint
on his action, he viewed it as the justification for it.
Another example is the Third Circuit opinion in NBO Industries Treadway Cos. v.
Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977). The
Court discussed the question of whether a private plaintiff had a right to seek
divestiture under § 7 of the Clayton Act. While the Third Circuit panel decided it did




Amendment has been the most widely recommended remedy for
the ill-effects of the Robinson-Patman Act. 445 From a political stand-
point, amendment seems more likely than repeal because a congress-
man can more easily justify a vote to "improve" the Act than a vote to
repeal it. In 1975, momentum for change had developed. 446 Today,
however, given the resemblance of some economic conditions to the
Depression which spawned the Act, whether anything can be accom-
plished is not clear.
Assuming that some form of amendment is possible, some factors
may nevertheless make such an effort unwise. First, once the amend-
ment process is begun, no change is guaranteed to be an improve-
ment. Any restrictive proposals will surely meet with counter-amend-
ments put forth by the Act's supporters. Who will win the day is
anyone's guess. 447 Past efforts to amend the Act may provide clues as
to what its supporters will introduce in the future. The Kefauver-
history from 1914, strong as it appears, should control the contemporary application
of a statute laying down a fundamental national economic policy.. . .There is a
danger in permitting the pronouncements of statesmen long deceased to control the
contemporary meaning of statutes which are almost an economic constitution for our
complex national economy." Id. at 278-79 (emphasis added). This rather frank
statement that the court would not feel bound by congressional intent was rightly
criticized in another opinion which noted "the Court's function is not to legislate."
Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 402 F. Supp. 636, 639 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). Unfortunately, what is unusual about these two opinions is not the disregard
of clear precedent and legislative history, but the candid acknowledgement that they
disregarded them.
445. See, e.g., Stigler Report, supra note 280, at x-8; Neat Report, supra note 80,
at 3, 9-10; C. Edwards, supra note 43, at 646; C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust
Policy: An Economic 'and Legal Analysis 47-48 (1959); Address by Thomas E.
Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Before the Annual Meeting of the New York
State Bar Association, at 9 (Antitrust Division) (Jan. 22, 1975); Keating, Myth,
Reality, and the Future of Antitrust, 24 A.B.A. Antitrust See. 59, 60-63 (1964);
Symposium, The Robinson-Patman Act: How-Not Whether-It Should be
Amended, 22 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 621, 621-24 (1967) (remarks of Howrey) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Symposium II].
446. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
447. As one commentator noted:
[W]e should all recognize that lawmaking is an uncertain business. Group
interests almost always come into conflict in committee hearing rooms.
Modifications and compromises are almost always made to win legislative
and executive approval. In distribution and marketing, trade associations,
in the wholesale and retail fields, have long been conspicuous in [their]
efforts to make the Robinson-Patman Act more rigid and inflexible. They
may try again to create a political struggle between big and little business
for which there is no real basis.
Howrey, supra note 147, at 624.
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Patman bills, for example, sought to curtail the meeting-competition
defense. 448 Some bills sought to declare "discriminatory" a seller's
failure to grant "functional" or "trade discounts" to wholesalers, 44
and others, to infer private remedies in connection with a broadened
ban on unduly "low" prices. 450
Second, assuming that a satisfactory amendment could be passed,
some think it would be difficult to make that amendment safe from
possible result-oriented or misconceived approaches by courts and the
Commission. 451 In today's climate of the "new economics," however,
this does not appear to be a legitimate cause for concern. Actually, the
supporters of Robinson-Patman have more to fear from some courts
and the Commission than do the critics. 452 Of course, in the future the
situation might be different. In any case, careful draftsmanship could
minimize much of what risk there is.
The final concern to be considered before the amendment process is
begun is the consequence that a failure to pass an amendment will
have on future attempts at improved enforcement. As Dean Neal
noted: "If an attempt were made . . .to stiffen the requirement of
adverse effect on competition and that were defeated, it isn't very
hard to imagine the use that might be made of that so-called legisla-
tive history [to counter] subsequent efforts to achieve the same result
by judicial construction. '453
448. See To Amend Section 2 of the Clayton Act: Hearings on H.R. 840, S. 11,
and S. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1956); To Amend Sections 2 and 3 of the
Clayton Act: Hearings on H.R. 11, H.R. 2611, H.R. 2690, H.R. 2850, H.R. 9487.
H.R. 89, H.R. 1840, H.R. 2577, and H.R. 8395 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-7 (1956).
449. See Functional Discounts: Hearings on H.R. 848, H.R. 927, H.R. 2788, H.R.
2868, and H.R. 4530 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1959); Functional Discounts: Hearings on H.R.
10,304, H.R. 10,305, H.R. 10,640, H.R. 10,999, and H.R. 11,409 Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4
(1958).
450. See Sales Below Cost: Hearings on H.R. 10,235 Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
451. One-time Chairman of the FTC Howrey, with regard to his proposed
amendment, stated:
[Elven if I were a skilled legislative draftsman and could put into statutory
form what I really mean to say, still I am cynical enough to doubt if it
would survive the ordeal of trial and error which it would face in the
Commission and before the courts ....
Howrey, supra note 147, at 623. Howrey was particularly concerned about the
"result-oriented" majority of the Warren Court, which he concluded would "decide
what they think the law ought to be as applied to the particular case and interpret
the amendment accordingly." Id.
452. See supra notes 239, 283-85, 319-26 and accompanying text.
453. Neal, supra note 80, at 58.
1202 [Vol. 51
ROBINSON-PA TMAN LAW
In evaluating the desirability of amendment, therefore, one must
consider whether the present Act and its case law are better than that
which may result from efforts to amend the Act. This evaluation will
depend on one's perception of the Act's present shortcomings and
future developments. For those critics of Robinson-Patman who advo-
cate amendment, presumably the gains are worth the risks.
How then should the three alternatives for change be evaluated?
Clearly, attempts at improved enforcement, while the least risky, also
provide for the least amount of change. Recent developments in the
enforcement area indicate, however, that even more effort might
provide effective change. Repeal, on the other hand, although it has
some risks, would provide the most effective change. But there is next
to no hope that it could be achieved. Finally, while amendment is the
most risky, it is more feasible than repeal, and if properly drafted,
would also be very effective. Still, it too is not very likely. In sum,
while the realistic hopes of Robinson-Patman critics appear to ride on
better enforcement, better enforcement cannot provide the effective
means to make the Act fully consistent with competitive principles.
Only through statutory amendment can this goal be achieved.
B. Amendment of the Robinson-Patman Act
This section does not attempt to draft specific provisions for a
proposed amendment of the Act. Instead, it generally sets forth pro-
posed changes and discusses why certain areas should remain un-
changed.
1. Methods of Enforcement
While many discussions have taken place on how to amend the
Act, 454 few have specifically focused on the methods of enforce-
ment. 455 The foregoing discussions have demonstrated, however, the
desirability of making statutory changes in enforcement methods.
First, the FTC should be relieved of its enforcement role. While its
present "non-enforcement" role is economically sound, and certainly
better than its previously misconceived enforcement policies, even this
FTC enforcement posture presents problems. Currently, for example,
the Commission all but ignores the complaints made by small busi-
nessmen of alleged Robinson-Patman violations. 45 6 This must be bit-
454. See, e.g., Stigler Report, supra note 280, at x-8; Neal Report, supra note 80;
C. Edwards, supra note 43, at 9-10; Campbell & Emanuel, supra note 385; Sympo-
sium II, supra note 445; Appendices A & B.
455. Kaysen and Turner devoted a chapter in their book to statutory changes with
respect to the methods of enforcement of the antitrust laws in general. C. Kaysen &
D. Turner, supra note 445, at 234-72.
456. See Recent Efforts Hearings [pt. I], supra note 7, at 53,457; id. [pt. II] at 21,
25, 67-68. See supra note 323.
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terly frustrating to the businessman who believes that he has been
wronged. Yet, on the other hand, to divert manpower to investigate
all such allegations would be a great waste of public funds. Moreover,
such investigations have a chilling effect on competition in those
markets. Finally, even if they are valid, to prosecute these minor
actions would serve no enforcement role beyond the interests of the
immediate participants. Thus, the dilemma is to choose between
wasting public resources to investigate all complaints and holding out
to the citizenry the misleading hope that a federal agency will look
into the smallest alleged infraction of the Act. Elimination of the FTC
from an enforcement role may solve this problem.
Moreover, some of the past efforts of the Commission have been
imbued not with basic antitrust principles but with regulatory and
truth-in-labeling principles. 457 The Department is not charged with
the same broad responsibilities in the statutes it must enforce that the
FTC has, and therefore this cross-pollination is less likely to occur as a
result of the Division's enforcement activities.
Dual enforcement of the Act by the FTC and the Antitrust Division
has served no good purpose in the past. Therefore, given the affirma-
tive reasons against it and the lack of good reasons for it, the FTC
enforcement role should be entirely eliminated.
Second, a section within the Department should be established to
deal exclusively with prosecution of Robinson-Patman actions. The
principal, if not only, function of this section should be to monitor
private actions, and participate in them as amicus curiae whenever it
is deemed appropriate by either the Division or the court.
Third, treble damages should be eliminated from private Robinson-
Patman actions. For the reasons discussed above, the "private attor-
ney general" is a myth. 45 8 Treble damages do not serve the stated
public policy goals, and in the context of the Robinson-Patman Act,
are basically unfair. The award of attorneys' fees and single damages
should be incentive enough to enable those with valid oauses of action
to sue without also enticing others to sue for windfall damages or
possible settlements.
2. Jurisdictional Requirements
The Act's jurisdictional requirements make its application more
restrictive than the other antitrust statutes. 459 And so it should be.
Price discrimination laws have not been demonstrated to be as valu-
able as other antitrust statutes, and clearly "most of [the reasons for
457. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 354-63 and accompanying text.
459. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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price discrimination] are related to the improved functioning of the
competitive system"; those that are not are "exceptional. ' 46 0 More-
over, the restrictive scope is a check against those interpretations of
the Commission and courts that are at odds with competitive goals.
In an effort at "logical tidiness and completeness,"' 46 1 the Neal
Report proposed both that the Act's interstate commerce requirement
be coextensive with that of the Clayton Act and that its coverage be
extended to include "the sale, lease, transfer or provision of any
commodity or service. ' 462 The Justice Department's "Robinson-Pat-
man Reform Act" likewise would change the interstate commerce
requirement, 46 3 and would also eliminate the requirement of two
complete sales, proposing the alternative triggering events of one sale
and one offer to sell at a different price. 4 4 Both proposals considerably
extend the jurisdictional scope of the Act, and while they may be
logical, the life of the law is not logic, but experience. And experience
indicates the requirements should remain as they are now. 465
The most drastic proposed change in the jurisdictional requirements
is contained in the Justice Department's "Predatory Practices Act. 466
This proposal eliminates the need for price discrimination altogether.
The proposal, which deals only with primary-line injury, attacks the
basis for finding injury in primary-line situations-the supposed subsi-
dization of a low price in one market or with one customer by a higher
price in another market or to another customer. In contrast to this
theory, which has never been shown to reflect commercial reality, the
Predatory Practices Act assumes first that the source of the financial
strength that supports predatory behavior is immaterial to the injury;
and second, that the injury results from the level of the price rather
than from a price differential. The consequence of eliminating the
price differential as an element of the offense is that the definition of
what constitutes a "predatory" practice or price becomes the all-
important inquiry. 467
460. Neal Report, supra note 80, at 18.
461. See Neal, supra note 80, at 58.
462. See Neal Report, supra note 80, at 18.
463. See Appendix B, § 13.
464. Id. § 9.
465. Even Dean Neal has noted that the addition of services to the Act's coverage
was a "dubious improvement." Neal, supra note 80, at 58.
466. See Appendix A.
467. The Predatory Practices Act is an innovative proposal that presents many
interesting questions. For the purposes of this discussion, however, a number of
general objections to its approach will suffice. First, it seeks to wipe the slate clean.
This, by itself, is not necessarily objectionable, but it means that good case law of the
past is thrown out with the bad. It creates uncertainty as to what the new statute
means until a significant body of case law has developed.
Second, the Act relies upon determinations of what is "predatory." As elaborate as
the definition is, the term inherently leaves some room for subjective interpretation
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3. Competitive-Injury Test
The main difficulty in any effort to amend the Robinson-Patman
Act is refocusing its concern on the protection of competition rather
than on the protection of competitors. One solution is to eliminate the
"injure, destroy, or prevent" clause of the injury-to-competition provi-
sion. Although this language does not specifically mention individual
competitors, courts have construed it as if it does. Thus, such a
deletion, made with unmistakably clear justifications set forth in the
congressional reports, would refocus the Act on competition gener-
ally. On the other hand, at this point in the development of Robinson-
Patman law, this might be a case of too little, too late. 468
Perhaps for this reason many of the proposals to revise the injury-to-
competition test have specifically limited the discretion of courts and
the Commission. An example is the Neal Report, which, with respect
to primary-line injury, recognized as actionable only geographic dis-
crimination, and would even limit that test to situations in which
there was below-cost pricing 469 and a showing that the discrimination
imminently threatened to eliminate a competitor whose survival is
significant to competition. Along the same lines, the Robinson-Pat-
man Reform Act requires that the sales be on a sustained basis as well
as at a price below cost.470
by the courts. The Neal Report correctly noted: "Interpretations of [predatory] intent
are particularly perilous in [Robinson-Patman] and, as illustrated by the Utah Pie
case, the concept may be manipulated to support improper results." Neal Report,
supra note 80, at 19.
Third, it is not clear why the Sherman Act could not deal with the specific
violations contained in the proposal. Finally, the Justice Department has added to
the pricing provision a general prohibition against threatening a competitor with any
form of physical or economic harm. This is an invitation for lawsuits that have little
to do with antitrust and that depend on allegations that, however unfounded, will
always get the plaintiff to the jury. It provides a perfect strike suit vehicle while not
answering any clear need.
468. Neal, supra note 80, at 54. Dean Neal noted:
It seems doubtful . . . that the mere elimination of the alternative test
would produce a sharp change in the application of the Act. I think we can
reasonably surmise that the Act will continue to have a life and momentum
of its own. There would be a considerable temptation to mold the lessening-
competition test in the shape of the Act's prior language and the decisions
that have put a gloss on that language. Those decisions, incidentally, do not
in any event seem to have depended too heavily on the protection-of-
competitors language of the present Act.
Id.
469. Below-cost pricing here is defined as that "less than the reasonably antici-
pated long-run average cost of serving those areas (including capital costs)." Neal
Report, supra note 80, at 18.
470. Below-cost pricing is defined here as "below the reasonably anticipated
average direct operating expense incurred in supplying the commodity." Appendix B,
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As to secondary-line injury, both the Neal Report and the Robinson-
Patman Reform Act would require that the discrimination be substan-
tial and either be part of a pattern that systematically favors large
firms over smaller ones or imminently threatens to eliminate one or
more competitors whose survival is significant to the maintenance of
competition.
While disagreement may exist over the proper definition of below-
cost pricing, 471 all the proposed provisions are better than the present
language and they all correctly seek to focus the act on competition
rather than on injury to competitors.
Some have questioned the need for a secondary-line provision at
all.47 - In order for any revision to realistically stand a chance for
passage, however, the Act must have one. Moreover, with proper
drafting the secondary-line provision can be limited to protect small
businesses only from truly predatory practices of sellers or large buy-
ers, to the extent that they really exist. 47 3 Such protection is a proper
goal, and if the proposed provision only serves to make clear this
policy perhaps that alone is enough to justify it.
4. Meeting-Competition Defense
Of course, if the injury-to-competition provisions are suitably re-
vised, the defenses will be less important. The meeting-competition
defense is just another way of stating that competition has not been
injured. 474
§ 3. Howrey would require a finding, based on "an inquiry into the discrimination's
business context and market effects, [that the purpose and probable effect of the
discrimination] may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce." Howrey, supra note 147, at 621.
471. Compare note 469, supra (Neal Report's definition of below-cost pricing)
with note 470, supra (tAobinson-Patman Reform Act's definition of below-cost pric-
ing). The Department's test, which is based on the Areeda-Turner approach, seems
to be preferable. It is the most restrictive of the various tests suggested, see supra
notes 160-61, and in the Robinson-Patman, non-monopolist seller situation this is
justifiable. The objection to the test usually focuses on application to a monopolist
seller, see, e.g., Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 869, 875-83 (1976), or to the failure to allow non-price or intent
information to be considered. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. As to the
latter, in the Robinson-Patman context such information merely diverts attention
from the economic merits of the transactions in question without adding much useful
information on the issue of injury-to-competition. For instance, using the invectives
of a sales manager to prove, inferentially, injury-to-competition is like using a half-
time locker-room talk to prove intent to murder the opposing team.
472. For example, the Predatory Practices Act, which is proposed to replace the
Robinson-Patman Act, has no secondary-line provision. See Appendix A.
473. The Department's Robinson-Patman Reform Act is such a proposal. See
supra note 471.
474. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court in Falls City Industries and A & P has led the
way to making the meeting-competition defense a valuable tool for
reconciling the Act with the competitive principles of antitrust. 475
Still, some issues need to be addressed in an amendment.
One is the still murky question of how a seller is to verify the lower
price of a competitor. The Supreme Court leaves this largely to the
"good faith" determination and the judgment of the trier of fact.4 76
Any revision should provide that absent a showing of the seller's bad
faith, a seller may rely upon whatever verification system will nor-
mally lead to a correct judgment about the buyer's representation of a
competitor's price offer. Also it should be made clear that there is no
requirement that a competitor's product meet the technical require-
ments of being of like grade and quality if such product competes with
the seller's product.
A troublesome issue is whether the competitor's price must be a
lawful one. If sellers are permitted to meet unlawful prices, without
limitation, it may be impossible to remedy an industry-wide pattern
of discrimination. The enforcement agencies or private plaintiff
would be compelled to identify the initiator of the pattern, a poten-
tially impossible task. Yet, if a seller is not permitted to meet unlawful
prices he is precluded from competing effectively at a time when he is
exposed to the worst kind of competitive assault. Both the Neal Report
and the Robinson-Patman Reform Act have proposed a solution: An
industry-wide pattern of discrimination, initiated by an unlawful
price, would be terminated through proceedings providing for pro-
spective relief only and in which substantially all of the firms practic-
ing the pattern of discrimination are joined.477 Although this solution
may not be entirely practicable, it seems preferable to prohibiting
altogether a seller from meeting an unlawful price.
5. Cost-Justification Defense
Revision of the cost-justification defense would require permitting
greater tolerance of approximations, reasonable estimates, and rea-
sonable classifications of customers. 478 This would allow price differ-
ences to reflect legitimate efficiencies. 479 Also important to the revision
of this defense would be an explicit overruling of the Commission's
ruling that only those costs saved by the seller, as opposed to costs
475. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
476. See supra text accompanying note 417.
477. See Neal Report, supra note 80, at 19-20; Appendix B, § 6.
478. Neal Report, supra note 80, at 10.
479. A good example of such a redrafting is contained in the Department's Robin-
son-Patman Act Reform Statute. Appendix B, § 7.
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incurred by buyers in operations such as servicing of retailers, are
legitimate. 4
0
The most innovative proposal, and one that would make the de-
fense much less technical, is that of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion. 41 It proposes the equivalent of the objective good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule proposed for the fourth amendment. A price
discrimination would be considered cost-justified if at the time of the
concession the seller maintained a "good faith belief based upon rea-
sonable evidence" that the concession was cost-justified. 4812
While this seems likely to change the present law considerably, the
trier of fact would still determine good faith. Considering the track
record in this regard with respect to the meeting-competition defense,
and the past inclination of some courts to find "predatory intent" at
the drop of a hat, some uncertainty would undoubtedly remain. Of all
the suggestions, however, this one would seem to be the most likely to
achieve the desired result of making the defense realistically available.
6. Changing-Conditions Defense
The changing-conditions defense should be maintained in its
present form. Congress should make clear, however, that contrary to
present restrictive interpretations, 483 the defense is not limited to those
examples given in the language of the Act. Moreover, Congress should
also renounce the FTC's restriction that a "pronounced and serious
deterioration or alteration in the market conditions" must exist, 48 4 and
declare that discounts on products prior to the introduction of a new
line of merchandise or on very slow moving merchandise are permissi-
ble.
7. Availability
Any revision should clearly indicate that if the goods or comparable
goods are available to the disfavored buyer at the favored price, no
480. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
Howrey would put the burden on the plaintiff to show that the discrimination
exceeded cost differences. His reason is interesting: "[I]f the government is required
to show a failure of cost justification as part of its prima facie case, the Commission
and the courts might quickly become less technical." Howrey, supra note 147, at 683.
Though one way to combat the hostility shown to the defense in the past, it neverthe-
less is better to place the burden on defendants who are in the best position to know
the costs of their own operations.
481. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1006, at A-10 (Mar. 19, 1981).
482. Id.
483. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
484. Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, 63 F.T.C. 1308, 1345 (1963), aff'd on other
grounds, 347 F.2d 785, 787 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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cause of action exists. If secondary-line provisions are to be justified,
they must apply only when the damage to the customer is a result of
the seller's discrimination. Moreover, the customer should not be
allowed to sue the seller if he could have obtained the goods from the
seller or someone else at the same price. Although this notion may be
implicit in the present Act, 485 making it explicit may be necessary. 40
8. Sections 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e)
There is wide agreement that sections 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e) should be
eliminated in their present form. 48 7 For the reasons discussed in the
applicable sections above, 488 this conclusion is reasonable. The only
unanswered question appears to be whether they should remain in
some form at all. Patchwork amendments to a statute build in years of
uncertainty as courts construe, and in some cases reconstruct, 48 9 them
case by case. The best solution therefore is complete repeal.
It could be argued that the judiciary has so softened the section 2(c)
per se proscriptions490 that it is worthwhile to retain it for its use
against dummy brokerage and corporate bribery. This argument is
not persuasive. First, the judiciary is not a harmonious whole, and
there is no guarantee how a particular court will treat actions under
section 2(c). The law of Robinson-Patman varies from court to court,
and, in extreme examples, even before the same judge.491 One cannot,
therefore, counsel clients with any confidence on the basis of a few
favorable precedents. 492 Second, even assuming the law was favorable
485. See Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1964).
486. See Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970). The court noted:
[A]vailability can have no place as a defense under the Robinson-Patman
Act .... To hold otherwise would be to make a farce of the Act and to put
a seller into the ludicrous position of being able to say, "If I have engaged in
illegal discrimination, what of it? You didn't have to buy your goods from
me."
Id. The result would only be "ludicrous" if price discrimination was a per se offense.
487. See, e.g., Neal Report, supra note 80, at 18; Justice Report, supra note 17, at
267-69; Greenberg, supra note 271, at 628; Robinson-Patman Act Reform Statute,
Appendix B.
488. See supra notes 219-85 and accompanying text.
489. For an example of such a reconstruction, see the Supreme Court's treatment
of bank mergers under § 7 of the Clayton Act and the Bank Merger Act of 1960 in
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-55 (1963). See Kintner &
Hansen, A Review of the Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 213,
226-31 (1972).
490. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
491. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
492. An example of a favorable precedent is Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo
Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17 (lst Cir. 1981).
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and clear, over time it could swing back to the per se approach.
Third, however deleterious the effects of dummy brokerage and cor-
porate bribery, they are problems that can be dealt with in a separate
statute, thereby preventing the per se approach from infecting the rest
of Robinson-Patman law. Finally, to the extent dummy brokerage is a
way for a seller to price cut without detection by competitors, it may
contribute to destabilizing prices, and should not be proscribed.
Therefore, section 2(a) should be adequate to deal with the alleged
abuses associated with the dummy brokerage.
A better case can be made for retaining something of sections 2(d)
and 2(e). Even though section 2(a) would prohibit payment for serv-
ices never performed by a customer, overpayment for such services,
and the shifting of promotional costs from the buyer to the seller, all
as direct or indirect price discriminations, it might be difficult to
apply those transactions against the cost of the goods to determine if
discrimination in price did exist, and if it did, to what degree. This
problem is not insurmountable, however. Unless the particular sellers
are irrational, they would utilize some method to determine how
much to provide the buyer in relation to his purchases. This should
provide a framework for the courts.
Supporters of Robinson-Patman argue that these sections are
important to effectuate the purpose of protecting the small business
and to give it a fair deal-an equal opportunity without regard to
competitive injury. 493 Although this idea is appealing on its face, the
record does not bear it out. In fact, it indicates the opposite.4 4 Yet,
even assuming that they do help small business, the sections could not
provide assistance great enough to consider retaining them in light of
the gross inefficiencies and harm they cause to normal marketing
practices. 49 5
9. Section 2(f)
Section 2(f) is likely to polarize the critics and supporters of Robin-
son-Patman. Those who favor promoting competition and economic
efficiency question the need for a buyer liability provision at all.
Those who favor protecting small business from the ravages of compe-
tition, and thereby ensuring its survival as an institution for its own
sake, realize the importance of the provision: It is the large buyer who
is most able to shake up a market and destabilize prices by inducing
price discriminations.
493. See H.R. Rep. No. 1738, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1976); Cohen, Let's Retain
It, 45 Antitrust L.J. 44, 49 (1976); Kintner, Henneberger & Fleischaker, Reform of
the Robinson-Patman Act: A Second Look, 21 Antitrust Bull. 203, 230-33 (1976).




The Justice Department's Robinson-Patman Reform Act does not
have a buyer liability provision. This is probably the best solution. It is
difficult to justify a provision that, even today, makes hard bargaining
suspect.
Nevertheless, if it is to be retained, some changes should be made.
The derivative nature of section 2(f) should be made explicit. This
would codify the holding in A&P that the "silent buyer" is not liable if
no section 2(a) violation occurred. 496 The "lying buyer" should also be
immune, given that the effect of his lie on competition is the same as
another's silence and that silence itself can be a lie. In any case, to
depend on a factual distinction between silence and lying in a trial
years after the incident is risky. Consequently, as a practical matter a
cautious buyer could never afford to be silent. Finally, the lying buyer
exception to derivative liability turns the proceeding into a morality
play, and diverts attention from the proper issue-harm to competi-
tion.
10. Section 3
Section 3 establishes criminal liability for charging unreasonably
low prices for products in different geographic locations "for the
purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor. '4 7 It
is misguided, 498 overly vague, 499 and has almost never been used. 500 It
should be eliminated.
11. Section 5 of the FTC Act
Section 5 has been used to fill the gaps in the Robinson-Patman
Act. 50 1 Any revision of the Act must be carefully drafted to, among
other things, restrict courts and the Commission from making undesir-
able interpretations. Yet even careful drafting would be for naught if
the Commission were able through this open-ended section to chal-
lenge any price discrimination that it deemed to be an unfair method
of competition. This section, a vehicle for bypassing the Act's com-
mands, should be eliminated through a specific provision such as the
ones contained in the Neal Report's draft502 or in the Department of
Justice's draft statutes. 50 3
496. See supra note 292.
497. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1976).
498. See F. Rowe, supra note 27, at 474.
499. Shniderman, supra note 385, at 154.
500. Id. at 151, 152 n.2.
501. See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
502. See Neal Report, supra note 80, at 21.
503. See Appendix B, § 10; Appendix A, § 8.
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CONCLUSION
The Robinson-Patman Act has been the subject of periodic debate.
Critics have found little, if anything, to praise, while supporters have
demonstrated unending loyalty to an Act they call the Magna Carta of
small business. Unfortunately, supporters have had more faith than
facts to support their position.
The Act was a bad seed introduced during the Great Depression-a
time of great despair in this country. When the country recovered, the
Act remained. Unlike other anticompetitive Depression-era legislation
which was weeded out, the Robinson-Patman Act was supported in
Congress and nourished by the FTC and the courts. Although it has
an antitrust facade, the Act to a large degree protects competitors
from competition.
Today its survival appears assured in a Congress in which the
influence of small business is strong, and in which consumer groups
have not pushed for change. The climate is different, however, in the
enforcement agencies and the courts. Justice Department efforts to
amend or repeal the Act and the new economics approach to the law
have helped to produce a "new skepticism." Few courts find that
defendants acted with predatory intent-a former Robinson-Patman
mainstay. The FTC and the Department decline to enforce the Act
with the zeal of nonbelievers. The Supreme Court, although declining
to reinterpret the Act to comport with the new economics, has expan-
sively construed the meeting-competition defense which may accom-
plish the same purpose.
The fundamental flaws in the Robinson-Patman Act require repeal
or amendment to remedy fully the Act's anticompetitive effects. The
Justice Department in 1975 was therefore correct. Yet it is clear that
the Act in its present form will be with us for some time. For the first
time in the Act's history, however, its critics may find more hope for
the future than its supporters. By the Act's golden anniversary the new






Be it enacted, etc., that this Act shall be known as "The Preda-
tory Practices Act of 1975."
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for the seller of a commodity engaged
in commerce overtly to threaten a competing or potential compet-
ing seller of the commodity with economic or physical harm, so as
to cause or induce the competing seller (a) to conform to pricing
policies favored by the seller; or (b) to cease or refrain from selling
any commodity to any particular customer; regardless of whether
any overt action is taken to fulfill such threat.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for a seller of a commodity, engaged
in commerce, knowingly to sell on a sustained basis such commod-
ity at a price below the reasonably anticipated average direct
operating expense incurred in supplying the commodity, where
such commodity is sold for use, consumption, or resale within the
United States, the District of Columbia, or any other territory
under the jurisdiction of the United States.
Sec. 4. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 3 that an
otherwise unlawful price:
(a) was charged by a person in order to meet in good faith an
equally low price of a competitor;
(b) was charged by a new entrant, a person having at the time of
sale a less than 10 percent share of the sales of the commodity in the
section of the country in which the commodity was sold at such
price being deemed a new entrant;
(c) was charged in response to changing conditions affecting the
market for or the marketability of the commodities involved, such
as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable
commodities, obsolescence of seasonal commodities, distress sales
under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of
business in the commodities concerned; or
(d) did not clearly threaten the elimination from a line of com-
merce of a competitor of the person charging the otherwise unlaw-
ful price.
Sec. 5. As used herein:
(a) "Commerce" shall have the same meaning as in Section 1 of
the Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730) commonly known as the
Clayton Act;
(b) "Price" shall mean the exaction of all consideration dimin-
ished by the granting of any brokerage, advertising, promotional,
or other allowance, or the furnishing of services or facilities;
(c) "Economic harm" shall include a reduction of revenues by
sales at a price below the direct operational expense incurred in
supplying the commodity, destruction of goodwill, and the with-
drawal of credit without cause from a person;
(d) "Physical harm" shall include (i) physical damage to or de-
struction of real property, plants, buildings, equipment or other
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physical assets of a business enterprise or of those individuals man-
aging, operating, owning or controlling a business enterprise, and
(ii) physical injury to or physical intimidation of individuals en-
gaged in managing, operating, owning or controlling a business
enterprise;
(e) "Direct operating expense" shall include only direct costs of
production and distribution associated with the particular sales of
the commodities in question and only the portion of costs of depre-
ciation, capital, leases of land and productive facilities, and gen-
eral overhead and advertising, the incurring of which vary directly
with the quantity of commodity which is produced; and
(f) "to sell on a sustained basis" shall mean to sell the commodity
in question for more than 60 days within a period of one year.
See. 6. Any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both.
Sec. 7. This Act shall be considered one of the "antitrust laws"
for the purposes of Section 1 of the Act of October 15, 1914 (38
Stat. 730). Provided, however, that this Act shall not be construed
to limit the applicability of such antitrust laws.
Sec. 8. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act shall not
be held to prohibit any discrimination in price for the sale of
commodities, or the receipt of any such discrimination.
See. 9. Section 2 of the Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730)
commonly known as the Clayton Act, as amended, and Sections 1
and 3 of the Act of June 19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1528) commonly known
as the Robinson-Patman Act, are hereby repealed. Any orders or
decrees entered pursuant to the sections enumerated in the pro-
ceeding sentence shall expire two years after the enactment of this
Act, or sooner if they so provide.
Sec. 10. The Federal Trade Commission is hereby empowered to
enforce the provisions of this Act as if they were provisions of the
Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730).
APPENDIX B
Robinson-Patman Act Reform Statute
(* denotes sections contained in Predatory Practices Act)
Be it enacted, etc., that this Act shall be known as "Price Dis-
crimination Act of 1975."
*Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for the seller of a commodity
engaged in commerce to overtly threaten a competing or potential
competing seller of the commodity with economic or physical
harm, so as to cause or induce the competing seller (a) to conform
to pricing policies favored by the seller or (b) to cease or refrain
from selling any commodity within a geographic area or to cease or
refrain from selling any commodity to any particular customer;
regardless of whether any overt action is taken to fulfill such threat.
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*Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for a seller of a commodity, engaged
in commerce, knowingly to sell on a sustained basis such commod-
ity at a price below the reasonably anticipated average direct
operating expense incurred in supplying the commodity, where
such commodity is sold for use, consumption, or resale within the
United States, the District of Columbia, or any other territory
under the jurisdiction of the United States.
*See. 4. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 3 that an
otherwise unlawful price:
(a) was charged by a person in order to meet in good faith an
equally low price of a competitor;
(b) was charged by a new entrant, a person having at the time of
sale a less than 10 percent share of the sales of the commodity in the
section of the country in which the commodity was sold at such
price being deemed a new entrant;
(c) was charged in response to changing conditions affecting the
market for or the marketability of the commodities involved, such
as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable
commodities, obsolescence of seasonal commodities, distress sales
under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of
business in the commodities concerned; or
(d) did not clearly threaten the elimination from a line of com-
merce of a competitor of the person charging the otherwise unlaw-
ful price.
See. 5. It shall be unlawful to discriminate either directly or
indirectly in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases in-
volved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such com-
modities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any
insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States, where:
(a) the recipient of the discrimination is in competition with
others not granted the discrimination, the discrimination is signifi-
cant in amount, and the discrimination is part of a pattern which
systematically favors larger recipients in the relevant line of com-
merce over their smaller competitors; or
(b) the recipient of the discrimination is in competition with
others not granted the discrimination, the discrimination is signifi-
cant in amount, and the discrimination clearly threatens to elimi-
nate from a line of commerce one or more competitors of the
recipient where the effect of such elimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce in any section of the country.
Sec. 6. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 5 that the
lesser price was charged in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor. Except in a suit seeking only prospective relief
against all or substantially all of the competitors practicing the
discrimination, the defense shall be allowed even if the equally low
exaction of a competitor is subsequently determined to be unlaw-
ful.
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Sec. 7. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 5 that the
lesser price makes an appropriate allowance for differences in the
cost of manufacture, distribution, sale, or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities involved in supplying the cus-
tomers in question. An allowance is appropriate where the differ-
ence in price does no more than approximate the difference in cost;
where the difference in price does not exceed a reasonable estimate
of the difference in cost; or where the estimated difference in cost is
the result of a reasonable system of classifying transactions which is
based on characteristics affecting cost of manufacture, distribution,
sale or delivery, under which differences in price among classes
approximate differences in cost.
Sec. 8. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 5 that: (i) the
lesser price was in response to changing conditions affecting the
market for or the marketability of the commodities involved, such
as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable
goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court
process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the
goods concerned; or (ii) the lesser price was available, on reasona-
bly practicable conditions, to the person allegedly discriminated
against.
Sec. 9. Nothing herein contained shall prevent any person from
refusing to deal with any person. An offer to deal only on discrimi-
natory terms shall, however, be treated as a completed transaction
for the purpose of according relief under this Act.
*Sec. 10. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act shall
not be held to prohibit any discrimination in price for the sale of
commodities, or the receipt of any such discrimination.
Sec. 11. An order or injunction issued to restrain or prohibit a
violation of Sections 5 through 9 shall remain in effect for a limited
time, stipulated at the time of entry, and reasonably related to the
nature of the violation. In no case shall an order issued to enforce
such sections remain in effect more than five years after the date of
entry.
*See. 12. Section 2 of the Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730)
commonly known as the Clayton Act, as amended, and Sections 1
and 3 of the Act of June 19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1528) commonly known
as the Robinson-Patman Act, are hereby repealed. Any orders or
decrees entered pursuant to the sections enumerated in the preced-
ing sentence shall expire two years after the enactment of this Act,
or sooner if they so provide.
*See. 13. As used herein:
(a) "Commerce" shall have the same meaning as in Section 1 of
the Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730) commonly known as the
Clayton Act;
(b) "Price" shall mean the exaction of all consideration dimin-
ished by the granting of any brokerage, advertising, promotional,
or other allowance, or the furnishing of services or facilities;
(c) "Economic harm" shall include a reduction of revenue by
sales at a price below the direct operating expense incurred in
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supplying the commodity, destruction of goodwill, or the with-
drawal of credit without cause from a person;
(d) "Physical harm" shall include (i) physical damage to or de-
struction of real property, plants, buildings, equipment or other
physical assets of a business enterprise or of those individuals man-
aging, operating, owning or controlling a business enterprise, and
(ii) physical injury to or physical intimidation of individuals en-
gaged in managing, operating, owning or controlling a business
enterprise;
(e) "Direct operating expense" shall include only direct costs of
production and distribution associated with the particular sales of
the commodities in question and only the portion of costs of depre-
ciation, capital, leases of land and productive facilities, and gen-
eral overhead and advertising, the incurring of which vary directly
with the quantity of the commodity which is produced; and
(f) "to sell on a sustained basis" shall mean to sell the commodity
in question for more than 60 days within a period of one year.
*Sec. 14. This Act shall be considered one of the "antitrust laws"
for the purposes of Section 1 of the Act of October 15, 1914 (38
Stat. 730). Provided however, that this Act shall not be construed
to limit the applicability of such antitrust laws.
*Sec. 15. Any person violating Sections 2 or 3 of this Act shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both.
*Sec. 16. The Federal Trade Commission is hereby empowered
to enforce the provisions of this Act as if they were provisions of the
Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730).
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